The Myth of the Imperial Presidency : How Public Opinion Checks the Unilateral Executive

Throughout American history, presidents have shown a startling power to act independently of Congress and the courts. On their own initiative, presidents have taken the country to war, abolished slavery, shielded undocumented immigrants from deportation, declared a national emergency at the border, and more, leading many to decry the rise of an imperial presidency. But given the steep barriers that usually prevent Congress and the courts from formally checking unilateral power, what stops presidents from going it alone even more aggressively? The answer, Dino P. Christenson and Douglas L. Kriner argue, lies in the power of public opinion. With robust empirical data and compelling case studies, the authors reveal the extent to which domestic public opinion limits executive might. Presidents are emboldened to pursue their own agendas when they enjoy strong public support, and constrained when they don’t, since unilateral action risks inciting political pushback, jeopardizing future initiatives, and further eroding their political capital. Although few Americans instinctively recoil against unilateralism, Congress and the courts can sway the public’s view via their criticism of unilateral policies. Thus, other branches can still check the executive branch through political means. As long as presidents are concerned with public opinion, Christenson and Kriner contend that fears of an imperial presidency are overblown. "Many have long decried the dramatic expansion of presidential unilateral power since the New Deal and World War II. The Republicans complained about Barack Obama's use of executive orders on issues dealing with the environment and immigration among other areas while Democrats and many Republicans object to Donald Trump's use of executive authority in areas like trade and to build his wall on the border with Mexico. However, the most perplexing question is what can explain the relative paucity, not the proliferation, of unilateral actions. In this book the authors look at the role of public opinion and the political costs that might follow unilateral action as constraints on presidents. The authors argue that public opinion-not formal checks by Congress and the courts-serves as the primary constraint on the unilateral executive"-- Provided by publisher An imperial presidency? -- How Americans think about unilateral action -- Congressional pushback in the public sphere -- Rethinking the role of the courts -- A popular check on unilateralism -- Pathways of political constraint -- Democratic decline?