The Morality of Knowledge in Conversation (Studies in Interactional Sociolinguistics, Series Number 29)

Each time we take a turn in conversation we indicate what we know and what we think others know. However, knowledge is neither static nor absolute. It is shaped by those we interact with and governed by social norms - we monitor one another for whether we are fulfilling our rights and responsibilities with respect to knowledge, and for who has relatively more rights to assert knowledge over some state of affairs. This book brings together an international team of leading linguists, sociologists and anthropologists working across a range of European and Asian languages to document some of the ways in which speakers manage the moral domain of knowledge in conversation. The volume demonstrates that if we are to understand how speakers manage issues of agreement, affiliation and alignment - something clearly at the heart of human sociality - we must understand the social norms surrounding epistemic access, primacy and responsibilities.-- Provided by publisher Cover......Page 1 The Morality of Knowledge in Conversation......Page 3 Studies in Interactional Sociolinguistics......Page 4 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 We dedicate this book to Gail Jefferson and her legacy (1938–2008) ......Page 7 Contents......Page 9 Contributors......Page 11 Preface......Page 13 Acknowledgements......Page 15 1 Temporal and sequential relationships......Page 16 2 Aspects of speech delivery, including aspects of intonation......Page 17 3 Other markings......Page 19 Part I Introduction......Page 23 Introduction......Page 25 Background......Page 26 Knowledge in social interaction......Page 29 Key notions in the study of knowledge in social interaction......Page 30 Epistemic access......Page 31 Epistemic primacy......Page 35 Epistemic responsibilities......Page 39 The morality of knowledge and its implications for interactional cooperation......Page 41 Cooperation in conversation: alignment and affiliation......Page 42 About this volume......Page 45 Conclusion......Page 46 Part II Affiliational consequences of managing epistemic asymmetries......Page 47 Introduction......Page 49 Knowledge and progressivity of talk and action: the example of itinerary descriptions......Page 50 A single case: a knowledgeable speaker who does not know......Page 53 The manifestation of the problem......Page 54 The conjunction of the participants: the opening of the three-way call......Page 55 Resources for expressing epistemic positions: knowledge verbs......Page 59 Claiming not to know and questioning the terms of the previous action ( je ne sais pas )......Page 60 Dealing with reality disjunctures ( je ne connais pas )......Page 64 Evolving epistemic positions......Page 67 Realizing that the knowledgeable speaker possibly does not know: negative questions......Page 68 Alternative sources of knowledge: turning to the computer......Page 69 Call-taker announces results: je vois......Page 72 Contrasting epistemic positions ( je ne vois pas vs. je vois )......Page 73 The resolution of the case......Page 75 Conclusion: reversing knowledge asymmetries......Page 77 Additional transcript conventions......Page 79 Introduction......Page 80 Japanese particle yo......Page 81 Evaluation intensity in interaction......Page 84 Yo- marked first assessments......Page 86 Yo- marked agreements......Page 93 Yo -marked disagreements......Page 99 Conclusion......Page 103 Introduction......Page 104 Contexts of use......Page 110 Orientations to unaskability......Page 116 Multiple responses......Page 123 Discussion......Page 126 Conclusion......Page 128 Introduction......Page 129 Linguistic features and data corpus......Page 132 Preliminary overview of epistemic incongruence and social affiliation in question–answer sequences......Page 134 “As you should know” – jo/ju-accounts that challenge the questioner’s ignorance......Page 137 “As we both know” – jo/ju-accounts after first accounts......Page 140 “Your fault” accounts – treating epistemic incongruence as a moral transgression......Page 145 Discussion......Page 150 Introduction......Page 153 Imaginative transformation: an essential feature of make-believe......Page 154 Exclusive epistemic rights in independent play: “stipulations”......Page 155 Shared epistemic rights in joint play: proposals......Page 163 Violating shared epistemic rights in joint play: report-formatted assertions......Page 166 Reality disjuncture in make-believe......Page 168 Epistemic communities......Page 173 Part III Epistemic resources for managing affiliation and alignment......Page 179 Introduction......Page 181 Empathic moments......Page 183 Ancillary questioning......Page 186 Parallel assessments......Page 190 Subjunctive assessments......Page 191 Observer responses......Page 193 Response cries......Page 195 The affordances of experience descriptions and their demands......Page 198 The sale at the vicarage......Page 199 Discussion......Page 203 Conclusion......Page 204 Introduction......Page 206 The questioning context......Page 208 “No knowledge” prefaces to answers......Page 209 “No knowledge” as question response......Page 210 “No knowledge” and evidentiality......Page 215 Responsibility and types of knowledge......Page 218 A second responsive position......Page 223 Conclusion......Page 227 Introduction......Page 229 Previous studies of ‘you know’......Page 232 Analysis......Page 234 Sequence organization after ‘you know’......Page 251 Discussion......Page 255 Introduction......Page 257 Equivalent epistemic access and unconditional agreement......Page 259 Equivalent but separate epistemic access – agreeing with the facts but not necessarily with the action implications of the prior utterance......Page 264 Displaying resistance in disagreement-indicative contexts......Page 270 Non-committal response: the positive response token......Page 274 Conclusion......Page 277 Introduction......Page 279 Data......Page 281 2. Remedy......Page 282 Problem remedy: a moral project......Page 284 Differential access as a moral matter......Page 286 A cause-and-effect world......Page 287 A canonical problem inquiry sequence......Page 289 Recurrent candidates for cause: injuries and object disputes......Page 290 A child’s responsiveness to the caregiver’s inquiries......Page 292 Joint attention: pointing and showing as resources for answering......Page 293 Case 7 lizard......Page 298 Case 8 ball throw......Page 300 Conclusion......Page 303 Part IV Toward a framework......Page 305 Enchrony......Page 307 Status......Page 313 Propositions and the relativity of knowledge......Page 318 Agency......Page 325 Conclusion......Page 331 References......Page 335 Index......Page 355 In conversation we treat each other as having rights and responsibilities to know certain information and observe each other for violations of this moral order. This book examines practices used in managing what we know, how we monitor one another's knowledge, and how this affects our affiliation with others.