The Naval History of the World War : The Stress of Sea Power, 1915-1916

T HE early months of the year 1915 had offered great strategic opportunities to the Entente Allies. Not only had the Teutonic Allies lost the offensive but the Central Powers were practically besieged. Their armies were held in a deadlock on intrenched fronts, and their nations were feeling the relentless pressure of Sea Power in the hands of the Allies.A study of the map will show this siege of the Central Powers. Although the German armies had penetrated into France and Belgium, they had been brought to a standstill, and on the Eastern Front increased forces were needed, as the Austro-Hungarians were so hard pressed that German aid was necessary to prevent a collapse in the southeast.The defeat of the great German offensive had prevented any of the hesitating Balkan nations from joining the Central Powers, and the Teutons were thus cut off from even their Turkish ally. The innate hostility of the Italian people against Austria was impelling Italy to a declaration of war against her ancient enemy. As a consequence, the Central Powers were surrounded by a ring through which there was no passage.This situation, in itself, had created new strategic objectives. That of the Entente Allies was to constrict s THE SIEGE OF THE CENTRAL POWERS 11 report of the United States Naval Attaché at Berlin, "The Baltic, south of the Gulf of Finland, has remained a German lake." It was in the Baltic that the Germans had most feared harassing naval attacks by the British. And it must be acknowledged that there were great possibilities for harassing operations of British submarines with the advantage of bases in the Russian Baltic ports. But the Germans were left practically free to use the Baltic for undisturbed transportation of minerals and supplies from Sweden. And, being thus undisturbed by British naval offensives, the Germans were enabled to develop the offensive use of their own U-boats into a determined attempt to impair the Allied control of the seas. An account of this German submarine offensive will be given in the following chapter. CHAPTER II GERMAN PROJECTS FOR U-BOAT WARFARE 5 has been explained in the previous volume, neither side had developed the offensive use of submarines at the outbreak of the World War. It was only from first tentative beginnings, after the opening of hostilities, that the submarines gradually became more of a factor as the war continued. But it soon became evident that they held great possibilities for harassing attacks upon an enemy's navy and commerce.In recognizing and developing these possibilities for the offensive use of submarines, Germany had far outstripped the Entente Allies. It is true that submarines of the British Navy had extended their operations, and patrols of these craft were maintained even off the German naval outwork of Heligoland. But the only two British submarines, which first went into the Baltic, "put into Lapvik, where they were definitely placed under Admiral von Essen's orders." 1 There was not in any sense a campaign undertaken for harassing naval operations in the Baltic, nor, in fact, for harassing naval operations against the Germans in any area. All ideas for the offensive of the British Navy in the North of Europe were concentrated upon the program for Lord Fisher's Baltic scheme. Consequently, it should be understood that, at the beginning of 1915, nothing 1 "As an assistance to the Russians in disputing the command of the Baltic, their presence was little more than a token of good will." -Sir Julian Corbett. it and the Tyne is to be kept free for Danish and Swedish vessels, in which there is to be no mining or sinking." "February 20th, 1915. -Order to open campaign in North Sea and English Channel, American and Italian flags to be spared even here. A free safe belt is provided for Scandinavians to sail to England." "February 22nd, 1915. -Order to open campaign on west coast of United Kingdom. Especial care recommended to spare American and Italian flags." "March 7th, 1915. -The free belt for Scandinavians is abolished, but is not to be mined: it is thus really hardly endangered." "March 30th, 1915.-The free belt is wholly abolished." "April 2nd, 1915. -After loss of several submarines through traps, order that safety of our own boats is to come before all other considerations. No longer essential to rise to surface." CHAPTER III THE NAVAL SITUATION B EFORE giving a narrative of the events of the German U-boat campaign of 1915, it would be well to describe the general situation on the sea which the Germans sought to change by this new means. It was altogether adverse to the Central Powers, âS) £lt this stage of the war, the German cruisers and commerce destroyers had been swept from the waterways of the world, and there was practically no interference with Allied control of the surface of the outlying seas.The German cruiser Königsberg had been shut