The metaphysics of The healing : a parallel English-Arabic text = al-Ilahīyāt min al-Shifāʼ

Avicenna, the most influential of Islamic philosophers, produced __The Healing__ as his magnum opus on his religious and political philosophy. Now translated by Michael Marmura, __The Metaphysics__ is the climactic conclusion to this towering work. Through Marmura’s skill as a translator and his extensive annotations, Avicenna’s touchstone of Islamic philosophy is more accessible than ever before. In __The Metaphysics__, Avicenna examines the idea of existence, and his investigation into the cause of all things leads him to a meditation on the nature of God. From this discussion, Avicenna develops a theory of divine causation that synthesizes Neoplatonic, Aristotelian, and Islamic ideas. Within this emanative scheme, Avicenna establishes some of the basic ideas of his religious and political philosophy, as he discusses the divine attributes, divine providence, the hereafter, and the ideal “virtuous” city with its philosopher-prophet as the human link between the terrestrial and heavenly realms. With this edition, __The Metaphysics__ can now be better seen as one of the most masterful works of classical Islamic philosophy. Contents 1.7-5.9 Foreword to the Series Acknowledgments Note on Conventions Translator's Introduction xix Key to the Arabic Notes xv Book One Consisting of eight chapters Chapter [One]: 1 On beginning to seek the subject if]irst philosophyso that its individual quiddity among the sciences becomes evident I. The place of metaphysics in the system of the philosophical sciences (pp. 3, 11–5, 1) (2) The divison philosophical sciences (6) Metaphysics: [Finally, it was stated] that the divine science investigates thethings that are separable from matter in subsistence and definition II. 2 Problems (8) Problem 1: What is its subject-matter? Is it the First Cause or something else? the Book of Demonstration something which is a subject;things that are searched after; and principles, [universally] admitted, fromwhich demonstrations are constructed. (9) Problem 2: 3 Attributes III. Proposed solution to Prob 1: God and the ultimate causes are not the subject-matter of metaphysics (p. 5, 15–9, 10) (10) We will now show you that this science we are after is first philosophyand that it is absolute wisdom A. Negative Proof (11) 1. It is not possible that [God's existence] should be the subject matter. 1 the subject matter of every science is somethingwhose existence is admitted in that science, 2 The existence of God ...is [something] sought in it. (13) 2. The ultimate causes are not the subject-matter of metaphysics (pp. 7, 6–9, 10) four ways according to which the ultimate causes can be considered a. The ultimate causes are not the subject matter of metaphysics when they are taken absolutely (pp. 7, 14–8, 18) i) metaphysics investigates certain notions (like universal and particular, potency and act, possibility and necessity) b. The ultimate causes are not the subject matter of metaphysics when they are taken as causes of a certain type c. The ultimate causes are not the subject matter of metaphysics when they are taken together (p. 9, 1–6) d. If the ultimate causes are the subject-matter of metaphysics when they are taken as existing things, then “existent” is the actual subject-matter of metaphysics (p. 9, 6–8) Chapter [Two]: On attaining the subject matter if this science 7 B. Positive Proof: (1) First Proof: No other science investigates its own subject matter qua existent (pp. 10, 5–12, 14) (2) The subject matter of natural science (3) As for mathematical science (4) The subject matter of logic Besides these sciences, there are no other sciences. (5) Moreover, investigating the state of substance inasmuch as it isan existence and a substance This [inquiry] can neither be part of the knowledge of sensible thingsnor [be] part of the knowledge of what exists in sensible things. (10) Second Proof: There are concepts common to all the sciences, that have to be defined and certified, but no other science investigates them (pp. 12, 15–13, 7) 9 C. Third Proof: the quiddity of “existent qua existent” has not to be known and its existence to be proved (p. 13, 9–12) 12) It is thus clear to you from this totality [of what has been said]that the existent inasmuch as it is an existent is something common toall these things D. Conclusion of the three proofs (p. 13, 12–19) IV. Objection: 10 (14) If the existent is made the subject matter of this science, then the principles of the existents cannot be established in i (15) Response: [This is] because the existent's being a principle