The Moral Psychology of Guilt (Moral Psychology of the Emotions)

In most Western societies, guilt is widely regarded as a vital moral emotion. In addition to playing a central role in moral development and progress, many take the capacity to feel guilt as a defining feature of morality itself: no truly moral person escapes the pang of guilt when she has done something wrong. But proponents of guilt's importance face important challenges, such as distinguishing healthy from pathological forms of guilt, and accounting for the fact that not all cultures value guilt in the same way, if at all. In this volume, philosophers and psychologists come together to think more systematically about the nature and value of guilt. The book begins with chapters on the biological origins and psychological nature of guilt and moves on to discuss the culturally enriched conceptions of guilt and its value that we find in various eastern and western philosophic traditions. In addition, numerous chapters discuss healthy or morally valuable forms guilt and their pathological or irrational shadows. Cover The Moral Psychology of Guilt Series page The Moral Psychology of Guilt Copyright page Contents Acknowledgments Introduction The Nature and Measurement of Guilt Chapter 1 The Feeling of Guilt Some Conceptions of Guilt Opponents of Guilt Proponents of Guilt Problems for Philosophical Accounts of Guilt Empirical Research on Guilt Positive Findings Regarding Guilt Why Guilt Is Not an Emotion Varieties of Guilt Feeling and Being Guilt as a Feeling Feelings and Emotions Conclusion Notes Bibliography Chapter 2 On the Distinction between Shame and Guilt Guilt and Shame: The Standard Picture TOSCA-Shame, TOSCA-Guilt What’s So Bad about Shame? Problems with Guilt Guilt and Shame: A More Complex Story Note Bibliography Chapter 3 Empathy and Conscience Notes Bibliography Chapter 4 Against Exclusively Retrospective Guilt Definitions: Guilt and Temporal Focus A Peculiar Tension Present-Focused Guilt Future-Focused Guilt Conclusion Notes References Chapter 5 Anticipatory Guilt Forward and Backward Guilt The Nature of Guilt Categorizing Emotions Emotion Assessments Assessments of Simulated Guilt Too Much Guilt? Conclusion Notes References Understanding Guilt and Its Functions Chapter 6 The Evolution of Guilt and Its Non-Instrumental Enactments Guilt as an Adaptation Adaptive Prerequisites to Guilt A Constituent-End Account of Guilt Guilt as a Constitutive Moral Emotion Could Constitutive Norm Following and Guilt Have Evolved? Conclusion Note References Chapter 7 Improving Our Understanding of Guilt by Focusing on Its (Inter)Personal Consequences Defining Guilt Guilt’s Interpersonal Consequences Findings of Phenomenological Studies on Guilt Findings of Behavioral Studies on Guilt An Integrative View on Guilt’s Function References Chapter 8 How Guilt Serves Social Functions from Within Is Guilt Social by Nature? The Case For Is Guilt Social by Nature? The Case Against From Social to Personal: Internalization and Mystification Social Origins, Internalized Development? The Internalization of Social Concerns in Self-Control Situations: Theory and Evidence Conclusion References Chapter 9 One Reactive Attitude to Rule Them All 1. Self-Reactive Attitudes among Others 2. Unifying the Classes of Reactive Attitudes 3. Making Sense of Complicated Relationships 4. Guilt, Shame, and Individual Ideals 5. The Argument from Resentment 6. To There and Back Again Notes Section 3: Evaluating Guilt Chapter 10 Darker Sides of Guilt Defining the Obsessive Mind Guilt in OCD Guilt Is Good Self Doing Wrong Things Taking Thoughts Seriously Guilt as a Threat Breaking Rules Unacceptable Guilt The Feared Self: All Those Things I Could Do Insoluble Guilt and Shame Conclusion Notes References Chapter 11 Nietzsche’s Repudiation of Guilt Guilt’s Contingency Leiter on the Innocence of Becoming An Alternative Interpretation Letting Go of Guilt Notes Chapter 12 Conscience and Guilt from St. Paul to Nietzsche1 Notes Chapter 13 A Thomistic View of Conscience and Guilt What Is Conscience? The Conscience Principle Restricting the Conscience Principle Defending the Thomistic Conscience Principle Why the Solution Fits: Guilt, Good Will, and Moral Virtue Notes References Chapter 14 Kant and Williams on Guilt, Shame, and the Morality System The Challenges Posed by Williams’s Critique Guilt and Shame, Continued Honor, Respect, and Conscientious Self-Knowledge in Kant Conclusion: Guilt, Revisited Notes References Chapter 15 Moral Autonomy and Relationality of Confucian Shame Self-Reproaching Shame: Shame as a Feeling of the Disgraced and Vulnerable Self Aristotelian Shame: Shame as a Regulative Sense of Appropriateness and Self-Integrity Relational Shame: Shame as a Relational Moral Sense Confucian Shame as an Inner Moral Sense Confucian Shame as a Developmental Virtue Conclusion Notes References Index About the Contributors Philosophers and psychologists come together to think systematically about the nature and value of guilt, looking at the biological origins and psychological nature of guilt, and then discussing the culturally enriched conceptions of this vital moral emotion.