The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism (OXFORD HANDBOOKS SERIES)

"This handbook contains thirty-two previously unpublished contributions to consequentialist ethics by leading scholars, covering what's happening in the field today as well as pointing to new directions for future research. Consequentialism is a rival to such moral theories as deontology, contractualism, and virtue ethics. But it's more than just one rival among many, for every plausible moral theory must concede that the goodness of an act's consequences is something that matters even if it's not the only thing that matters. Thus, all plausible moral theories will accept both that the fact that an act would produce good consequences constitutes a moral reason to perform it and that the better that act's consequences the moral reason there is to perform it. Now, if this is correct, then much of the research concerning consequentialist ethics is important for ethics in general. For instance, one thing that consequentialist researchers have investigated is what sorts of consequences matter: the consequences that some act would have or the consequences that it could have-if, say, the agent were to follow up by performing some subsequent act. And it's reasonable to suppose that the answer to such questions will be relevant for normative ethics regardless of whether the goodness of consequences is the only thing matters (as consequentialists presume) or just one of many things that matter (as non-consequentialists presume)"-- Provided by publisher Cover The Oxford Handbook of Consequentialism Copyright Contents Contributors Chapter 1: Introduction 1. Trying to Define Consequentialism 2. The Importance of Consequentialism 3. A Very Brief Overview of This Volume References Part I: Foundational Issues Chapter 2: ConsequentIalizing 1. Introduction 2. Traditional Agent-Neutral Consequentializing 3. The Consequentializing Argument for Consequentialism 4. The Consequentialist Argument for Consequentializing 5. Against the Consequentialist Argument for Consequentializing 6. Conclusion Chapter 3: Relativized Rankings 1. Agent-Relativity 1.1. Agent-Relative Rules and Theories 1.2. Agent-Relative Rankings 2. Other Kinds of Relativized Rankings 2.1. Time-Relativity 2.2. Location-Relativity and World-Relativity 2.3. Patient-Relativity 2.4. Combining Relativities 3. The Debate on Relativizing 3.1. The Incoherence Argument 3.2. Theoretical Arguments References Chapter 4: Fault Lines in Ethical Theory 1. Introduction 2. Deontic Constraints and Options 2.1. Dimensions of Importance 2.2. Assumptions about Goodness 2.3. There Are No Deep Fault Lines on Neutral Grounds 2.3.1. A Fault Line on Neutral Grounds 2.3.2. Impossibility and Modesty 3. Structural Descriptions of Cases and Standard Consequentialism 3.1. The Logical Structure of Cases 3.2. Standard Consequentialism and the Ubiquity of Fault Lines 3.3. Nonneutral Grounds 3.4. Modest Grounds 3.5. Depth 4. Further Dimensions of Depth 4.1. Basic Resources 4.2. Generalizing 4.3. Some Relations between the Choice Points and Fault Lines 4.4. Further Generalizations 4.5. The Principles 5. Conclusion Appendix References Chapter 5: Consequences 1. The Significance of Consequences 2. Theories of the Consequence Relation 2.1. The Moralized Approach 2.2. A Traditional Approach 3. Concerns about the Traditional Approach 3.1. Why a Causal Relation? 3.2. Why the Act Itself? 4. Reconsidering the Difference Made 5. Overinclusivity: Part I 6. Overinclusivity: Part II 7. Same Consequences 8. Conclusion: Is This Really What We Care about? References Chapter 6: Alternatives 1. Introduction 1.1. Multiple Versions of Acts 1.2. Co-temporal Acts 1.3. Sequences of Acts 2. Constraints on Solutions 3. The Structure of Human Action 4. Three Proposals for Identifying an Agent’s Alternatives 4.1. Proposal I: Bottom-most Acts as Alternatives 4.2. Proposal II: Highest Normatively Significant Act Tokens as Alternatives (Highest) 4.3. Proposal III: Act Trees as Alternatives (Trees) 5. Relation between the Normative Status of an Act Tree and the Normative Status of Its Component Acts 5.1. Possible Relations between Normative Properties of Act Trees and Those of Their Component Act Tokens 5.2. Addressing the Traditional Problem Created by Multiple Act Versions 6. Conclusion References Chapter 7: Actualism, Possibilism, and the Nature of Consequentialism 1. Introduction 2. Consequentialism and Deontic Logic 3. Time’s Relationship to Abilities and Obligations 4. Possibilism 5. Actualism 6. Securitism 7. The Nonratifiability Problem 8. Hybridism 9. Conclusion References Chapter 8: Consequentialism, Blame, and Moral Responsibility 1. Consequentialist Accounts of Moral Responsibility 2. Blameless Wrongdoing 3. Moral Responsibility Constrained Accounts of Consequentialism 4. Conclusion References Chapter 9: Consequentialism and Reasons for Action 1. Reasons for Action 2. Act Consequentialism 3. Indirect Consequentialism 4. Consequentialism and Constraints 5. How Do Reasons Interact? 