The Origins of Fairness: How Evolution Explains Our Moral Nature (Foundations of Human Interaction)

In order to describe the logic of morality, "contractualist" philosophers have studied how individuals behave when they choose to follow their moral intuitions. These individuals, contractualists note, often act as if they have bargained and thus reached an agreement with others about how to distribute the benefits and burdens of mutual cooperation. Using this observation, such philosophers argue that the purpose of morality is to maximize the benefits of human interaction. The resulting "contract" analogy is both insightful and puzzling. On one hand, it captures the pattern of moral intuitions, thus answering questions about human cooperation: why do humans cooperate? Why should the distribution of benefits be proportionate to each person's contribution? Why should the punishment be proportionate to the crime? Why should the rights be proportionate to the duties? On the other hand, the analogy provides a mere as-if explanation for human cooperation, saying that cooperation is "as if" people have passed a contract-but since they didn't, why should it be so? To evolutionary thinkers, the puzzle of the missing contract is immediately reminiscent of the puzzle of the missing "designer" of life-forms, a puzzle that Darwin's theory of natural selection essentially resolved. Evolutionary and contractualist theory originally intersected at the work of philosophers John Rawls and David Gauthier, who argued that moral judgments are based on a sense of fairness that has been naturally selected. In this book, Nicolas Baumard further explores the theory that morality was originally an adaptation to the biological market of cooperation, an arena in which individuals competed to be selected for cooperative interactions. In this environment, Baumard suggests, the best strategy was to treat others with impartiality and to share the costs and benefits of cooperation in a fair way, so that those who offered less than others were left out of cooperation while those who offered more were exploited by their partners. It is with this evolutionary approach that Baumard ultimately accounts for the specific structure of human morality. Cover 1 Series 3 The Origins of Fairness 4 Copyright 5 Contents 6 Foreword by the Series Editor 10 Acknowledgments 12 Introduction: Reconciling Morality with the Natural Sciences 16 Naturalism: The Moral Sense 17 Contractualism: The Social Contract 19 A Naturalistic and Contractualist Theory of Morality 22 Part one: The Moral Sense 30 1. A Mental Organ 32 1.1. An Autonomous Disposition 34 1.1.1. Moral Judgments and Moral Intuitions 34 1.1.2. Moral Intuitions and Moral Ideas 36 1.2. A Domain-Specific Disposition 37 1.2.1. Morality, a Passion among Others 37 1.2.2. The Sense of Honor 39 1.3. A Universal Disposition 41 1.3.1. Variability as a Product of the Diversity of Situations and Beliefs 42 1.3.2. Observed Diversity and Real Diversity 43 1.4. An Innate Disposition 47 1.5. Nonintuitive Moral Judgments 51 2. Functional Disposition 61 2.1. The Competing Passions 61 2.2. The Moral Sense and Nonnaturalistic Theories 64 2.2.1. The Domain Specificity of Moral Judgments 65 2.2.2. The Innateness of Moral Judgments 67 2.3. The Moral Sense as Adaptation 68 2.3.1. Functionality and Modularity 68 2.3.2. Efficient Causes and Final Causes 70 Part Two: Morality as Fairness 74 3. From Cooperation to Morality 76 3.1. A Naturalistic Contractualism 76 3.2. From the Cooperation Market to the Sense of Fairness 76 3.2.1. The Cooperation Market 76 3.2.2. Cooperation Market Theory versus Other Mutualistic Theories 78 3.2.3. Manipulation on the Cooperation Market 80 3.2.4. The