The Origins of Dominant Parties : Building Authoritarian Institutions in Post-Soviet Russia

In Many Autocracies, Regime Leaders Share Power With A Ruling Party, Which Can Help Generate Popular Support And Reduce Conflict Among Key Elites. Such Ruling Parties Are Often Called Dominant Parties. In Other Regimes, Leaders Prefer To Rule Solely Through Some Combination Of Charisma, Patronage, And Coercion, Rather Than Sharing Power With A Dominant Party. This Book Explains Why Dominant Parties Emerge In Some Nondemocratic Regimes, But Not In Others. It Offers A Novel Theory Of Dominant Party Emergence That Centers On The Balance Of Power Between Rulers And Other Elites. Drawing On Extensive Fieldwork In Russia, Original Data On Russian Political Elites, And Cross-national Statistical Analysis, The Book's Findings Shed New Light On How Modern Autocracies Work And Why They Break Down. The Book Also Provides New Insights About The Foundations Of Vladimir Putin's Regime And Challenges Several Myths About The Personalization Of Power Under Putin-- Machine Generated Contents Note: 1. Introduction; 2. A Theory Of Dominant Party Formation; 3. False Starts: The Failure Of Pro-presidential Parties Under Yeltsin; 4. The Emergence Of A Dominant Party In Russia; 5. United Russia As The Dominant Party; 6. United Russia And Russia's Governors; 7. Economic Elites And Dominant Party Affiliation; 8. Dominant Party Emergence Around The World; 9. Conclusion. Ora John Reuter. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Cover Half-title Title page Copyright information Table of contents List of figures List of tables Acknowledgments List of abbreviations 1 Introduction 1.1 Overview 1.2 What Are Dominant Parties? 1.3 Authoritarian Survival and the Puzzle of Dominant Party Formation 1.4 Alternative Explanations of Dominant Party Emergence 1.5 The Setting of the Argument: Leaders and Elites 1.6 The Argument in Brief 1.7 Why Russia? The Origins of United Russia 1.8 United Russia as a Dominant Party 1.9 Post-Soviet Russia and Authoritarian Institutions 1.10 Dominant Parties and the New Institutionalism 1.11 Dominant Parties and the Study of Democratization 1.12 Research Design, Methodology, and the Plan of the Book 2 A Theory of Dominant Party Formation 2.1 The Actors: Building a Theory of Dominant Party Formation Elites, Society, and Dominant Party Formation Elite Commitment and the Study of Political Parties 2.2 Dominant Party Formation as a Two-Sided Commitment Problem The Leader’s Commitment Problem, Part 1: Benefits of Cooperating with Elites Ensuring Loyalty to the Regime Controlling Legislatures and Making Policy Generating Regime Support and Winning Elections Coordinating Pro-regime Candidates during Elections Routinization of Political Appointment Processes The Leader’s Commitment Problem, Part 2: Costs of Cooperation and Incentives to Renege The Elites’ Commitment Problem, Part 1: Benefits of Reaching an Agreement with Leaders Dependable Career Advancement Securing Dependable Access to Spoils and Policy Influence Reducing Transaction Costs The Elites’ Commitment Problem, Part 2: Costs of Cooperation and Incentives to Renege Summing Up: A Two-Sided Commitment Problem 2.3 Overcoming the Commitment Problem Part 1: Dominant Party Institutions Dominant Parties and the Leader’s Credible Commitments Dominant Parties and Elite Credible Commitments Summary Overcoming the Commitment Problem, Part 2: Changes in the Balance... Explaining Variation in the Emergence of Dominant Parties: The Limitations of Institutional Explanations Reducing the Severity of the Leader’s Commitment Problem Reducing the Severity of the Elite’s Commitment Problem Balanced Resources: Maximizing the Likelihood of a Dominant Party Theory and Practice: Institutional Evolution in Nascent Dominant Party Systems 3 False Starts 3.1 The Absence of a Ruling Party in the First Russian Republic: 1990–1993 Summary: The First Russian Republic 3.2 Russia’s Choice: The Failure of Russia’s First Party of Power Why Yeltsin Failed to Invest in Russia’s Choice Why Elites Failed to Invest in Russia’s Choice Summary: The Failure of Russia’s Choice 3.3 Our Home Is Russia: Russia’s Second Failed Party of Power The Immediate Causes of Our Home’s Failure: Presidential and Regional Neglect National Elites and Our Home Is Russia Regional Elites and Our Home Is Russia The Kremlin and Our Home Is Russia Why Yeltsin Did Not Invest in Our Home Why Elites Did Not Invest in Our Home Is Russia Kremlin Signals and Elites’ Reluctance to Invest in Our Home 3.4 Conclusion 4 The Emergence of a Dominant Party in Russia 4.1 Initial Failures: The Story of Unity, 1999–2001 From Our Home Is Russia to Unity The Kremlin and Unity Elites and Unity Why Elites Were Hesitant to Invest in Unity Why the Kremlin Was Hesitant to Invest in Unity Summary 4.2 The Formation of a Dominant Party in Post-Soviet Russia: The Story of United Russia, 2001–2010 The Kremlin and United Russia Elites and United Russia 4.3 Conclusion 5 United Russia as the Dominant Party 5.1 United Russia’s Role: Benefits to Elites Access to Policy and Spoils Reducing Uncertainty and Securing Dependable Career Advancement Opportunities Electoral Benefits 5.2 United Russia’s Role: Benefits to the Kremlin Ensuring Elite Loyalty and Controlling Legislatures Winning Elections and Mobilizing Popular Support 5.3 Commitment Problems and United Russia Russia’s Leaders and United Russia Elite Commitments and United Russia 5.4 Conclusion 6 United Russia and Russia’s Governors 6.1 Individual Elites, Dominant Party Affiliation, and Russia’s Governors 6.2 Alternative Explanations 6.3 The Dependent Variable: Governors’ Decisions to Join UR 6.4 Independent Variables: The Governors’ Resources Inherited Political Resources Economic Resources Ethnic Resources Geographic and Administrative Resources Controls Statistical Method 6.5 Results Robustness Checks 6.6 Conclusion 7 Economic Elites and Dominant Party Affiliation 7.1 The Dependent Variable: Regional Legislators 7.2 Resource Ownership and United Russia Faction Membership 7.3 Models and Results 7.4 Discussion and Conclusion 8 Dominant Party Emergence around the World 8.1 Dependent Variable 8.2 Independent Variables 8.3 Modeling Strategy 8.4 Results 8.5 Discussion and Conclusion 9 Conclusion 9.1 Summary 9.2 A New Era? United Russia after the 2011–2012 Elections 9.3 Dominant Parties and Regime Breakdown 9.4 Implications for Russian Politics References Index "In many autocracies, regime leaders share power with a ruling party, which can help generate popular support and reduce conflict among key elites. Such ruling parties are often called dominant parties. In other regimes, leaders prefer to rule solely through some combination of charisma, patronage, and coercion, rather than sharing power with a dominant party. This book explains why dominant parties emerge in some nondemocratic regimes, but not in others. It offers a novel theory of dominant party emergence that centers on the balance of power between rulers and other elites. Drawing on extensive fieldwork in Russia, original data on Russian political elites, and cross-national statistical analysis, the book's findings shed new light on how modern autocracies work and why they break down. The book also provides new insights about the foundations of Vladimir Putin's regime and challenges several myths about the personalization of power under Putin"-- Provided by publisher