The Metaphysics of Contingency: A Theory of Objects’ Abilities and Dispositions (Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics)

"Philosophers approach the problem of possibility in two markedly different ways: with reference to worlds, whereby an event is possible if there is a world in which it occurs, and with reference to modal properties, whereby an event is a possible manifestation of a property of some substance or object. Showing how the world-account of possibilities cannot properly explain the nature of properties within worlds, Ferenc Huoranszki argues that the latter approach is more plausible. He develops a theory of contingent possibilities grounded in a clear distinction between abilities and dispositions as real, first-order modal properties of objects, with fundamentally distinct ontological roles. By understanding abilities as first-order modal properties, and by linking such modal properties to counterfactual conditionals, Huoranszki argues we can distinguish between variably generic or specific abilities and identify more or less abstract possibilities in a world. In doing so, he furthers our understanding of how we reason with possibilities in both ordinary and theoretical contexts. Providing a novel account of dispositions, abilities and their capacity to explain modality, this book advances current debates in contemporary metaphysics."-- Provided by publisher Half Title Series Page Title Page Copyright Page Dedication Contents Tables Preface Chapter 1: The varieties of modal properties Possibilities, worlds, contingency Dispositions, powers and laws Abilities, possibilities and abstraction Modal properties, intentional states and realism Identification, conditionals and reasoning Manifestations, events and actuality Contexts, method and ground Chapter 2: Dispositions and abilities Introducing dispositions Being disposed to and being able to Why abilities are not dispositions Why dispositions are not abilities Dispositions and laws Teleological dispositions Chapter 3: Specificity and extrinsicness Specificity Extrinsic abilities and abstraction Intrinsicness and duplications The sense of sensitivity Intrinsicness and systems Chapter 4: Modal properties and conditionals: The nature of the connection The purpose of a conditional analysis: Phenomenalism, ontological reduction or enhanced understanding The traditional conditional analysis of dispositions and the standard objections Masks, antidotes and circumstances Why finks and masks are different Losing and gaining abilities A nonreductive conditional analysis of abilities ‘Achilles heels’, accidents and the conditional analysis of dispositions Chapter 5: Modal properties and conditionals: The scope of the connection A modal-property analysis of counterfactuals Some remarks on the logic of counterfactual conditionals Abilities and nondeterministic processes Ascribing abilities and reasoning with possibilities Interactions and the limits of generality Modal properties without conditionals Chapter 6: Manifestations, events and causes Manifestations and mimics Events, states and abilities Manifestations and effects Causal consequences versus abilities’ results Counting events and abilities Chapter 7: Possibility, actuality and worlds From events to worlds Contingency and contradiction Recombination and independence Essentialism: A world without contingency The constituents of actuality Idealism The system of beings References Index Philosophers approach the problem of possibility in two markedly different ways: with reference to worlds, whereby an event is possible if there is a world in which it occurs, and with reference to modal properties, whereby an event is a possible manifestation of a property of some substance or object. Showing how the world-account cannot properly explain the nature of possibilities within worlds, Ferenc Huoranszki argues that the latter approach is more plausible. He develops a theory of contingent possibilities grounded in a distinction between abilities and dispositions as real, first-order modal properties of objects, with fundamentally distinct ontological roles. By understanding abilities as first-order modal properties, and by linking such modal properties to counterfactual conditionals, Huoranszki argues we can distinguish between variably generic or specific abilities and identify more or less abstract possibilities in a world. In doing so, he furthers our understanding of how we reason with possibilities in both ordinary and theoretical contexts. Providing a novel account of dispositions, abilities and their capacity to explain modality, this book advances current debates in contemporary metaphysics.