The Origins of Liberty : Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World

Why would sovereigns ever grant political or economic liberty to their subjects? Under what conditions would rational rulers who possess ultimate authority and who seek to maximize power and wealth ever give up any of that authority? This book draws on a wide array of empirical and theoretical approaches to answer these questions, investigating both __why__ sovereign powers might liberalize and __when__. The contributors to this volume argue that liberalization or democratization will only occur when those in power calculate that the expected benefits to them will exceed the costs. More specifically, rulers take five main concerns into account in their cost-benefit analysis as they decide to reinforce or relax controls: personal welfare, personal power, internal order, external order, and control over policy--particularly economic policy. The book shows that repression is a tempting first option for rulers seeking to maximize their benefits, but that liberalization becomes more attractive as a means of minimizing losses when it becomes increasingly certain that the alternatives are chaos, deposition, or even death. Chapters cover topics as diverse as the politics of seventeenth-century England and of twentieth-century Chile; why so many countries have liberalized in recent decades; and why even democratic governments see a need to reduce state power. The book makes use of formal modeling, statistical analysis, and traditional historical analysis. The contributors are Paul Drake, Stephen Haggard, William Heller, Robert Kaufman, Phil Keefer, Brian Loveman, Mathew McCubbins, Douglass North, Ronald Rogowski, and Barry Weingast. Why Would Sovereigns Ever Grant Political Or Economic Liberty To Their Subjects? Under What Conditions Would Rational Rulers Who Possess Ultimate Authority And Who Seek To Maximize Power And Wealth Ever Give Up Any Of That Authority? This Book Draws On A Wide Array Of Empirical And Theoretical Approaches To Answer These Questions, Investigating Both Why Sovereign Powers Might Liberalize And When. The Origins Of Liberty / Paul W. Drake And Matthew D. Mccubbins -- Limited Government And Liberal Markets : An Introduction To Constitutions And Commitment / Douglass C. North And Barry R. Weingast -- Constitution And Commitment : The Evolution Of Institutions Governing Public Choice In Seventeenth Century England / Douglass C. North And Barry R. Weingast -- Democracy, Capital, Skill, And Country Size : Effects Of Asset Mobility And Regime Monopoly On The Odds Of Democratic Rule / Ronald Rogowski -- The International Causes Of Democratization, 1974-1990 / Paul W. Drake -- The Political Economy Of Authoritarian Withdrawals / Stephan Haggard And Robert R. Kaufman -- When You Wish Upon The Stars : Why The Generals (and Admirals) Say Yes To Latin American Transitions To Civilian Government / Brian Loveman -- Political Structure And Economic Liberalization : Conditions And Cases From The Developing World / William B. Heller, Philip Keefer, And Matthew D. Mccubbins -- Afterword / Paul W. Drake And Matthew D. Mccubbins. Edited By Paul W. Drake And Mathew D. Mccubbins. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [181]-199) And Index. Why would sovereigns ever grant political or economic liberty to their subjects? Under what conditions would rational rulers who possess ultimate authority and who seek to maximize power and wealth ever give up any of that authority? This book draws on a wide array of empirical and theoretical approaches to answer these questions, investigating both why sovereign powers might liberalize and when.The contributors to this volume argue that liberalization or democratization will only occur when those in power calculate that the expected benefits to them will exceed the costs. More specifically, rulers take five main concerns into account in their cost-benefit analysis as they decide to reinforce or relax controls: personal welfare, personal power, internal order, external order, and control over policy -- particularly economic policy. The book shows that repression is a tempting first option for rulers seeking to maximize their benefits, but that liberalization becomes more attractive as a means of minimizing losses when it becomes increasingly certain that the alternatives are chaos, deposition, or even death. Chapters cover topics as diverse as the politics of seventeenth-century England and of twentieth-century Chile; why so many countries have liberalized in recent decades; and why even democratic governments see a need to reduce state power. The book makes use of formal modeling, statistical analysis, and traditional historical analysis.