is neither [something]that gives it its subsistence nor [something] impossible in it; but, withrespect to the nature of the existent, [it] is something that occurs accidentallyto it and is one of the accidents to it. V. Division of metaphysics (pp. 14, 14–15, 8) 11 (16) What adheres necessarily to this science [therefore] is that it isnecessarily divided into parts [This science] will [also] investigate the First Cause, from whichemanates every caused existent inasmuch as it is a caused existent, not onlyinasmuch as it is an existent in motion (17) Thus, this science investigates the states of the existent-and thethings that belong to it that are akin [to being] divisions and species 11 VI. Goal of Metaphysics A. Solution of the problem of what first philosophy and wisdom are: metaphysics is first philosophy and wisdom (p. 15, 9–13) (18) This, then, is the science sought after in this art. It is first philosophy,because it is knowledge of the first thing in existence (namely, theFirst Cause) and the first thing in generality (namely, existence and unity). B. Metaphysics is, properly speaking, divine science (pp. 15, 13–16, 12) 12 1. Metaphysics possesses the definition of divine science (p. 15, 13–17) 2. Classification of the things investigated by metaphysics on account of their degree of separation from matter (pp. 15,17–16, 11) (19) If, in this science, one investigates that which is not prior tomatter, what is being investigated therein is only an idea, that idea notrequiring matter for its existence. 3. Conclusion: this type of things is the goal of metaphysics (p. 16, 11–12) Chapter [Three] 13 On the benifit of this science, the order [in which it is studied] and its name 13 (1) I. Benefits of this Science (gives verification to subordinate sciences) (6) II. Concerning the order [in which] this science [is studied], it shouldbe learned after the natural and mathematical sciences. 14 (7) III. Circularity objection 15 (8) IV. Response: The principle of a science is not a principle merely because allthe questions depend on it for their demonstrative proofs (11) V. You ought to know that, within [this subject] itself, there is a way toshow that the purpose in this science is to attain a principle without[requiring first] another science (13) VI. As for the name of this science, it is [metaphysics,] "that which is after nature." Chapter [Four] 19 On the totality of matters discussed in this science [Table of Contents] (1) Hence, we must, in this art, know the state of the relation of thething and the existent to the categories-the state of privation, the stateof necessity (that is, necessary existence and its conditions), and thestate of possibility and its true nature (this being the same as theoreticalinvestigation of potentiality and actuality). [We must also] examine thestate of what is in essence and what is accidental; the true and the false; and [bk 2] the state of substance 2) [bk 3] Since, in terms of some kind [of opposition], the opposite of substance is accident, [bk 4] We must [also] know the ranks of all the substancesin relation to each other in existence according to their priorityand posteriority. (3) [bk 5] In this place it is proper to acquaint ourselves with the state of theuniversal and the particular, the whole and the part Chapter [Five]: 22 On indicating the existent, the thing, and their]irstdivision, wherewith attention is directed to the objective [sought} I. The primary concepts in general (pp. 29, 5-30, 6) A. “Existent”, “thing” and “necessary” as primary concepts (p. 29, 5-6) 22 (1) are impressed in the soul in a primary way. 1. This impression doesnot require better known things to bring it about. a. [This is similar] towhat obtains in the category of assent, where there are primary principles,found to be true in themselves, causing [in turn] assent to the truths ofother [propositions]. b. If the expression denoting them does not occur to themind or is not understood, then it would be impossible to know vvhatever is known through them. B. The primary concepts are conceived in themselves, principles of other (2) Similarly, in conceptual matters, there are things which are principlesfor conception that are conceived in themselves. C. (5) The things that have the highest claim to be conceived in themselvesare those common to all matters 23 II. “Existent” and “thing” (pp. 30, 3-32, 5) (5) The things that have the highest claim to be conceived in themselvesare those common to all matters-as, for example, "the existent,""the one thing," and others. 