6. Conclusion References Chapter 10: What Should a Consequentialist Promote? 1. Introduction 2. Intrinsic Value—A Preliminary Point 2.1. Should a Consequentialist Be a Monist or a Pluralist? 2.2. Should a Consequentialist Be a Welfarist or Nonwelfarist? 2.3. Which Value? 3. How Does Pleasure Resonate? 4. Why Not Hedonism? 5. Conclusion References Part II: Objections Chapter 11: Understanding the Demandingness Objection 1. Getting the Feel of the Demandingness Objection 2. Traditional Lines of Defense from the Objection 3. The Ambitions of the Demandingness Objection 4. Toward Understanding the Demandingness Objection 5. Potential Problems for Understandings of Which Costs Are Especially Demanding 6. Which Costs Are Especially Demanding? 7. Conclusion Chapter 12: Consequentialism and Partiality 1. Introduction 2. The Objection from Partiality 3. The Strategic Response to the Objection from Partiality 4. Indirect Consequentialism 5. Consequentialism and Intimacy 6. The Moral and Rational Significance of Intimacy References Chapter 13: Must I Benefit Myself? 1. Motive Consequentialism 2. Nonmaximization Strategies 3. Special Relationships 4. Demandingness 5. Dual-Ranking Consequentialism 6. Conclusion: Self, Other, and Directed Options Chapter 14: Supererogation and Consequentialism 1. Introduction 2. The Problem for Consequentialism 3. Rejecting Supererogation 4. Satisficing Consequentialism 5. Dual-Ranking Consequentialism 6. Reinterpreting Supererogation 7. Indirect Consequentialism 8. Concluding Remarks References Chapter 15: Consequentialism and Promises 1. Introduction: Framing the Debate 2. Straightforward Act Consequentialist Accounts 3. Criticisms of Straightforward Act Consequentialist Accounts 3.1. Counterexample Cases of Inappropriate Promise-Breaking 3.1.1. Consequentialist Responses 3.1.2. Are Our Intuitions about Cases Reliable? 3.1.3. Underlying Theoretical Disputes 3.2. Are Act Consequentialist Theories Circular? 3.3. Do Act Consequentialist Accounts Prove Too Much? 4. Alternate Act Consequentialist Accounts 4.1. Multiple Intrinsic Goods 4.2. Directedness and Agent-Relative Values 5. Rule Consequentialist Accounts of Promising 6. Criticisms of Rule Consequentialist Accounts 6.1. Avoiding Collapse 6.2. A Challenge for Hooker’s Account 7. Upshots and Future Directions References Chapter 16: Consequentialism, Ignorance, and Uncertainty 1. Introduction 2. Background Assumptions 3. Empirical Uncertainty 4. The Rationality Account Applied to Empirical Uncertainty Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 5. Evaluative Uncertainty 6. The Rationality Account Applied to Evaluative Uncertainty 7. Uncertainty for Nonconsequentialists 8. Concluding Remarks References Chapter 17: Consequentialism and Action Guidingness 1. A Simple Example to Set the Scene 2. A Medical Example 3. Are We Being Too Kind to Mistaken Agents? 4. Compound Actions 5. Mill and Sidgwick 6. The “It’s Too Demanding” Objection to Consequentialism References Chapter 18: Consequentialism and Indeterminacy 1. Outcomes 2. Conditional Indeterminacy 3. Accommodating Conditional Indeterminacy 4. What If Causation Matters? 5. What Makes Some Worlds Closer Than Others? 6. What If There Are No Conditional Probabilities? 7. Moving Forward References Chapter 19: Value Comparability 1. Introduction 2. Challenging Interpersonal Aggregation 3. The Challenge of Value Incommensurability 4. Conclusion Chapter 20: Consequentialism, the Separateness of Persons, and Aggregation 1. Utilitarianism and Consequentialism 2. The Separateness of Persons 3. Assessing the Critique of Utilitarianism and Consequentialism 4. Assessing Pairwise Comparison and Anti-Aggregation 5. Unrestricted Aggregation? 6. A Sorites Argument for Unrestricted Aggregation 7. A Transitivity Argument for Unrestricted Aggregation 8. Concluding Remarks References Chapter 21: The Alienation Objection to Consequentialism 1. Alienation 2. The Alienation Challenge Facing Consequentialist Theories 3. Some Alternative Consequentialist Strategies 3.1. Hybrid Theories 3.2. Relative Value Theories 3.3. Global Consequentialism 4. Leveled Consequentialism 4.1. Characterization of Leveled Consequentialism 4.1.1. The Collapse Objection 4.1.2. The Higher-Level Alienation Objection 4.1.3. The Moral Self Objection 5. Conclusion References Part III: Forms and Limits Chapter 22: Global Consequentialism 1. Introduction 2. Consequentialist Treatments of Decision Procedures and Motives 3. Global Consequentialism 3.1. Axiological and Deontic Assessment 3.2. Roles 3.3. Formulating Global Consequentialism 3.4. The Incorrect Verdicts Objection, Again 4. The Inconsistency Objection 4.1. A First Pass 4.2. Making the Inconsistency Objection Precise 4.3. Actualism, Possibilism, and the Inconsistency Objection 5. Advantages of Global over Act Consequentialism Acknowledgments References Chapter 23: The Role(s) of Rules in Consequentialist Ethics 1. The Good 2. Actual versus Expected Value 3. The Role of Rules as a Moral Decision Procedure 4. Rules as Part of the Criterion of Moral Rightness? 