The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)

Lynne Rudder Baker presents and defends a unique account of the material world: the Constitution View. In contrast to leading metaphysical views that take everyday things to be either non-existent or reducible to micro-objects, the Constitution View construes familiar things as irreducible parts of reality. Although they are ultimately constituted by microphysical particles, everyday objects are neither identical to, nor reducible to, the aggregates of microphysical particles that constitute them. The result is genuine ontological diversity: people, bacteria, donkeys, mountains and microscopes are fundamentally different kinds of things - all constituted by, but not identical to, aggregates of particles. Baker supports her account with discussions of non-reductive causation, vagueness, mereology, artefacts, three-dimensionalism, ontological novelty, ontological levels and emergence. The upshot is a unified ontological theory of the entire material world that irreducibly contains people, as well as non-human living things and inanimate objects. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Series-title......Page 4 Title......Page 7 Copyright......Page 8 Dedication......Page 9 Contents......Page 11 Preface......Page 15 Introduction......Page 19 1 Beginning in the middle......Page 21 WHY DO WE NEED AMETAPHYSICS OF ORDINARY THINGS?......Page 24 IDP HENOMENA......Page 29 PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE OF THINGS......Page 31 PRACTICAL REALISM......Page 33 WHAT LIES AHEAD......Page 39 PART I Everyday things......Page 41 MOTIVATION FOR NONREDUCTION......Page 43 THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTION......Page 50 IS THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTION PLAUSIBLE?......Page 57 THINKING THINGS IN TO EXISTENCE?......Page 61 CONCLUSION......Page 65 AGGREGATES AND ARTIFACTS......Page 67 CONDITIONS FOR BEING AN ARTIFACT......Page 69 A CONSTITUTION VIEW OF ARTIFACTS......Page 71 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MALFUNCTION......Page 73 THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF ARTIFACTS......Page 77 CONCLUSION......Page 84 THE CONSTITUTION VIEW OF HUMAN PERSONS......Page 85 COMING INTO EXI STENCE : HUMAN ORGANISMS AND HUMAN PERSONS......Page 90 LIFE AND DEATH......Page 100 QUASI-NATURALISM AND THE ONTOLOGICAL UNIQUENESS OF PERSONS......Page 103 THREE APPROACHES CONTRASTED......Page 108 CONCLUSION......Page 111 PART II The everyday world......Page 113 5 Commonsense causation......Page 115 JAEGWON KIM’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST NONREDUCTIVE MENTAL CAUSATION......Page 117 DOES KIM’S KEY ARGUMENT GENERALIZE TO ALL MACROCAUSATION?......Page 122 RESPONSE TO KIM’S KEY ARGUMENT......Page 124 AN ACCOUNT OF NONREDUCTIVE CAUSATION......Page 129 SAVING NONREDUCTIVE MATERIALISM......Page 134 CONCLUSION......Page 137 6 Metaphysical vagueness......Page 139 ARGUMENTS FOR METAPHYSICAL VAGUENESS......Page 141 Argument from semantic indecision......Page 142 Argument from natural processes......Page 144 WHERE IN THE WORLD IS VAGUENESS?......Page 145 SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL BOUNDARIES......Page 146 Spatial vagueness......Page 147 Temporal vagueness......Page 148 THE VAGUENESS OF THE CONSTITUTION RELATION......Page 150 SORITES ARGUMENTS......Page 153 7 Time......Page 160 THE A-SERIES AND THE B-SERIES......Page 161 THE INDISPENSABILITY OF BOTH A- AND B-SERIES......Page 163 A THEORY OF TIME......Page 167 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS......Page 170 BEYOND PRESENTISM AND ETERNALISM......Page 172 CONCLUSION......Page 173 PART III Metaphysical underpinnings......Page 175 8 Constitution revisited......Page 177 DEFINITION OF ‘‘X CONSTITUTES Y AT T’’......Page 178 UNITY WITHOUT IDENTITY......Page 184 THE SAMEF......Page 187 OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES......Page 190 9 Mereology and constitution......Page 199 SUMS AND CONSTITUTION......Page 200 A CONSTITUTION VIEW OF PARTS......Page 205 ARE PARTS MORE BASIC THAN WHOLES?......Page 208 THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF SUMS......Page 209 SOME PHILOSOPH ICAL PUZZLES......Page 212 CONCLUSION......Page 215 THREE-DIMENSIONALISM V S. FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM......Page 217 THE ARGUMENT FROM VAGUENESS......Page 219 ‘‘PARADOXES OF COINCIDENCE’’......Page 226 REASONS TO PREFER THREE-DIMENSIONALISM......Page 231 CONCLUSION......Page 235 AN ACCOUNT OF ONTOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE......Page 236 TIME AND EXISTENCE......Page 244 ONTOLOGICAL LEVELS......Page 252 EMERGENCE......Page 255 CONCLUSION......Page 257 Select bibliography......Page 259 Index......Page 268 Cover 1 Half-title 3 Series-title 4 Title 7 Copyright 8 Dedication 9 Contents 11 Preface 15 Introduction 19 1 Beginning in the middle 21 WHY DO WE NEED AMETAPHYSICS OF ORDINARY THINGS? 