23 A. “Existent” and “thing” cannot be defined: examples of pseudo-definitions of “existent” and “thing” (pp. 30, 3-31, 2) for example, one who says: "It isof the existent's true nature to be either active or acted on." B. (8) [Moreover] we say: The meaning of "existence" and the meaningof "thing" are conceived in the soul and are two meanings, 24 1. First Formulation 24 2. 2nd Formulation (10) To resume, we say: It is evident that each thing has a realityproper to it-namely, its quiddity. C. ”Existent” is an inseparable concomitant of “thing”] D. Criticism of the opinion according to which “thing” can be absolutely non-existent (pp. 32, 6-34, 10) 25 "The thing may be absolutely nonexistent," 1. A “thing” cannot be non-existent both in the mind and in the external reality (p. 32, 6-11) (12) Concerning what is said-[namely,] "The thing is that aboutwhich information is given"-[this] is true. 2. The absolutely non-existent cannot be enunciated (pp. 32, 12-33, 11) (13) Regarding the informative statement, [the above analysis is correct]because information is always about something realized in the mind. 3. The absolutely non-existent cannot be known: only the non-existent that does not exist in external reality but exists in the mind can be known (p. 33, 12-15) (16) We say only that we have knowledge of the nonexistent 4. Explanation of the adversaries’ error (pp. 33, 16-34, 9) (17) According to those who uphold the view [rejected above] IV. Rejection of the opinion according to which “existent” and “thing” are not equivalent to their synonyms, and the attribute of a thing can be neither an existing thing nor a non-existing thing (p. 34, 9-14) (19) Hence, you have now understood the way in which "the thing"differs from what is understood by "the existent" and "the realized" 27 V. “Existent” is predicated according to priority and posteriority, and can be taken into account by a science (pp. 34, 15-35, 2) 27 (21) 'We now say: Although the existent, as you have known, is not agenus and is not predicated equally of what is beneath it, yet it has a meaningagreed on with respect to priority and posteriority. VI. “Necessary”, “possible”, “impossible” (pp. 35, 3-36, 6) 27 A. “Necessary”, “possible” and “impossible” cannot be defined properly: mutual circularity of their definitions (pp. 35.3–36.3) Pseudo-definitions of "necessary", "possible", "impossible" (22) It may also prove difficult for us to make known the state of thenecessary, the possible, and the impossible through ascertained definition,[and we would have to make this known] only through a sign. 1. First set of ps-Definitions (p. 35, 8-16): 2. 2nd set of ps-Definitions [using statements] (pp. 35,17-36,2): B. Priority of “necessary” with regard to “possible” and “impossible” (p. 36.4–6) VII. Criticism of the opinion according to which what has ceased to exist can be brought back to existence (p. 36, 6-19) 29 A. Exposition of the opinion (p. 36.6–8) (25) From our explaining these matters, it will become clear to yOUthat it is false for someone to say: B. First criticism (p. 36.8–11) C. Second criticism (p. 36.11–9) (26) [But if one argues in this way,] the nonexistent becomes anexistent in the manner to which we have alluded previously Chapter [Six]: 29 On commencing a discourse on the Necessary Existentand the possible existent; that the Necessary Existent has no cause;that the possible existent is caused; that the Necessary Existenthas no equivalent in existence and is not dependent [in existence}on another I. The Properties of the Necessary in Existence: Intro & Outline (1) ... There are specific properties that belong individually each to the Necessary Existent and the possible existent. (2) We thus say: That which in itself is a necessary existent has nocause, while that which in itself is a possible existent has a cause. 30 II. The Necessary Being has no cause, whereas the Possible Being is caused A. (3) That the Necessary Existent has no cause is obvious B. The Necessary Being per se cannot be the necessary being through another From this it is[also] clear that it is impossible for a thing to be [both] a necessaly existentin itself and a necessary existent though another. C. The Possible Existent has a cause 31 (4) Moreover, whatever is possible in existence when considered initself, its existence and nonexistence are both due to a cause. 1. If [it occurs] through another, then [this] otheris the cause. 