متا تاریخ دانش غربی در عصر مدرن: چهار متاپارادایم در حال تحول، از ۱۶۴۸ تا کنون (سری آنتهم دربارهٔ آستانه‌ها و دگرگونی‌ها)

The book is a study of the evolving history of knowledge in the arts and sciences in the modern era – from 1648 through the present. Modernism is treated as an epoch with evolving disciplines whose articulated problems of a time and the inquiry methods to address them, develop in a coordinated manner, given a mutual awareness. When one organizes the development of knowledge over periods of years, and gives it an appellation such as "Modernism," the organization of facts is guided by concepts and values discerned throughout these periods. These facts of knowledge development share sufficient understandings to be called an "era," or an "epoch," or other terms that insist on the shared aspects of those years. One can call such an effort a "metahistory," in that what is tracked is not merely a knowledge that is political, economic, ideological, sociological, or scientific, but an overview that tracks the respective conceptual developments of the fields in how they have changed and augmented their problem formulations, inquiry methods, and explanatory conceptions over time. | When one organizes events over periods of years and gives them an appellation such as "Modernism," the organization of facts is guided by concepts and values discerned throughout these periods, comparable facts sufficient to call it an "era," or an "epoch," or other terms that insist on the shared aspects of those years, regardless of differences seen as well over the span considered. One can call such an effort a "metahistory," in that what is tracked is not merely human events that are political, economic, ideological, sociological, or other disciplinary descriptors, but an overview that critically links all the years under consideration. Even more, to have a "metahistory" is to discern how the people of eras, epochs, or the other organizational labels, thought. Human history is generated by choices, choices informed by intuitions and more intentional understandings. One of the aspects the book dwells upon in this "metahistory" of Modernism is the presence of "perspective," how one sees in a time what is there to be addressed and dealt with. Perspectives can be poorly informed or in their very nature not adequate for a sufficient knowledge of what is addressed, even as one must as a human judge what faces one. To discern from evidence how one's perspective configures an event is the "meta" of "metahistory". Modernism, the epoch from 1648 to the Present, can be described among its tenets as a period where the notion of "objectivity" has been developed. This has occurred in every field of the emergent arts and sciences in these years. Post-modernism, as will be addressed, is a more critical modernism that has brought to light the idea of multiple perspectives of objectivity as a univocal perspective of 'objectivity'. Other modernist ideas have expanded in all fields and the ideas of what is human consciousness, epistemologies of both a reflective and a pre-reflective consciousness (called by some the 'unconscious') have emerged in art, aesthetics, psychology, philosophy, the social sciences, as well as the neurosciences To have "meta" knowledge is this comprehension of the scope and benefits, yet limitations, of one's "perspective" and that of others of a time. Only a historian interested in such perspectives can be called a "metahistorian." The book uses the concept of the "metaparadigm," taken from Thomas Kuhn, to track the evolution of how in a period of time the problems of the existing disciplines of knowledge are articulated, and how inquiry methods are used to flesh out a solvable problem and effectively resolve it. The book details four phases that constitute the period of... Cover 1 Front Matter 3 Half-title 3 Title page 5 Copyright information 6 Contents 7 Part I-IV 31 Part I The First Modern Metaparadigm, c.1648–c.1750 31 Chapter One The First Phase: Seminal Ideation, C.1648–C.1670: The Focus Upon Definition and Hypothesis 33 A. History/Philosophy of History 35 Thomas Hobbes (1588–1670) and Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694) 35 B. Literature—The Modern Novel 41 Anton Ulrich (1633–1714) 41 C. Mathematics—The Development of Logical Calculus (A Precursor of Calculus) 44 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1717) 