Cooperation Market in the Ancestral Environment 84 3.3. The Sense of Fairness 87 3.3.1. The Example of Reciprocity and Justice 87 3.3.2. Moral Rectitude, or Fairness in General 89 3.3.3. Fairness and Power Relationships 92 3.3.4. Framing Effects 94 4. Moral Principles and the Sense of Fairness 103 4.1. Getting Past Principles 104 4.2. The Mutualistic Logic of Moral Dilemmas 107 4.2.1. Actions and Omissions 108 4.2.2. The Trolley Dilemma 109 4.2.3. A Mutualistic Analysis of the Trolley Problem 110 4.2.4. Utilitarian Interpretations of the Trolley Problem 115 4.3. Principles and Justice 116 5. A Cognitive Approach to the Moral Sense 120 5.1. A Contract without Negotiations: Morality and Theory of Mind 120 5.1.1. The Importance of Others: Mental States versus Interests 121 5.1.2. Consent Has No Moral Value 122 5.1.3. A Mutualistic Approach to Responsibility 124 5.2. The Evaluation of Individual Interests 126 5.2.1. Intuitive Axiology and the Moral Sense 126 5.2.2. Victimless Crimes 130 5.2.3. Roles and Statuses 132 5.2.4. Moral Differences between the Sexes 134 5.3. The Limits of the Moral Community 137 5.3.1. The Proper and Actual Domains of the Moral Sense 137 5.3.2. The Variability of the Actual Domain 138 5.4. Disposition and Microdispositions 140 Part Three: Morality as Sacrifice 148 6. Mutualistic Morality and Utilitarian Morality 150 6.1. Utilitarian Morality and Group Selection 151 6.2. Utilitarian Societies? 154 6.2.1. Observed Utilitarianism and Real Utilitarianism 155 6.2.2. Collectivism and Utilitarianism 157 6.2.3. Social Institutions and Moral Interactions 160 6.3. Utilitarian Judgments? 162 6.3.1. Distributive Justice 164 6.3.2. Retributive Justice 166 6.3.3. Supererogatory Actions 167 6.3.4. Moral Dilemmas 169 6.4. Economic Games 170 6.4.1. The Ecological Validity of Economic Games 171 6.4.2. Economic Games: Moral Situations 172 6.4.3. A Mutualistic Analysis of Economic Games 174 7. Punishment or Just Deserts? 179 7.1. A Marginal Practice in Nonstate Societies 179 7.2. Revenge, Ostracism, and Self-Defense: Punishments? 181 7.3. A Simple Question of Duty 184 7.3.1. A Mutualistic Analysis of Apparently Punitive Actions 184 7.3.2. Punishment in Economic Games 185 7.4. Retributive Justice and Penal Systems 186 Part Four: Morality as Excellence 190 8. Mutualistic Morality and Virtue Morality 192 8.1. Sympathy 193 8.1.1. The Three Faces of Adam Smith 193 8.1.2. Of Sympathy and the Other Social Sentiments 196 8.2. The Parental Instinct 198 8.3. Disgust 199 8.4. The Virtues 203 9. On the “State of Nature” 208 9.1. Morality in Animals 210 9.1.1. Morality: One Disposition among Many 210 9.1.2. Primate Morality: Reality or Anthropomorphism? 212 9.2. Morality and Social Cognition 216 9.2.1. Understanding Others to Communicate 218 9.2.2. Communicating to Cooperate 221 Conclusion 227 The Steps in the Argument 227 The Scientific Implications of a Mutualistic Theory 232 The Practical Implications of Mutualistic Theory 237 References 242 Index 268 Develops Further John Rawls' Intuition That Our Sense Of Justice Is Rooted In Our Evolutionary Past And Presents A New Theory Of Morality Based On Evolutionary Biology. Introducation: Reconciling Morality With The Natural Sciences -- 1: A Mental Organ -- 2: A Functional Disposition -- 3: From Cooperation To Morality -- 4: Moral Principles And The Sense Of Fairness -- 5: A Cognitive Approach To The Moral Sense -- 6: Mutualistic Morality And Utilitarian Morality -- 7: Punishment: Useless And Uncertain -- 8: Mutualistic Morality And Virtue Morality -- 9: On The 1. Morality In Animals -- Conclusion Nicolas Baumard ; Translated By Paul Reeve. Translated From The French. Includes Bibliographical References And Index.