24 IDP HENOMENA 29 PHILOSOPHY IN THE MIDDLE OF THINGS 31 PRACTICAL REALISM 33 WHAT LIES AHEAD 39 PART I Everyday things 41 2 The reality of ordinary things 43 MOTIVATION FOR NONREDUCTION 43 THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTION 50 IS THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTION PLAUSIBLE? 57 THINKING THINGS IN TO EXISTENCE? 61 CONCLUSION 65 3 Artifacts 67 AGGREGATES AND ARTIFACTS 67 CONDITIONS FOR BEING AN ARTIFACT 69 A CONSTITUTION VIEW OF ARTIFACTS 71 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MALFUNCTION 73 THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF ARTIFACTS 77 CONCLUSION 84 4 Human persons 85 THE CONSTITUTION VIEW OF HUMAN PERSONS 85 COMING INTO EXI STENCE : HUMAN ORGANISMS AND HUMAN PERSONS 90 LIFE AND DEATH 100 QUASI-NATURALISM AND THE ONTOLOGICAL UNIQUENESS OF PERSONS 103 THREE APPROACHES CONTRASTED 108 CONCLUSION 111 PART II The everyday world 113 5 Commonsense causation 115 JAEGWON KIM’S ARGUMENTS AGAINST NONREDUCTIVE MENTAL CAUSATION 117 DOES KIM’S KEY ARGUMENT GENERALIZE TO ALL MACROCAUSATION? 122 RESPONSE TO KIM’S KEY ARGUMENT 124 AN ACCOUNT OF NONREDUCTIVE CAUSATION 129 SAVING NONREDUCTIVE MATERIALISM 134 CONCLUSION 137 6 Metaphysical vagueness 139 ARGUMENTS FOR METAPHYSICAL VAGUENESS 141 Argument from semantic indecision 142 Argument from natural processes 144 WHERE IN THE WORLD IS VAGUENESS? 145 SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL BOUNDARIES 146 Spatial vagueness 147 Temporal vagueness 148 THE VAGUENESS OF THE CONSTITUTION RELATION 150 SORITES ARGUMENTS 153 7 Time 160 THE A-SERIES AND THE B-SERIES 161 THE INDISPENSABILITY OF BOTH A- AND B-SERIES 163 A THEORY OF TIME 167 METAPHYSICAL IMPLICATIONS 170 BEYOND PRESENTISM AND ETERNALISM 172 CONCLUSION 173 PART III Metaphysical underpinnings 175 8 Constitution revisited 177 DEFINITION OF ‘‘X CONSTITUTES Y AT T’’ 178 UNITY WITHOUT IDENTITY 184 THE SAMEF 187 OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES 190 9 Mereology and constitution 199 SUMS AND CONSTITUTION 200 A CONSTITUTION VIEW OF PARTS 205 ARE PARTS MORE BASIC THAN WHOLES? 208 THE ONTOLOGICAL STATUS OF SUMS 209 SOME PHILOSOPH ICAL PUZZLES 212 CONCLUSION 215 10 Three-dimensionalism defended 217 THREE-DIMENSIONALISM V S. FOUR-DIMENSIONALISM 217 THE ARGUMENT FROM VAGUENESS 219 COUNT INDETERMIN ACY? 226 ‘‘PARADOXES OF COINCIDENCE’’ 226 REASONS TO PREFER THREE-DIMENSIONALISM 231 CONCLUSION 235 11 Five ontological issues 236 AN ACCOUNT OF ONTOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE 236 TIME AND EXISTENCE 244 ONTOLOGICAL NOVELTY 252 ONTOLOGICAL LEVELS 252 EMERGENCE 255 CONCLUSION 257 Select bibliography 259 Index 268 In The Metaphysics Of Everyday Life Lynne Rudder Baker Presents And Defends A Unique Account Of The Material World; The Constitution View. In Contrast To Leading Metaphysical Views That Take Everyday Things To Be Either Non-existent Or Reducible To Micro-objects, The Constitution View Construes Familiar Things As Irreducible Parts Of Reality. Although They Are Ultimately Constituted By Microphysical Particles, Everyday Objects Are Neither Identical To, Nor Reducible To, The Aggregates Of Microphysical Particles That Constitute Them. The Result Is Genuine Ontological Diversity People, Bacteria, Donkeys, Mountains, And Microscopes Are Fundamentally Different Kinds Of Things - All Constituted By, But Not Identical To, Aggregates Of Particles. Baker Supports Her Account With Discussions Of Non-reductive Causation, Vagueness, Mereology, Artifacts, Three-dimensionalism, Ontological Novelty, Ontological Levels, And Emergence. The Upshot Is A Unified Ontological Theory Of The Entire Material World That Irreducibly Contains People, As Well As Non-human Living Things And Inanimate Objects.--jacket. Beginning In The Middle -- The Reality Of Ordinary Things -- Artifacts -- Human Persons -- Commonsense Causation -- Metaphysical Vagueness -- Time -- Constitution Revisited -- Mereology And Constitution -- Three-dimensionalism Defended -- Five Ontological Issues. Lynne Rudder Baker. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 241-249) And Index. Cover; Half-title; Series-title; Title; Copyright; Dedication; Contents; Preface; Introduction; 1 Beginning in the middle; PART I Everyday things; 2 The reality of ordinary things; 3 Artifacts; 4 Human persons; PART II The everyday world; 5 Commonsense causation; 6 Metaphysical vagueness; 7 Time; PART III Metaphysical underpinnings; 8 Constitution revisited; 9 Mereology and constitution; 10 Three-dimensionalism defended; 11 Five ontological issues; Select bibliography; Index.Electronic reproduction.Available via World Wide Web. In this book, Lynne Rudder Baker presents and defends a unique account of the material world: the constitution view. In contrast to leading metaphysical views that take everyday things to be either non-existent or reducible to micro-objects, the constitution view construes familiar things as irreducible parts of reality