5. A Problem with Having the Decision Procedure and the Criterion of Rightness Conflict 6. Is Taking Rules To Be Part of the Criterion of Rightness a Mistake? 7. Recent Developments of Rule Consequentialism References Chapter 24: Consequentialism, Virtue, and Character 1. Virtue Theory and Virtue Ethics 2. How Would One Develop a Consequentialist Virtue Ethics? References Chapter 25: Population Ethics, the Mere Addition Paradox, and the Structure of Consequentialism 1. Introduction 2. The Basic Maximizing Idea and Three Structural Issues 2.1. Basic Maximizing Idea 2.2. Which Way to Calculate When Things Are Better for People? 2.3. Which Class of People Does It Make Things Better to Make Things Better for? 2.4. Which Betterness-For Facts Have Moral Significance? 3. The Mere Addition Paradox 3.1. The Mere Addition Case and the All-Critical Mere Addition Principle (MAP) 4. Options for Resolving the Mere Addition Paradox 4.1. Rejecting Premise That A+ Isn’t Worse Than A 4.1.1. MAP and Pareto Plus 4.1.2. Averagism as a Basis for Rejecting MAP 4.1.3. Person-Based Approach as a Basis for Rejecting MAP 4.2. Rejecting Premise That B Is Worse Than A 4.2.1. Totalism as a Basis for Rejecting Claim That B Is Worse Than A 4.3. Rejecting Premise That B Is Better Than A+ 4.4. Rejecting Transitivity 5. Conclusion References Chapter 26: Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good 1. Introduction 2. Maximizing 3. Scalar Consequentialism 3.1. Practical Guidance 4. Satisficing 4.1. Gratuitious Suboptimality 4.2. Arbitrariness 4.3. Options without Constraints 5. Reconciliation 5.1. Deontic Monism 5.2. Deontic Pluralism References Chapter 27: Conflicts and Cooperation in Act Consequentialism 1. Conjunction Problems and Self-Defeat 2. Cooperation 3. Novel Cooperation References Part IV: Policy, Practice, and Social Reform Chapter 28: The Science of Effective Altruism 1. Utilitarianism and Effective Altruism 2. The Structural Objection 3. Effective Altruism without Utilitarianism 4. Scientific Utilitarianism 5. Summary Acknowledgments References Chapter 29: Effective Altruism: A Consequentialist Case Study 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. Chapter 30: Consequentialism and Nonhuman Animals 1. Introduction 2. Background 2.1. Situating Animals in Consequentialist Theory 2.2. Sophisticated Consequentialism 3. Farmed Animals and the Logic of the Larder 3.1. Background 3.2. The Individual Effects of Animal Exploitation 3.3. The Social Effects of Animal Exploitation 4. Wild Animals and the Logic of the Logger 4.1. Background 4.2. The Individual Effects of Animal Extermination 4.3. The Social Effects of Animal Extermination 5. Conclusion: Future Technology, Future Directions References Chapter 31: Public Policy, Consequentialism, the Environment, and Nonhuman Animals 1. Consequentialism and the Environment 2. Standard Policy Analysis 2.1. Impact Assessment in Standard Policy Analysis 2.2. Axiology in Standard Policy Analysis: Anthropocentric Valuation Based on Human Preferences 2.2.1. Valuation of Impacts in Standard Policy Analysis 2.2.2. Social Welfare Functions in Standard Policy Analysis 2.2.3. Enlightened Standard Policy Analysis 3. Critiques of Standard Policy Analysis 3.1. Is Standard Policy Analysis Inadequate If the Preference-Satisfaction View Is Not Ultimately Correct? 3.2. A Fruitful Approach to Improving Policy Analysis 3.3. A Fundamental Problem with Standard Policy Analysis: Anthropocentrism 3.3.1. The Challenge of Interspecies Comparisons 3.3.2. A Method for Quantifying Animal Welfare and Making Interspecies Comparisons 3.3.3. Estimates of Optimal Tradeoff Rates between Humans and Animals, and the Repugnant Conclusion 4. Conclusion: A Perspective on Consequentialism and Policy Analysis References Chapter 32: The Love–Hate Relationship between Feminism and Consequentialism 1. Introduction 2. The Historical Connection 3. Feminist Criticisms of Consequentialist Moral Reasoning 4. Feminist Objections to Consequentialism and Right Action References Chapter 33: Act Consequentialism and the No-Difference Challenge 1. Introduction 2. Causation 3. The No-Difference Challenge in Moral Philosophy 4. The No-Difference Challenge in Climate Ethics 5. (Further) Solutions to the No-Difference Challenge 6. Conclusion References