2. if it did not exist through another, [then the nonexistenceof the other is the cause of its nonexistence]. D. The Possible Existent is necessary because of its cause (6) We thus say: [The possible in itself] must become necessarythrough a cause and with respect to it. III. On the Necessary Being: it is neither equal or related to any other 32 A. The Necessary Being is not equal to any other, bec. what is equal depends on a cause (7) We [further] say: It is impossible for the Necessary Existent tobe equivalent to another necessary existent 1. (8) If [(a)] necessary in itself, then either it would have also a necessitywith respect to the other, 2. (9) But, if [(b)] it is not necessary in itself, then, considered in itself,it must be possible in existence and considered, with respect to the other,necessary in existence. B. The Necessary Being is not related to any other 33 1. Related things depend on a cause (12) The two related things [are such that] one is not necessitated bythe other but is [necessary] with the other, that which necessitates thembeing the cause that brought them together 1. 1st Proof 2. 2nd Proof Chapter [Seven]: 34 That the Necessary Existent is one IV. On the Necessary Being: it is neither equal or related to any other 32 A. 1st Proof (1) We further say: The Necessary Existent must be one entity. B. 2nd Proof 35 (5) Indeed, we must add further clarification of this, [taking it] fromanother aspect-namely, that division of the meaning of necessary existencein [the supposed] multiplicity must conform to [only] one of tWOalternatives. C. 3rd Proof 37 (9) If necessary existence is an attribute of the thing, existing for it,then [there are two alternatives. D. Response to Objection (10) If [to this] someone were to say, "Its existence for this [thing]does not prevent its existence as an attribute for the other E. Conclusion 38 (13) The Necessary Existent is therefore one in [its] entirety (not asspecies are [subsumed] under genus) and one in number V. On the Possible Being 38 (5) Indeed, we must add further clarification of this, [taking it] fromanother aspect-namely, that division of the meaning of necessary existencein [the supposed] multiplicity must conform to [only] one of tWOalternatives. (6) One of the two is that the true nature of necessary existence isnothing but the very assuredness of existence Chapter [Eight]: 38 On clarifjing [the meaning] if"truth" and"veracity';- difense ifthe primary statements in true premises (12) 43 As for the obdurate, he must be subjected to the conflagration of fire, Book Two Consisting of four chapters 45 Chapter [One]: On making known substance and its divisionsin a universal way 45 (1) Being per se and per accidens (2) The most prior of the division of [things that] in themselves are existents is substance. (9) Necessary Existence is Not a Substance (10) Division of Substance Chapter [Two]: On ascertaining corporeal substance and what is composed from it 48 (1) the first division of substance: the nature of corporeality or body (3) It is not necessary that in every body there should be an actual line. 49 (7) This, then, is how body should be defined (12) II. First Hypothesis of body – divisible – contra and refutation of atomists 52 (19) 2nd Hypothesis of Body – form of corporeality, is actual, and is potential 53 (20) A questioner, however, may ask and say, "Hyle is also composite. 54 (23) From this it has become evident that the form of corporeaJityinasmuch as it is the form of corporeality is in need of matter. (27) As for the corporeality which we are discussing [however] it isin itself a realized nature whose specific kind is not realized throughsomething that joins it, (29) ... the need for matter belongs essentially to corporealityand to whatever possesses matter-and it belongs to corporeality inasmuchas it is corporeality 57 Chapter [Three]: That corporeal matter is not devoid of form 57 (1) We now say: This corporeal matter cannot exist devoid of form in actuality. Chapter [Four]: On placing form prior to matter in the rank of existence 63 (2)...With any two things, of which neither is thecause or the effect of the other [but] which have [the above] connectionbetween them, it is not possible for the removal of the one inasmuch asit is an essence to be the cause of the removal of the other. (3).. it is evident that thelike of [these] is not [in itself] a necessary existent (being in its quidditya possible existent), but [that it] becomes a necessary existent throughanother. However, it cannot at all become a necessary existent through thatother; this we have shown. This [connection] would, then,either belong to their two quiddities-in which case these [quiddilies]would be related, when it has been clearly seen that they are not relatedor[it would be found] in the existence of [each]. In the final analysis, it and its companionwould have to become necessary in existence through a third thing (ifwe ascend