The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: The Ottoman Empire and the First World War [Cambridge Military Histories Ser.]

"Why did the Ottoman Empire enter the First World War in late October 1914, months after the war's devastations had become clear? Were its leaders 'simple-minded, ' 'below-average' individuals, as the doyen of Turkish diplomatic history has argued? Or, as others have claimed, did the Ottomans enter the war because War Minister Enver Pasha, dictating Ottoman decisions, was in thrall to the Germans and to his own expansionist dreams? Based on previously untapped Ottoman and European sources, Mustafa Aksakal's dramatic study challenges this consensus. It demonstrates that responsibility went far beyond Enver, that the road to war was paved by the demands of a politically interested public, and that the Ottoman leadership sought the German alliance as the only way out of a web of international threats and domestic insecurities, opting for an escape whose catastrophic consequences for the empire and seismic impact on the Middle East are felt even today."--Publisher's description Half-title......Page 3 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Dedication......Page 7 Contents......Page 9 Acknowledgments......Page 10 Author's note......Page 12 Abbreviations......Page 14 Glossary......Page 15 Maps......Page 17 Introduction: pursuing sovereignty in the age of imperialism......Page 19 1 The intellectual and emotional climate after the Balkan Wars......Page 37 The Ottoman Empire and the international order......Page 39 “National struggle” and the mobilization of society......Page 47 The journal Büyük Duygu (The Great Yearning)......Page 54 2 1914: war with Greece?......Page 60 3 The Ottoman Empire within the international order......Page 75 The role of Germany......Page 80 The Russian reform proposal for eastern Anatolia......Page 90 The Ottomans in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars......Page 95 The German military mission......Page 98 Russian challenge and Ottoman response......Page 101 German–Ottoman alliance negotiations during the July Crisis......Page 111 The signing of the German–Ottoman alliance, August 2, 1914......Page 120 Alliance and mobilization......Page 122 The arrival of the SMS Goeben and the SMS Breslau......Page 128 5 Tug of war: Penelope's game......Page 137 The endangered alliance......Page 153 The first German–Ottoman crisis over Ottoman intervention, August 19–22......Page 155 Between neutrality and alliance......Page 159 The German "no" to Ottoman requests for military aid, September 10, 1914......Page 165 6 Salvation through war?......Page 171 The second German–Ottoman crisis over Ottoman intervention, September 14–22......Page 174 Alliance or neutrality?......Page 181 The naval attack on Russia, October 27–31, 1914......Page 196 Intervention and its impact on German–Ottoman relations......Page 200 Conclusion: the decision for war remembered......Page 206 German......Page 213 II. Published Documents and Official Histories......Page 215 III. Contemporary Publications and Memoirs......Page 216 IV. Secondary Sources......Page 218 Index......Page 226 "Why did the Ottoman Empire enter the First World War in late October 1914, months after the war's devastations had become clear? Were its leaders 'simple-minded, ' 'below-average' individuals, as the doyen of Turkish diplomatic history has argued? Or, as others have claimed, did the Ottomans enter the war because War Minister Enver Pasha, dictating Ottoman decisions, was in thrall to the Germans and to his own expansionist dreams? Based on previously untapped Ottoman and European sources, Mustafa Aksakal's dramatic study challenges this consensus. It demonstrates that responsibility went far beyond Enver, that the road to war was paved by the demands of a politically interested public, and that the Ottoman leadership sought the German alliance as the only way out of a web of international threats and domestic insecurities, opting for an escape whose catastrophic consequences for the empire and seismic impact on the Middle East are felt even today."-- Résumé de l'éditeur "Why did the Ottoman Empire enter the First World War in late October 1914, months after the war's devastations had become clear? Were its leaders "simple minded," "below-average" individuals, as the doyen of Turkish diplomatic history has argued? Or, as others have claimed, did the Ottomans enter the war because War Minister Enver Pasha, dictating Ottoman decisions, was in thrall to the Germans and to his own expansionist dreams? Based on previously untapped Ottoman and European sources, Mustafa Aksakal's study challenges this consensus. It demonstrates that responsibility went far beyond Enver, that the road to war was paved by the demands of a politically interested public, and that the Ottoman leadership sought the German alliance as the only way out of a web of international threats and domestic insecurities, opting for an escape whose catastrophic consequences for the empire and seismic impact on the Middle East are felt even today."--Jacket. Introduction: pursuing sovereignty in the age of imperialism The intellectual and emotional climate after the Balkan Wars 1914 : war with Greece? The Ottomans within the international order The great war as great opportunity : the Ottoman July crisis Tug of war : Penelope's game Salvation through war? Conclusion : the decision for war remembered. This study shows that responsibility for the Ottoman Empire entering the First World War went far beyond War Minister Enver Pasha. It also shows that the road to war was paved by the demands of a politically interested public, and that the Ottoman leadership sought the German alliance as a way out of a web of international threats