مسیر دریایی به ورطه: رقابت دریایی انگلستان و آلمان ۱۸۹۵-۱۹۱۴

The Intense Rivalry In Battleship Building That Took Place Between Britain And Germany In The Run Up To The First World War Is Seen By Many As The Most Totemic Of All Armaments Races. Blamed By Numerous Commentators During The Inter-war Years As A Major Cause Of The Great War, It Has Become Emblematic Of All That Is Wrong With International Competitions In Military Strength. Yet, Despite This Notoriety, 'the Great Naval Race' Has Not Received The Attention That This Elevated Status Would Merit And It Has Never Been Examined From The Viewpoint Of Both Of Its Participants Simultaneously And Equally. This Volume, Which Contains A Comprehensive Survey Of The Existing Scholarship On This Topic, Both English-language And German, As Well As Important Primary Source Materials From A Range Of Archives In Both Britain And Germany, Fills This Gap. By Putting The Actions Of The British Admiralty Side-by-side With Those Of Its German Counterparts, It Enables The Naval Race To Be Viewed Comparatively And Thereby Facilitates An Understanding Of How The Two Parties To This Conflict Interacted. By Offering A Comprehensive Range Of German Documents In Both Their Original Text And In English Translation, The Book Makes The German Role In This Conflict Accessible To An English Speaking Audience For The First Time. As Such, It Is An Essential Volume For Any Serious Student Of Naval Policy In The Pre-first World War Era.-- Tirpitz's Ascendency The Design And Initial Execution Of A Naval Challenge 1895-1904/5 -- Recognising The German Challenge: The Royal Navy 1898-1904 -- Obstacles, Success, And Risks: The German Navy, 1905-1907 -- Meeting The German Challenge: The Royal Navy 1905-1907 -- Tirpitz Triumphant? German Naval Policy 1908-1911 -- Surpassing The German Challenge: The Royal Navy 1908-1911 -- Decay: German Naval Policy 1912-1914 -- Defeating The German Challenge: The Royal Navy 1912-1914. Edited By Matthew S. Seligmann, Frank Nägler And Michael Epkenhans. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. The Anglo-German rivalry in battleship building at the beginning of the twentieth century has been blamed by many as a major cause of the First World War, yet 'the Great Naval Race' has not received the attention that its notoriety would merit. The intense rivalry in battleship building that took place between Britain and Germany in the run up to the First World War is seen by many as the most totemic of all armaments races. Blamed by numerous commentators during the inter-war years as a major cause of the Great War, it has become emblematic of all that is wrong with international competitions in military strength. Yet, despite this notoriety, 'the Great Naval Race' has not received the attention that this elevated status would merit and it has never been examined from the viewpoint of both of its participants simultaneously and equally. This volume, which contains a comprehensive survey of the existing scholarship on this topic, both English-language and German, as well as important primary source materials from a range of archives in both Britain and Germany, fills this gap. By putting the actions of the British Admiralty side-by-side with those of its German counterparts, it enables the naval race to be viewed comparatively and thereby facilitates an understanding of how the two parties to this conflict interacted. By offering a comprehensive range of German documents in both their original text and in English translation, the book makes the German role in this conflict accessible to an English speaking audience for the first time. As such, it is an essential volume for any serious student of naval policy in the pre-First World War era The intense rivalry in battleship building that took place between Britain and Germany in the run up to the First World War is seen by many as the most totemic of all armaments races. Blamed by numerous commentators during the inter-war years as a major cause of the Great War, it has become emblematic of all that is wrong with international competitions in military strength. Yet, despite this notoriety, 'the Great Naval Race' has not received the attention that this elevated status would merit and it has never been examined from the viewpoint of both of its participants simultaneously and equally. This volume, which contains a comprehensive survey of the existing scholarship on this topic, both English-language and German, as well as important primary source materials from a range of archives in both Britain and Germany, fills this gap. By putting the actions of the British Admiralty side-by-side with those of its German counterparts, it enables the naval race to be viewed comparatively and thereby facilitates an understanding of how the two parties to this conflict interacted. By offering a comprehensive range of German documents in both their original text and in English translation, the book makes the German role in this conflict accessible to an English speaking audience for the first time. As such, it is an essential volume for any serious student of naval policy in the pre-First World War era.-- Provided by Publisher This publication is an essential volume for any serious student of naval policy in the pre-First World War era. The intense rivalry in battleship building that took place between Britain and Germany in the run up to the First World War is seen by many as the most totemic of all armaments races. It has been blamed by numerous commentators during the inter-war years as a major cause of the Great War.'The Great Naval Race'has never been examined from the viewpoint of both of its participants simultaneously and equally. This volume will fill this gap. It draws on documents both English-language and German, and will therefore make the German role in this conflict accessible to an English speaking audience for the very first time. The book addresses the build up of the German Navy and it's threat to Britain. All in all, crucial documents leave no doubt that the Imperial German Navy deliberately challenged the Royal Navy. Tirpitz certainly did not want a war before the navy was ready, which he hoped it would be in the 1920s.