in terms of causes). (5)... But the cause of a cause is [itself] acause. (6) Let us now consider which of the two ought to be the cause. Asfor matter, it cannot be the cause for the existence of form. (7) Secondly, it is impossible for a thing's essence, when still inpotentiality, to be the cause of something in actuality. Rather, its essencemust have become actual, it is possible, in the case of some causes of the existence of a thing,that there might exist, by [the cause], only a thing that is connected withits essence; If matter, then, were to be the cause of form, it wouldnecessarily have an essence that in actuality is prior to the form. (8) Thirdly, if matter were the proximate cause of form, (9).. there remains receptivity alone [for matter]. It thus becomesfalse that matter, in any respect, is the cause of form. (10) As for form whose matter is [never] separated from it, this ispossible. But as regards the form that separates from matter, [with that]matter continuing to exist with another form, this is not possible. It is thus necessary that the cause of the existenceof matter is something conjoined with form, so that the existenceof matter emanates only from that thing. (11) ... [matter] does not cease to exist with the annihilationof form, since form only separates from it to be [replaced by]another form which acts with the cause (from which the principle of theexistence of matter derives), performing the same act as the first form. (12) For many an existing thing is only completely [realized] throughthe existence of two things. light and illumination come aboutfrom an illuminating cause and from a quality that is not specifically the[only one] that renders the illuminated body receptive to having the raypenetrate it without being reflected. (13) Someone, however, may say: If the connection of matter is withthat thing and with form, then their combination is akin to the cause [ofthe connection]. (14) [In answering this,] we say: For that thing and the form inasmuch as it is[simply form] will always exist, so that, if that were not to exist, therewould be no matter; and, if that form inasmuch as it is form did notexist, there would be no matter. If the first form were to cease to exist,[but] not because of the successive second [form], then that separatething would be alone, (15) Someone, however, may say: The combination of this-the causeand the form-is not numerically one but one in a general sense. (16) We say: We do not disallow that the one in the general sensewhich preserves the unity of its generality, in terms of what is numericallyone, should be the cause of that which is numerically one. (17) Forms, then, are either forms from which matter never separatesor forms from which matter separates but of whose likeness matteris never devoid. (I8) [In the case of] forms that separate from matter to be succeeded[by other forms], that which places [the successive form] in [matter]perpetuates it by rendering that form the successor. If the [first form] is rendered subsistent by the cause that perpetuatesmatter through [the form's] mediation, then subsistence, deriving fromthe [celestial] first principles, belongs to [the form] first, then to matter. (I9) As for the forms from which matter does not separate, it is notpermissible to make them caused by matter whereby matter in itselfdetermines and necessitates them. a thing inasmuch as it is receptive is other than [a thing] inasmuchas it is necessitating. (20) Form, therefore, is prior to matter; For actuality is the essence8 of form. (21) As for the nature of that which is potential, its receptacle ismatter. Cause is not rendered subsistent by effect. (22) Form, then, exists only in hyle, [but] not in [the sense] that hyleis either the cause of its existence or of its existence in hyle. (23) By this it becomes evident that every form that exists in corporealmatter exists through some cause. Book Three Consisting of ten chapters 71 Chapter [One]: On indicating what ought to be investigatedregarding the state ifthe nine categories and about theiraccidental [nature] Chapter [Two]: 74 On discussing the one Chapter [Three]: 79 On ascertaining the one and the many and showing that number is an accident Chapter [One]: On making known substance and its divisionsin a universal way Book Four Consisting of three chapters 124 Chapter [One]On the prior and the posterior, and on origination BOOK FIVE Consisting of nine chapters 148 Chapter [One]: On general things and the manner of their existence I. Definitions of Universal & Particular (1) It behooves us now to discuss the universal and the particular. 