The Ontology of Well-Being in Social Policy and Welfare Practice

This book provides important philosophical insights concerning the kind of creatures we are such that we can experience something we understand as well-being, with these insights then being applied to various areas of social policy and welfare practice. The author defends what he calls The Ontology of Well-Being Thesis (TOWT), addressing ontological questions about the human condition, and how these questions are fundamental to issues concerning what we might know about human well-being and how we should promote it. Yet, surprisingly, these ontological questions are often side-lined in academic, political, and policy and practice based debates about well-being. Addressing these questions, head-on, six features of the human condition are identified via TOWT: human embodiment, finiteness, sociability, cognition, evaluation, and agency. The main argument of the thesis is that these features reveal the conflicting character of human experiences, which can, in turn, have a profound bearing on our experience of well-being. Notably, it is our conflicting experiences of time, emotion, and self-consciousness, which can potentially help us experience well-being in complex and multi-dimensional ways. The author then applies these insights to various social policies and welfare practices, concerning, for example, pensions, disability, bereavement counselling, social prescribing within health settings, the promotion of mental health, and co-production practices. This book is of importance to philosophers, social policy analysts, and welfare practitioners and is also relevant to the fields of psychology, sociology, politics, and the health sciences. Acknowledgements Contents Chapter 1: The Politics and Philosophy of Human Well-Being 1.1 Introduction 1.2 The Blurred Distinction Between Objectivity and Subjectivity and the Ontology of Well-Being Thesis (TOWT) 1.3 The Inadequacy of GDP for Measuring Social Progress and Societal Well-Being 1.4 Philosophical Controversies When Promoting Well-Being for Social Policy and Welfare Practice 1.5 Measuring Subjective Well-Being for Social Policy and Welfare Practice 1.6 Philosophical Ambiguities and Indeterminacies in Pluralistic Understandings of Well-Being 1.7 Philosophical Ambiguities and Indeterminacies When Comparing the Quality of Lives Led 1.8 Conclusion References Chapter 2: Well-Being and the Human Condition 2.1 Introduction 2.2 Atomism v Holism in Theories of Well-Being 2.3 Six Ontological Features of the Human Condition 2.4 Some Uneven Philosophical Terrains, and Some Implications for Social Policy and Welfare Practice 2.5 Conclusion References Chapter 3: Well-Being, Pain and Parfit: Time, Self-Interest and Pensions Policy 3.1 Introduction 3.2 Liberal Accounts of Self-Interest and Well-Being, and the Problem of Irrationality 3.3 Parfit’s View of Identity and Some Problems for Reductionism 3.4 Non-Reductionism v Reductionism and Subjectivity v Objectivity: False Dichotomies 3.5 Questions of Identity and Biased Experiences of Time: Well-Being and Pensions Policy 3.6 Conclusion References Chapter 4: Well-Being and Finiteness: Agency, Self-Acceptance, and Disability 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The Liberal ‘Ethic of Agency’ and Well-Being Promotion 4.3 The Liberal ‘Ethic of Self-Acceptance’ and Well-Being Promotion 4.4 The Social Model of Disability and the Ethics of Agency and Self-Acceptance 4.5 Conclusion References Chapter 5: Well-Being, Melancholy and Happiness: Bitter-Sweet Emotions and Sober Self-Reflection 5.1 Introduction 5.2 Negative and Positive Conceptions of Melancholy 5.3 Two Themes When Ignoring Melancholy in Discussions of Happiness and Well-Being 5.4 Melancholy, Authentic Happiness, and the Fulfilment of Informed Desires 5.5 Melancholy, Self-Acceptance and Emotional Connectedness with Loss and Pain 5.6 Melancholy and the ‘Here-and-Now’ 5.7 Conclusion References Chapter 6: Well-Being, Sociability, and False Consciousness: Radical Politics, Disability, Self-Knowledge, and Subjectivity v Objectivity 6.1 Introduction 6.2 Two Conflicting Interpretations of False Consciousness 6.3 Two Contrasting Interpretations of the Social Model of Disability 6.4 Facilitating Creative Conflict Within the Principles of Co-Production 6.5 Conclusion References Chapter 7: Well-Being, Mental Illness, Co-Production and Social Prescription: Social Constructionism, Relational Integrity, and Agency 7.1 Introduction 7.2 The Social Causation and Social Construction of Mental Health 7.3 The Six Features of the Human Condition and Competing Conceptions of Mental Well-Being 7.4 Some Implications for Mental Health Care in Practice 7.5 Social Prescribing, Policy and Research Backgrounds 7.6 Relational Integrity and Co-Production Within Social Prescribing Practices 7.7 Conclusion References Chapter 8: Explanatory and Purpose-Based Approaches to Pluralistic Understandings of Well-Being 8.1 Introduction 8.2 Distinguishing Between Explanation and Purpose When Understanding and Promoting Well-Being 8.3 The Conflict Between Explanation and Purpose When Understanding and Promoting Well-Being in Social Policy and Welfare Practice 8.4 Identifying the Explanatory and Purpose-Based Approaches Within the Ontology of Well-Being Thesis (TOWT) 8.5 Conclusion References Chapter 9: Conclusion: The Human Condition, Conflicting Experiences of Time, Emotion and Self-Consciousness, and Value Incommensurability 9.1 Introduction 9.2 Conflicting Experiences of Time and the Human Condition 9.3 Conflicting Experiences of Emotion and the Human Condition 9.4 Conflicting Experiences of Self-Consciousness and the Human Condition 9.5 Value Incommensurability and Structural v Non-Structural Accounts of Value, and the Objectivity v Subjectivity Dichotomy Revisited 9.6 A Balanced Life Is Not Necessarily a Better Life 9.7 Concluding Remarks: Ten ‘Take-Home’ Points for Further Reflection References Index