The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility (OXFORD HANDBOOKS SERIES)

The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on scholarship on this topic since 1960, with a focus on the past three decades. Articles address the nature of moral responsibility - whether it is fundamentally a matter of deserved blame and praise, or whether it is grounded anticipated good consequences, such as moral education and formation, or whether there are different kinds of moral responsibility. They examine responsibility for both actions and omissions, whether responsibility comes in degrees, and whether groups such as corporations can be responsible. The traditional debates about moral responsibility focus on the threats posed from causal determinism, and from the absence of the ability to do otherwise that may result. The articles in this volume build on these arguments and appraise the most recent developments in these debates. Philosophical reflection on the personal relationships and moral responsibility has been especially intense over the past two decades, and several articles reflect this development. Other chapters take up the link between blameworthiness and attitudes such as moral resentment and indignation, while others explore the role that forgiveness and reconciliation play in personal relationships and responsibility. The range of articles in this volume look at moral responsibility from a range of perspectives and disciplines, explaining how physics, neuroscience, and psychological research on topics such as addiction and implicit bias illuminate the ways and degrees to which we might be responsible. Contents 6 About the Contributors 10 General Introduction • Dana Kay Nelkin and Derk Pereboom 18 PART I: THEORIES OF RESPONSIBILITY 38 1. Instrumentalist Theories of moral Responsibility • Manuel Vargas 40 2. Reasons- Responsiveness, Frankfurt Examples, and the Free Will Ability • Michael McKenna 64 3. Attributionist Theories of Moral Responsibility • Matthew Talbert 90 PART II: KINDS OF RESPONSIBILITY 108 4. Accountability, Answerability, and Attributability: On Different Kinds of Moral Responsibility • Sofia Jeppsson 110 PART III: DIMENSIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY 126 5. Responsibility for Acts and Omissions • Randolph Clarke 128 6. Degrees of Responsibility • D. Justin Coates 148 7. Group Responsibility • Christian List 168 PART IV: DETERMINISM AND THE ABILITY TO DO OTHERWISE 192 8. Moral Responsibility, Alternative Possibilities, and Frankfurt Examples • Derk Pereboom 194 9. Manipulation Arguments Against Compatibilism • Derk Pereboom and Michael McKenna 216 PART V: SKEPTICISM 238 10. Illusionism • Saul Smilansky 240 11. Free Will Skepticism and Criminal Justice: The Public Health-Quarantine Model • Gregg D. Caruso 259 12. Metaskepticism • Tamler Sommers 284 PART VI: BLAME 304 13. Blame and Holding Responsible • Angela M. Smith 306 14. Responsibility and Reactive Attitudes • R. Jay Wallace 324 15. Response-Dependence Theories of Responsibility • David Shoemaker 341 PART VII: RESPONSIBILITY, KNOWLEDGE, AND CAUSATION 362 16. Ethics Is Hard! What Follows? On Moral Ignorance and Blame • Elizabeth Harman 364 17. Responsibility and Causation • Carolina Sartorio 385 PART VIII: RESPONSIBILITY, LAW, AND JUSTICE 400 18. Responsibility, Punishment, and Predominant Retributivism • David O. Brink 402 19. Legal Responsibility: Psychopathy, a Case Study • Elizabeth Shaw 425 20. Responsibility and Distributive Justice • Richard Arneson 449 PART IX: RESPONSIBILITY, NEUROSCIENCE, AND PSYCHOLOGY 468 21. Moral Responsibility and Neuroscience • Alfred R. Mele 470 22. Responsibility and Consciousness • Matt King and Peter Carruthers 485 23. Responsibility and Situationism • Brandon Warmke 505 24. Experimental Philosophy and Moral Responsibility • Gunnar Björnsson 531 PART X: RESPONSIBILITY, RELATIONSHIPS, AND MEANING IN LIFE 554 25. Moral Responsibility and Existential Attitudes • Paul Russell 556 26. Relationships and Responsibility • Dana Kay Nelkin 579 27. Responsibility, Personal Relationships, and the Significance of the Reactive Attitudes • Seth Shabo 603 28. Forgiveness • Per-Erik Milam 627 29. Reconciliation and the End of Responsibility • Linda Radzik 646 30. Responsibility and Religion • Daniel Speak 662 PART XI: CASE STUDIES 682 31. Moral Responsibility in the Context of Addiction • Doug McConnell 684 32. Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias and the Impact of Social Categorization • Maureen Sie 705 33. Skepticism about Evil: Atrocity and the Limits of Responsibility • Dominic Murphy and John M. Doris 734 Index 764 The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on scholarship on this topic since 1960, with a focus on the past three decades. Articles address the nature of moral responsibility - whether it is fundamentally a matter of deserved blame and praise, or whether it is grounded anticipated good consequences, such as moral education and formation, or whether there are different kinds of moral responsibility. They examine responsibility for both actions and omissions, whether responsibility comes in degrees, and whether groups such as corporations can be responsible.The traditional debates about moral responsibility focus on the threats posed from causal determinism, and from the absence of the ability to do otherwise that may result. The articles in this volume build on these arguments and appraise the most recent developments in these debates. Philosophical reflection on the personal relationships and moral responsibility has been especially intense over the past two decades, and several articles reflect this development. Other chapters take up the link between blameworthiness and attitudes such as moral resentment and indignation, while others explore the role that forgiveness and reconciliation play in personal relationships and responsibility. The range of articles in this volume look at moral responsibility from a range of perspectives and disciplines, explaining how physics, neuroscience, and psychological research on topics such as addiction and implicit bias illuminate the ways and degrees to which we might be responsible. "The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on scholarship on this topic since 1960, with a focus on the past three decades. Articles address the nature of moral responsibility-whether it is fundamentally a matter of deserved blame and praise; or whether it is grounded anticipated good consequences, such as moral education and formation; or whether there are different kinds of moral responsibility. They examine responsibility for both actions and omissions, whether responsibility comes in degrees, and whether groups such as corporations can be responsible. The traditional debates about this issue focus on threats to moral responsibility from causal determinism, and from the absence of the ability to do otherwise that may result; and articles in the volume appraise the most recent developments in these debates. They also discuss how physics, neuroscience, and psychological research on topics such as addiction and implicit bias illuminate the ways and degrees to which we might be responsible. Philosophical reflection on the personal relationships and moral responsibility has been especially intense over the past two decades, and a number of articles reflect this development. Blameworthiness is often linked to attitudes such as moral resentment and indignation, and the role of these attitudes in relationships is explored. Forgiveness and reconciliation also have an important role in personal relationships, and articles in the volume explore these responsibility-related notions"-- Provided by publisher ## Abstract The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility is a collection of 33 articles by leading international scholars on the topic of moral responsibility and its main forms, praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. The articles in the volume provide a comprehensive survey on scholarship on this topic since 1960, with a focus on the past three decades. Chapters address the nature of moral responsibility—whether it is fundamentally a matter of deserved blame and praise; or whether it is grounded anticipated good consequences, such as moral education and formation; or whether there are different kinds of moral responsibility. They examine responsibility for both actions and omissions, whether responsibility comes in degrees, and whether groups such as corporations can be responsible. The traditional debates about this issue focus on threats to moral responsibility from causal determinism, and from the absence of the ability to do otherwise that may result; and chapters in the volume appraise the most recent developments in these debates. They also discuss how physics, neuroscience, and psychological research on topics such as addiction and implicit bias illuminate the ways and degrees to which we might be responsible. Philosophical reflection on personal relationships and moral responsibility has been especially intense over the past two decades, and a number of chapters reflect this development. Blameworthiness is often linked to attitudes such as moral resentment and indignation, and the role of these attitudes in relationships is explored. Forgiveness and reconciliation also have an important role in personal relationships, and chapters in the volume explore these responsibility-related notions.