The nature of customary law : [legal, historical and philosophical perspectives

Some legal rules are not laid down by a legislator but grow instead from informal social practices. In contract law, for example, the customs of merchants are used by courts to interpret the provisions of business contracts; in tort law, customs of best practice are used by courts to define professional responsibility. Nowhere are customary rules of law more prominent than in international law. The customs defining the obligations of each State to other States, and, to some extent, to its own citizens, are often treated as legally binding. However, unlike natural law and positive law, customary law has received very little scholarly analysis. To remedy this neglect, a distinguished group of philosophers, historians and lawyers has been assembled to assess the nature and significance of customary law. The book offers fresh new insights on this neglected and misunderstood form of law. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Contents......Page 7 List of contributors......Page 9 Table of cases......Page 10 Is custom all we have?......Page 13 The relation between reason and customary morality......Page 15 The relation between reason and customary law......Page 17 The nature of customary international law......Page 20 PART I Custom and morality: natural law, customary law and ius gentium......Page 23 1 Pitfalls in the interpretation of customary law......Page 25 Clarifying the question......Page 29 Hanson’s question......Page 32 Wittgenstein’s question......Page 35 Quine’s question......Page 38 Llewellyn’s question......Page 40 The valence of convergence (or, Kahneman’s question)......Page 43 Conclusion: does wisdom matter?......Page 45 2 The moral role of conventions......Page 47 Morality reaches beyond convention......Page 48 That morality necessarily contains, or connects with, convention......Page 52 Reflective equilibrium......Page 53 Moral scepticism......Page 56 Recognising behaviour as conventional does not destroy its moral force......Page 60 Introduction: a circle of concepts: nature, custom, stipulation......Page 65 Transcending the nature–convention dichotomy......Page 67 Ethos and habit: the first face of custom......Page 71 Nomos and convention: the second face of custom......Page 74 Custom and law, or custom v. law?......Page 78 Law remedies the deficiencies of custom......Page 84 4 Custom, ordinance and natural right in Gratian’s Decretum......Page 91 The Decretum: context and purposes......Page 94 Natural right and practices......Page 99 Custom and ordinance......Page 103 Past and present......Page 113 Vitoria and the Indies......Page 117 The grounding of ius gentium......Page 122 Suarez on customary law......Page 126 Ius gentium, natural law, and international law......Page 131 Introduction......Page 137 The Volk and customary law......Page 142 Custom and Sittlichkeit......Page 149 Positivity, reason and history......Page 153 Conclusion......Page 159 PART II Custom and law: custom, common law and customary international law......Page 161 Custom in Roman law......Page 163 The senses of custom......Page 165 Characteristics of custom in the Middle Ages......Page 167 Custom in medieval English law......Page 173 Custom in Bracton......Page 174 Post-Bractonian law: the common law as custom......Page 177 Post-Bractonian law: custom in inferior courts......Page 179 Post-Bractonian law: the common law and local custom......Page 184 The sack of Tienen......Page 188 Siege warfare before Westphalia......Page 189 Siege warfare after Westphalia: practice......Page 195 Siege warfare after Westphalia: doctrine......Page 202 Customary law and the laws of war......Page 207 The earliest common lawyers......Page 215 The Year Book period......Page 218 Christopher St German......Page 221 Custom and artificial reason......Page 225 Common law as populist custom......Page 232 Conclusion......Page 237 10 Three ways of writing a treatise on public international law: textbooks and the nature of customary international law......Page 240 Sceptical accounts of the nature of customary international law......Page 241 Pollock and Hall: two midwives’ accounts of international law......Page 243 International law as the deliverances of a civil law tradition......Page 244 International law as the deliverance of an English legal tradition......Page 245 A natural law of variable content......Page 247 An Anglican civilian’s natural law......Page 248 Holland on the scaffolding needed for the building of international law......Page 253 Oppenheim on the background ideals needed by an international lawyer......Page 256 Conclusion: morals for contemporary writers on customary international law......Page 264 11 Custom, common law reasoning and the law of nations in the nineteenth century......Page 268 The common law and custom......Page 269 The common law and the custom of merchants......Page 273 The common law, reason and the law of nations......Page 276 The common law and the force of treaties......Page 283 The common law and developing international custom......Page 286 Conclusion......Page 289 A troubled concept......Page 291 The normativity of custom......Page 294 The concept of custom......Page 296 Normative practice......Page 299 Deliberative practices......Page 302 Deeds, words, and custom......Page 303 Material and deliberative interdependence......Page 304 The normative force of custom......Page 307 Custom and the limits of community......Page 312 Custom and the limits of interest......Page 314 Hope without fear?......Page 319 Positivism and legitimacy......Page 325 The ‘autonomy’ of politics......Page 327 A disjunctive account of opinio juris......Page 332 An interpretative account......Page 336 Objections and replies......Page 341 Index of names......Page 348 Cover 1 Half-title 3 Title 5 Copyright 6 Contents 7 List of contributors 9 Table of cases 10 The character of customary law: an introduction 13 Is custom all we have? 13 The relation between reason and customary morality 15 The relation between reason and customary law 17 The nature of customary international law 20 PART I Custom and morality: natural law, customary law and ius gentium 23 1 Pitfalls in the interpretation of customary law 25 Clarifying the question 29 Hanson’s question 32 Wittgenstein’s question 35 Quine’s question 38 Llewellyn’s question 40 The valence of convergence (or, Kahneman’s question) 43 Conclusion: does wisdom matter? 