148 A. (2) 3-Fold Definition of Universal (3) It is possible to combine all this [in saying] that this universal is that whose very conception does not prevent its being predicated of many B. Definition of particular 149 II. Distinction between Universal and Nature to which it Belongs (4) The universal, then, inasmuch as it is a universal, is one thing;and, inasmuch as it is something to which universality attaches, A. Universal as Such B. Nature in Itself as Such 1. It is Nothing but Itself is neither one nor many Rather, oneness is an attribute that conjoins with "horseness," 2. (5) Only the Negation of Contradictory Predicates is Said of It 3. (6) Neither of two Contraries of these Contradictories are Predicated of It 150 4. (7) It is Neither One nor Many 5. (9) [Response to Objection 1: Same or Different?] In itself It is One in Number absolute negation 6. (11) RR to Obj 2: Aren't its Negative Attributes Other than It? 151 7. (12) How to Answer Questions of This Kind C. (15) Resume 152 "animal" in x is a part III. Properties of Nature in Itself in Relation to Particulars or Universality A. (18) It is Permissible to Consider Nature Thus 153 1. What is Additional to it Is Either Accidental or a Necessary Concomitant 2. It is Prior in Being to Particular or Universal 3. (19) It is Necessarily either One or Many B. (20) It Can Exist in Individuals C. (21) Objection against this Conclusion: Animal qua Animal Exists, therefore it is Separate 154 D. (23) Response (24) it is a necessary concomitant of animal to be either particular or general. E. (25) Clarification: On Non-Necessity of Negative Attributes 'Non-Particularity' & 'Non-Universality' 155 (26) [2 Ways of Considering A qua A in Abstraction] the Platonic exemplars F. (27) Animal in Itself Need not be something Separate G. (28) Resume 156 1. Animal, then, taken with its accidents, is the natural thing. 2. Its [Proper] Existence is Prior 3. Divine as Caused by God 4. Its Existence in Matter is the Result of the Particular Nature IV. (28 cont) On the Nature to Which Universality Belongs as Universal 156 A. It is Found in Intellect as a Simple Form B. It Has One Relation to Particulars C. (29) It Is Many in Number as in Intellects 157 D. (30) 2 Modes of Being for Universals Chapter [Two]: 157 On the manner in which universality comes tobelong to universal natures; completing the discussion ifthis[topic]; and on the dijference between the whole and the part,the universal and the particular I. Summary Presentation of Universal A. (1) Universals Do not Exist in Reality, but in Soul 1. Doubt 2. Response B. (2 cont.) Relation of Universals to Matter 158 1. Natures that are [infima] Species i. Some Natures Require no Matter ii. (3) Others Require Matter 2. Generic Natures II. Detailed Treatment A. (4) It is not possible for one specific meaning to exist in many [things). 158 B. (5 cont.) Universal is in Soul as related to Many 159 C. (6 cont.) Universals in Soul are based on Particulars D. (9) Equivocal Senses of "Universal" III. (10) On Whole & Part in light of Universal/Particular 161 Chapter [Three]: 162 On dijferentiating between genus and matter (3) Body is spoken of as a genus of man and as the matter of man Chapter [Four] 168 On the manner in which ideas extraneous to genus enter its nature (1) Let us now discuss the things whose assemblage within genus is possible, pausing to consider establishing [that] its nature and quiddity, as realized in actuality, are due to them. Chapter [Five]On the species Chapter [Six] On making differentia known and ascertaining [its nature} (8) We now say: As for differentia, (12) As for the premise stating that, because differentia is a certain idea, it must then be either the most general of predicates or subsumed under the most general of predicates (14) Thus, the differentia which is spoken ofunivocally means somethinghaving a certain description in an unqualified [sense]. Chapter [Seven] On making known the proper relationship between ddinition and the thing ddined Chapter [Eight]On difinition (1) What we must now make known is the manner in which thingsare defined, the relation of definition to them, and the differencebetween a thing's quiddity and form. 3) As for composite things, there occurs in them the repetition ofone and the same thing twice. (5) The quiddity of every[thing that is] simple is the same as itselfbecause there is nothing receptive of its quiddity. its form is not that to which itsdefinition corresponds. Chapter [Nine] On the appropriate relation between difinition and its parts 190 Book Six Consisting of five chapters 194 Chapter [One] On the division of causes and their states 