Index Consequentialism is a major moral theory in contemporary philosophy: it is the view that the only thing that matters when making moral decisions is the outcome of those decisions. Consequentialists hold that to morally assess an act, we must first evaluate and rank the various ways that things could turn out depending on whether it or some alternative act is performed. Whether we should perform that act thus depends on how its outcome ranks relative to those of its alternatives. Consequentialism rivals deontology, contractualism, and virtue ethics, but, more importantly, it has influenced contemporary moral philosophy such that the consequentialist/non-consequentialist distinction is one of the most central in normative ethics. After all, every plausible moral theory must concede that the goodness of an act's consequences is something that matters, even if it's not the only thing that matters. Thus, all plausible moral theories will accept that both 1) an act's producing good consequences constitutes a moral reason to perform it, and 2) the better its consequences, the more of a moral reason there is to perform it. In this way, much of consequentialist ethical theory is important for normative ethics in general. This Oxford Handbook contains thirty-two previously unpublished contributions by top moral philosophers examining the current state of play in consequentialism and pointing to new directions for future research. The volume is organized into four major sections: foundational issues; objections to consequentialism; its forms and limits; and consequentialism's implications for policy, practice, and social reform. Consequentialism is a major moral theory in contemporary philosophy: it is the view that the only thing that matters when making moral decisions is the outcome of those decisions. Consequentialists hold that to morally assess an act, we must first evaluate and rank the various ways that things could turn out depending on whether it or some alternative act is performed. Whether we should perform that act thus depends on how its outcome ranks relative to those of its alternatives. Consequentialism rivals deontology, contractualism, and virtue ethics, but, more importantly, it has influenced contemporary moral philosophy such that the consequentialist/non-consequentialist distinction is one of the most central in normative ethics. After all, every plausible moral0theory must concede that the goodness of an act's consequences is something that matters, even if it's not the only thing that matters. Thus, all plausible moral theories will accept that both 1) an act's producing good consequences constitutes a moral reason to perform it, and 2) the better its consequences, the more of a moral reason there is to perform it. In this way, much of consequentialist ethical theory is important for normative ethics in general. 0This Oxford Handbook contains thirty-two previously unpublished contributions by top moral philosophers examining the current state of play in consequentialism and pointing to new directions for future research. The volume is organized into four major sections: foundational issues; objections to consequentialism; its forms and limits; and consequentialism's implications for policy, practice, and social reform This handbook contains thirty-two previously unpublished contributions to consequentialist ethics by leading scholars, covering what's happening in the field today as well as pointing to new directions for future research. Consequentialism is a rival to such moral theories as deontology, contractualism, and virtue ethics. But it's more than just one rival among many, for every plausible moral theory must concede that the goodness of an act's consequences is something that matters even if it's not the only thing that matters. Thus, all plausible moral theories will accept both that the fact that an act would produce good consequences constitutes a moral reason to perform it and that the better that act's consequences the greater the moral reason there is to perform it Consequentialism is a major moral theory and a rival to such non-consequentialist theories as deontology, contractualism, and virtue ethics. It is the view that the only thing that matters morally is the consequences of an action. Thus, consequentialists hold that, to assess an act, we must first evaluate and rank the various ways things could turn out depending on whether it or some alternative act is performed. Its moral permissibility, then, depends on how itsconsequences compare to those of its alternatives on this ranking. This Handbook contains thirty-two previously unpublished contributions by leading scholars, covering the state of the art in consequentialist theory as well as pointing to new directions for future research