45 2 The moral role of conventions 47 Morality reaches beyond convention 48 That morality necessarily contains, or connects with, convention 52 Reflective equilibrium 53 Moral scepticism 56 Recognising behaviour as conventional does not destroy its moral force 60 3 Habit and convention at the foundation of custom 65 Introduction: a circle of concepts: nature, custom, stipulation 65 Transcending the nature–convention dichotomy 67 Ethos and habit: the first face of custom 71 Nomos and convention: the second face of custom 74 Custom and law, or custom v. law? 78 Law remedies the deficiencies of custom 84 4 Custom, ordinance and natural right in Gratian’s Decretum 91 The Decretum: context and purposes 94 Natural right and practices 99 Custom and ordinance 103 5 Vitoria and Suarez on ius gentium, natural law, and custom 113 Past and present 113 Vitoria and the Indies 117 The grounding of ius gentium 122 Suarez on customary law 126 Ius gentium, natural law, and international law 131 6 Custom and positivity: an examination of the philosophic ground of the Hegel–Savigny controversy 137 Introduction 137 The Volk and customary law 142 Custom and Sittlichkeit 149 Positivity, reason and history 153 Conclusion 159 PART II Custom and law: custom, common law and customary international law 161 7 Custom in medieval law 163 Custom in Roman law 163 Custom in the Middle Ages: continental Europe 165 The senses of custom 165 Characteristics of custom in the Middle Ages 167 Custom in medieval English law 173 Custom in Bracton 174 Post-Bractonian law: the common law as custom 177 Post-Bractonian law: custom in inferior courts 179 Post-Bractonian law: the common law and local custom 184 8 Siege warfare in the Early Modern Age: a study on the customary laws of war 188 The sack of Tienen 188 Siege warfare before Westphalia 189 Siege warfare after Westphalia: practice 195 Siege warfare after Westphalia: doctrine 202 Customary law and the laws of war 207 9 The idea of common law as custom 215 The earliest common lawyers 215 The Year Book period 218 Christopher St German 221 Custom and artificial reason 225 Common law as populist custom 232 Conclusion 237 10 Three ways of writing a treatise on public international law: textbooks and the nature of customary international law 240 Sceptical accounts of the nature of customary international law 241 Pollock and Hall: two midwives’ accounts of international law 243 International law as the deliverances of a civil law tradition 244 International law as the deliverance of an English legal tradition 245 Two natural lawyers’ accounts of international law 247 A natural law of variable content 247 An Anglican civilian’s natural law 248 Two noble liars’ accounts of international law: Holland and Oppenheim 253 Holland on the scaffolding needed for the building of international law 253 Oppenheim on the background ideals needed by an international lawyer 256 Conclusion: morals for contemporary writers on customary international law 264 11 Custom, common law reasoning and the law of nations in the nineteenth century 268 The common law and custom 269 The common law and the custom of merchants 273 The common law, reason and the law of nations 276 The common law and the force of treaties 283 The common law and developing international custom 286 Conclusion 289 12 Custom in international law: a normative practice account 291 A troubled concept 291 The normativity of custom 294 The concept of custom 296 Custom and deliberative normative practices 299 Normative practice 299 Deliberative practices 302 Deeds, words, and custom 303 The social environment of custom 304 Material and deliberative interdependence 304 The normative force of custom 307 Custom in the global environment 312 Custom and the limits of community 312 Custom and the limits of interest 314 13 Customary international law and the quest for global justice 319 Hope without fear? 319 Positivism and the idolatry of the state 325 Positivism and legitimacy 325 The ‘autonomy’ of politics 327 The interpretative account of custom 332 A disjunctive account of opinio juris 332 An interpretative account 336 Objections and replies 341 Index of names 348 Frederick Schauer Frederick Schauer -- Ross Harrison Frederick Schauer -- Ross Harrison -- James Bernard Murphy Frederick Schauer -- Ross Harrison -- James Bernard Murphy -- Jean Porter Frederick Schauer -- Ross Harrison -- James Bernard Murphy -- Jean Porter -- Brian Tierney Frederick Schauer-- Ross Harrison-- James Bernard Murphy-- Jean Porter-- Brian Tierney-- Christoph Kletzer. David Ibbetson David Ibbetson -- Randall Lesaffer David Ibbetson -- Randall Lesaffer -- Alan Cromartie David Ibbetson -- Randall Lesaffer -- Alan Cromartie -- Amanda Perreau-Saussine David Ibbetson -- Randall Lesaffer -- Alan Cromartie -- Amanda Perreau-Saussine -- Michael Lobban David Ibbetson -- Randall Lesaffer -- Alan Cromartie -- Amanda Perreau-Saussine -- Michael Lobban -- Gerald J. Postema David Ibbetson-- Randall Lesaffer-- Alan Cromartie-- Amanda Perreau-Saussine-- Michael Lobban-- Gerald J. Postema-- John Tasioulas. In international law, the customs defining the obligations of States are often treated as legally binding. A distinguished group of philosophers, historians and lawyers assess the nature and significance of customary law, and offer fresh insights on this neglected and misunderstood form of law.