up in the Rufigi River, where she was afterwards destroyed in July, 1915, by the two lightdraft monitors, Severn and Mersey, sent out for that purpose. It should be noted that the bombardment, directed against this cruiser by means of airplane spotting, was another example of the difficulties of indirect fire for ships' guns. As was the case at the Dardanelles, the ships had a hard task to obtain hits on their target. Their first attempts failed, but the Königsberg was at last damaged beyond moving, although the Germans were afterwards able to mount her guns at Dar-es-Salaam.The cruiser Dresden, after her escape from the Falkland action, 1 had only been able to lurk in hiding among inlets on the west coast of South America. She had been ordered to try to get to Germany, but could not make the attempt, on account of the condition of her engines as well as the uncertainty of a supply of coal. \* " ... of Russian military assistance, there was no longer any hope for months. . . . " -Ibid. ACKNOWLEDGMENT CONTENTS LIST OF MAPS CHAPTER I. THE SIEGE OF THE CENTRAL POWERS CHAPTER II. GERMAN PROJECTS FOR U-BOAT WARFARE CHAPTER III. THE NAVAL SITUATION CHAPTER IV. THE U-BOAT CAMPAIGN OF 1915 AND THE LUSITANIA CHAPTER V. THE MILITARY ATTEMPT AT THE DARDANELLES CHAPTER VI. DISAPPOINTMENTS FOR THE ENTENTE ALLIES CHAPTER VII. ITALY IN THE WAR. U-BOATS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN CHAPTER VIII. GERMANY FORCED TO ABANDON THE U-BOAT CAMPAIGN CHAPTER IX. MILITARY REVERSES OF 1915 CHAPTER Χ. BULGARIA IN THE WAR. SERBIA OVERWHELMED CHAPTER XI. DEFEAT AT THE DARDANELLES CHAPTER XII. SITUATION AT BEGINNING OF 1916 CHAPTER XIII. RENEWED PROJECT FOR U-BOAT WARFARE CHAPTER XIV. THE HALT CALLED BY THE UNITED STATES CHAPTER XV. THE NEW GERMAN NAVAL STRATEGY CHAPTER XVI. THE BRITISH NAVAL STRATEGY OF 1916 CHAPTER XVII. THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — THE FIRST CONTACT CHAPTER XVIII. THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — THE BATTLE CRUISER ACTION CHAPTER XIX. THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — THE GERMAN FLEET UNITED CHAPTER XX. THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — THE BRITISH EFFORT TO UNITE FORCES CHAPTER XXI. THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — THE EVASION OF THE WEAKER FORCE CHAPTER XXII. THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — THE FAILURE TO WIN A DECISION CHAPTER XXIII. THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — THE ACTION BROKEN OFF CHAPTER XXIV. THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND — THE RETURN OF THE FLEETS CHAPTER XXV. THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND —THE CAUSES AND RESULTS OF THE BRITISH FAILURE CHAPTER XXVI. THE EFFECT OF THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND UPON GERMANY CHAPTER XXVII. OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH SEA CHAPTER XXVIII. THE U-BOATS OPERATING “ACCORDING TO PRIZE LAW” CHAPTER XXIX. THE DIE CAST BY GERMANY FOR UNRESTRICTED U-BOAT WARFARE APPENDICES APPENDIX A. LETTER OF ADMIRAL JELLICOE TO THE BRITISH ADMIRALTY, AND THE WRITTEN APPROVAL OF THE ADMIRALTY, DEFINING THE “CONDUCT OF THE FLEET IN ACTION.” APPENDIX Β. ORGANIZATION OF THE BRITISH FLEET APPENDIX C. BRITISH CASUALTIES APPENDIX D. TABLE OF DATES OF THE WORLD WAR INDEX Excerpt from The Naval History of the World Offensive Operations, 1914 1915After the War Of 1870 Germany had steadily gained power, under the shrewd policies of Bismarck, who Skil fully took advantage of the enmity between Great Brit ain and Russia at the end of the russo-turkish War of 1877, and made Germany a dominating power in Europe at the Congress of Berlin at which the treaties were drawn up after that war. In 1879 the alliance be tween Germany and austria-hungary had been made, which became the Triple Alliance when joined by Italy. But Great Britain was inuenced by anti-russian poli cies, and in fact had even fostered the growth of Ger many as a buffer against Russia.About the PublisherForgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at (http://www.forgottenbooks.comThis) www.forgottenbooks.comThis book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. Excerpt from The Naval History of the World War: Offensive Operations, 1914 1915 After the War Of 1870 Germany had steadily gained power, under the shrewd policies of Bismarck, who Skil fully took advantage of the enmity between Great Brit ain and Russia at the end of the russo-turkish War of 1877, and made Germany a dominating power in Europe at the Congress of Berlin at which the treaties were drawn up after that war. In 1879 the alliance be tween Germany and austria-hungary had been made, which became the Triple Alliance when joined by Italy. But Great Britain was influenced by anti-russian poli cies, and in fact had even fostered the growth of Ger many as a buffer against Russia. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works.