The Multiple Realization Book

Since Hilary Putnam offered multiple realization as an empirical hypothesis in the 1960s, philosophical consensus has turned against the idea that mental processes could be identified with brain processes, and multiple realization has become the keystone of the 'antireductive consensus' across philosophy of science broadly. Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro offer the first book-length investigation of multiple realization. Their analysis of multiple realization serves as a starting point to a series of philosophically sophisticated and empirically informed arguments that cast doubt on the generality of multiple realization in the cognitive sciences. In the course of making their case, they respond to classic defenses of multiple realization that Jerry Fodor, Ned Block, and other prominent philosophers of psychology have offered. Polger and Shapiro conclude that the identity theory, once left for dead, remains a viable theory of mind--one that, when suitably framed, enjoys the benefits typically thought to accrue only to theories of mind that presuppose the truth of multiple realization. As Polger and Shapiro see matters, mind-brain identities have played an important role in the growth and achievements of the cognitive sciences, and they see little prospect--or need--for multiple realization in an empirically-based theory of mind. This leads Polger and Shapiro to offer an alternative framework for understanding explanations in the cognitive sciences, as well as in chemistry, biology, and other non-basic sciences. Cover 1 The Multiple Realization Book 4 Copyright 5 Dedication 6 Contents 8 Preface 10 Acknowledgments 12 List of Figures and Tables 14 PART I: Whence Multiple Realization? 16 1: Physicalism and Multiple Realization 18 1 Post-Cartesian Physicalism 18 2 Functionalism and Explanation in Psychology 21 3 What Good Is Multiple Realization? 28 2: Realization and Multiple Realization 33 1 What Is Realization? 33 2 Explanatory Realization Relations 44 3 How Much Multiple Realization Is Enough? 48 3: What Is Multiple Realization? 52 1 Multiple Realization, Variation, and the Autonomy of Psychology 52 2 Putnam’s Recipe and the Basic Recipe 56 3 Multiple Realization and Cognitivism 61 4 Varieties of Multiple Realizability 65 4: Multiple Realization and Relevant Differences 75 1 Relevant Differences 75 2 Beyond Relevant Differences: The Official Recipe 81 3 What Multiple Realization Is Not 92 PART II: The Evidence for Multiple Realizability 96 5: Evidence for Multiple Realization: Neural Plasticity 98 1 Evidence and Ambition 98 2 Early Approaches to Evidence for Multiple Realization 99 3 Situs Inversus Viscerum 101 4 Neural Plasticity and Multiple Realization 105 6: Evidence for Multiple Realization: Kind Splitting and Comparative Evidence 114 1 Memory and Kind Splitting 114 2 Cone Opsins and Trichromacy 119 3 Comparative Evidence for Multiple Realization: Octopuses and Birds 126 4 Direct and Indirect Evidence for Multiple Realization 135 7: The Likelihood of Multiple Realizability 138 1 Evidence for Multiple Realization 138 2 Evidence and Likelihood 139 3 Equipotentiality 143 4 Convergent Evolution 151 5 Machine Minds 161 8: The Computationalist Argument for Multiple Realizability 165 1 Computational Explanation and Task Analysis 165 2 Abstractness and Multiple Realizability 170 3 Neural Computation and Medium Independence 177 4 Methodological Considerations in Favor of Identity 182 PART III: After Multiple Realization 188 9: Putnam’s Revenge 190 1 Taking Stock 190 2 Unification, Individual Differences, and Convergence 193 3 Heuristics, Abstraction, and Idealization 195 4 Kind Splitting 203 10: Mental Causation and the Autonomy of Psychology 209 1 Multiple Realization and Descartes’ Revenge 209 2 Explanatory Exclusion and the Autonomy of Psychology 214 3 Explanation and Ontology 219 4 Intervention and Actual Autonomy 221 5 Identity and Explanation in the Mind-Brain Sciences 226 6 The Special Sciences Reconsidered 231 Guide for Teaching and Learning 236 General Background 236 Chapter 1 236 Additional reading 237 Chapter 2 237 Additional reading 237 Chapter 3 238 Additional reading 238 Chapter 4 238 Additional reading 239 Chapter 5 239 Additional reading 239 Chapter 6 240 Additional reading 240 Chapter 7 240 Additional reading 241 Chapter 8 241 Additional reading 241 Chapter 9 242 Additional reading 242 Chapter 10 242 Additional reading 243 References 244 Index 264 Thomas W. Polger And Lawrence A. Shapiro Provide A Full Investigation Of Multiple Realisation - The Idea That Minds Can Be Realised In Ways Other Than The Human Brainches They Cast Doubt On The Hypothesis And Give An Alternative Framework For Understanding Explanations In The Cognitive Sciences, And In Chemistry, Biology, And Related Fields. Machine Generated Contents Note: Pt. I Whence Multiple Realization? -- 1. Physicalism And Multiple Realization -- 2. Realization And Multiple Realization -- 3. What Is Multiple Realization? -- 4. Multiple Realization And Relevant Differences -- Pt. Ii The Evidence For Multiple Realizability -- 5. Evidence For Multiple Realization: Neural Plasticity -- 6. Evidence For Multiple Realization: Kind Splitting And Comparative Evidence -- 7. The Likelihood Of Multiple Realizability -- 8. The Computationalist Argument For Multiple Realizability -- Pt. Iii After Multiple Realization -- 9. Putnam's Revenge -- 10. Mental Causation And The Autonomy Of Psychology. Thomas W. Polger & Lawrence A. Shapiro. Includes Bibliographical References (pages 229-247) And Index. Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro offer the first full investigation of multiple realization-the idea that minds can be realized in ways other than the human brain. They cast doubt on the hypothesis and offer an alternative framework for understanding explanations in the cognitive sciences, and in chemistry, biology, and related fields.