The nature of value : axiological investigations

»During the past forty or fifty years a great deal has been published in moral and political philosophy. During most of this period, however, axiology or the general theory of value has been relatively neglected, and not as much work has been done in this area as was done during the last decades of the nineteenth and first decades of the twentieth century by philosophers such as Brentano, Moore, and Ross. In recent years there has beén something of a renewed interest in value theory. Much, however, if not indeed most, of the recent work in this area has not been in the non-naturalist, rationalist, intuitionist, realist tradition of the three thinkers just mentioned. The present work is in that tradition. It seeks to develop and vindicate a view of the irreducibility, rationality, and objectivity of value as an alternative to reductionist, skeptical, relativist, and subjectivist treatments of value. This it does in what may be referred to as a “positive” as opposed to a “negative” way by concentrating mainly on the development of my own views rather than on presenting detailed criticisms of the views of others, and there are few explicit references to and discussions of recent work. [...]« "Timelessly valuable. . . . An original, systematic treatment of some important issues in moral philosophy that have been neglected in recent years. . . . A splendid book of general interest to philosophers."--James Rachels, University of Alabama at Birmingham "A major contribution to the general theory of value and moral philosophy. Its thoroughness is unsurpassed in recent philosophy."--Panayot Butchvarov, University of Iowa Ramon Lemos develops and vindicates a view of "the irreducibility, rationality, and objectivity of value as an alternative to reductionist, skeptical, relativist, and subjectivist treatments of value." While traditional in his approach, Lemos concentrates mainly on developing his own views rather than on presenting criticism of the views of others. One of the central theses of his book is that value is neither identical with nor reducible to psychological phenomena such as liking or disliking, preferring, evaluating, and valuing or disvaluing. He examines various kinds of value, the place of moral value within them, the ontological status of the bearers of value, and the relationship between morality and rationality. In clear writing he defines the issues he considers, sets out his position, and supports his views with original arguments that display his awareness of the history of moral philosophy. He also discusses some of the implications for higher education of his view of the complete human good, arguing that the task of higher education is to assist students in acquiring their complete good, not merely to increase their understanding of arts and sciences. Ramon M. Lemos is professor of philosophy at the University of Miami in Coral Gables, Florida. He is the author of Metaphysical Investigations; Rights, Goods, and Democracy; Hobbes and Power and Consent; Rousseau's Political An Exposition and Interpretation; and Experience, Mind, and Philosophical Essays and of essays and reviews in philosophical journals. The Nature of Value Contents Preface 1. Value and Psychological Phenomena 1. Value, Valuing, and Evaluating 2. Levels of Psychological Phenomena 3. Terminological Remarks 2. Ontological Categories and Bearers of Value 1. States of Affairs, Propositions, and Facts 2. States of Affairs as Bearers of Value 3. Propositions as Bearers of Value 4. Abstracta and Concreta as Bearers of Value 3. Species of Value 1. Intrinsic, Extrinsic, and Total Value 2. Extrinsic Value and Utility 3. Instrumental and Contributory Value 4. Inherent Value 4. Definition, Proof, and Knowledge of Intrinsic Value 1. The Definability of Intrinsic Value 2. Proof and Knowledge of Intrinsic Value 5. Moral and Non-Moral Value 1. Moral Concepts and Value Concepts 2. The Value of Moral Objectives 3. Theodicy 6. Persons, Things, and Value 1. Universals, Kinds, and Value 2. Normality and Value 3. Goodness and Excellence 4. Good-Making Properties and Virtues 5. Virtues and Vices 6. Loving and Hating 7. The Primacy of Practical Rationality 1. The Value of Religious Belief and Hope 2. Theoretical and Practical Rationality 3. Silence and Deception 4. Positive, Negative, and Conflicting Duties 5. Self-Deception 6. The Possibility of Self-Deception 7. The Value of Knowledge 8. Morality and Rationality 1. Acting Morally and Acting Rationally 2. Morality and Self-Interest 3. The Inadequacy of Egoism 4. Unmitigated Non-Egoism 9. Attitudes toward the Indifferent 1. Likings and Dislikings of Good and Bad Objects 2. Extreme Views of Attitudes toward the Indifferent 3. Moderate Views of Attitudes toward the Indifferent 4. Instances, Kinds, and Value 5. Egocentrism, Anthropocentrism, and Magnanimity 6. Disliking Indifferent Things 10. The Complete Human Good and Higher Education 1. Civilization and Morality 2. Being Good and Having Goods 3. Moral and Non-Moral Education Notes Works Cited Index This text provides a systematic treatment of several important issues in moral philosophy. The author examines various kinds of value, the place of moral value within them, the ontological status of the bearers of value, and the relationship between morality and rationality.