194 I. (1) Retrospective Introduction II. (2) Initial Division of 4 Causes A. (2) Enumeration B. (3) Classification: Included in Subsistence or Not 195 C. (4) 4-5 Causes, Depending on How Matter is Understood: as Potency or as Element III. (4 cont.) Some Precisions on Each of the Causes 195 A. Precisions re: Material Cause 1. Element is not a Principle of Form 2. What is in Potency is also not a Principle, except Accidentally 3. Subject is a Principle of Accidents B. (5) Precisions re: Formal Cause 196 form is prox principle of existence, giving it makes matter be in act C. (6) Precisions re: Efficient Cause 196 1 Df 2 Distinction between Agent & Effect 3 In the case of Cause of Motion, Agent Brings about Effect where it is, but in what is Distinct: Nature is Efficient Cause of Motion 4. (9) Agent Causes of Temporal Effects Do Not Cause Non-Existence, but only Existence 197 5. (9) Response to Objection 1: "the fact of Going from Non-Existence to Existence" is Caused 197 6. (11) Response to Objection 2: Agent Cause Is only Necessary at Outset of Coming from Non-Existence 198 a. (12) Resp 1 b. (14) Resp 2 [199] c. (16) Resp 3 [200] 7. Summary Conclusion 200 Chapter [Two] On resolving doubts directed against what the adherents of true doctrine hold, to the effect that every cause coexists with its effect; and on ascertaining the true statements about the efficient cause 201 I. True Causes are Simultaneous with Effects & Do not Form an Infinite Series A. (1) The Reason for the Opinion that Effects Can Exist after the Cessation of Their Cause 201 1. Analysis of Examples (2) builder, father, fire are simul with change 2. (5) Causes that are Temporally Prior Are Per Accidens or Dispositive Causes 202 3. The True Cause in Each Case B. (6) Causes that Are Prior to Their Effects Are Infinite 202 C. (7) There Cannot be an Infinite Number of True Necessitating Causes 1. Argument a. An Infinite Number of Necessitating Causes Would Either Exist in Succession without Duration b. or Would Overlap Each Other c. Or They Would Change, in Which Case Something Must Necessitate Them d. Conclusion 203 II. Agent v. Creative Cause A. (9) Creative Cause 203 B. (10) The Distinction between Effects that Originate in Two Senses C. (12) Response to Objection: No Mediate Cause Can be Creative, even if Immaterial 204 D. (14) Agent Cause Chapter [Three] On the compatibility between the efficient causes and their effects 205 Ch 4: Concerning the other causes-the elemental ,the ftrmal, and the final 215 (I) This [then] is what we say about the efficient principle. As regards the element, it is that wherein is the potentiality of a thing's existence. (4) If they [bear] it singly, [then this takes place in one of two alternatives. This is [the thing] which,properly speaking, ought to be called subject with respect to that which isin it. (5) As for [the thing that bears potentiality], by participating withanother, it necessarily has combination and composition. (9) As regards the form, we say: "Form" is said of every meaning inactuality which is suitable for performing action, so that, in this sense,the separate substances are forms. [Sometimes] "form" is said of that by which matter is renderedsubsistent in act, (10) You have known that one and the same thing may, in "Avicenna (Ibn Sina, 980-1037) was the most systematic, thorough, and influential of the Islamic philosophers. His Metaphysics (Al-Ilahiyyat) is the climactic, concluding part of his magnum opus, The Healing (Al-Shifa). As in his physics and mathematics, the existent is once again Avicenna's main subject in the metaphysics. But while in the physics he examines the existent inasmuch as it is subject to motion and rest, and in the mathematics inasmuch as it is quantified or relates to measure and quantity, in his metaphysics Avicenna deals with the existent as such - not inasmuch as it is either in motion or quantified, but simply inasmuch as it is an existent, without qualification. In addition, Avicenna here seeks to understand the cause of all things, which leads him, as it lead Aristotle before him, to a discussion of God. He develops an emanative theory of divine causation that represents a remarkable synthesis of Neoplatonic, Aristotelian, and Islamic ideas. Within this emanative scheme we encounter some of the basic ideas of Avicenna's religious and political philosophy, including his discussion of the divine attributes, divine providence, the Hereafter, and the ideal, "virtuous" city with its philosopher-prophet as the recipient and conveyer of the revealed law, a human link between the celestial and the terrestrial worlds."--Jacket