44 Chapter Two The Second Phase: Developing a Systematic Theory for Future Inquiry and Problem-Solving C.1670–C.1690 49 A. History/Philosophy of History 50 Thomas Hobbes (1588–1670) 50 Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694) 53 B. Literature 55 Anton Ulrich (1633–1714) 55 C. Mathematics—The Further Development of Logical Calculus: Two Studies (1679) 57 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1717) 57 Chapter Three The Third Phase: Material Inquiry Into the Verifiability of Specific Concepts, and Conflict Over the Implications of the Findings C.1690–C.1720 63 A. History/Philosophy of History 66 Anthony Ashley-Cooper, Third Earl of Shaftesbury (1671–1713) 66 B. Literature 71 Daniel Defoe (1660–1731) 71 C. Mathematics—A Study in the Logical Calculus, Early 1690s 73 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1717) 73 Chapter Four The Fourth Phase: Integrating the New Four Causal Understandings With the Traditional C.1720–C.1750 75 A. Philosophy of History/Societal Development of Political Institutions 79 Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu (1689–1755) 79 B. Literature 84 C. Biology—Environmental Determinism as the Cause of the Evolution of Plants, Animals and Homo Sapiens 87 Montesquieu (1689–1755) 87 Part II The Second Modern Metaparadigm, c.1750–c.1865 93 Chapter Five The First Phase: Seminal Ideation, C.1750–C.1770: The Focus Upon Definition and Hypothesis 95 A. Philosophy of History/Development of Institutions 96 Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) 96 B. Literature 99 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729–1781) and Edward Young (1683–1765) 99 C. Biology and Botany—Discovery of the Male-Female Participation in the Evolution of the Embryo 105 Friedrich Caspar Wolff (1733–1794) 105 Chapter Six The Second Phase: Developing a Systematic Structure for Guiding New Inquiry and Explanation C.1770–C.1790 111 A. History/Philosophy of History 113 Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) and Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803) 114 B. Literature 119 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) 120 C. Biology/Botany 123 Erasmus Darwin (1731–1802) 123 Chapter Seven The Third Phase: Material Inquiry Into the Verifiability of Specific Concepts, and Conflict Over the Implications of the Findings C.1790–C.1820 127 A. Philosophy of History 127 Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) 127 B. Literature 129 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1831) 129 C. Biology/Botany 131 Erasmus Darwin (1731–1802) 131 Chapter Eight The Fourth Phase: Integrating the New Four Causal Understandings With the Traditional C.1820–C.1860 139 A. Philosophy of History/History 141 Leopold van Ranke (1795–1886) 141 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) 143 Karl Marx (1818–1883) 145 B. Literature 148 Honoré Balzac (1799–1850) 148 C. Biology 151 Charles Darwin (1809–1882) 151 Part III The Third Modern Metaparadigm c.1860–c.1960 155 Chapter Nine The First Phase: Seminal Ideation, C.1860–1870: The Focus Upon Definition and Hypothesis 159 A. Philosophy of History 159 Karl Marx (1818–1883) 159 B. Literature/Drama 162 Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906) 162 C. Biology 166 Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) 166 Chapter Ten The Second Phase: Developing a Systematic Structure For Guiding New Inquiry and Explanation C.1870–C.1895 177 A. Philosophy of History 177 Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) 177 B. Literature/Drama 180 Henrik Ibsen (1828–1906) 180 C. Psychology 183 Franz Brentano (1838–1917) 183 Chapter Eleven The Third Phase: Material Inquiry Into the Verifiability of Specific Concepts, and Conflict Over the Implications of the Findings C.1890–C.1920 187 A. History 187 Heinrich Friedjung (1851–1920) 187 B. Literature 190 Thomas Mann (1875–1955) 190 C. Psychology 193 Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) 193 Chapter Twelve The Fourth Phase: Integrating the New Four Causal Understandings With the Traditional C.1920–C.1960 197 A. History/Philosophy of History 199 Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) 199 B. Literature/Drama 202 Jean-Paul Sartre (1905–1980) 202 C. Micro-Sociology 208 Kurt Lewin (1890–1947) 208 Part IV The Fourth Modern Metaparadigm, c.1970–c.2060 215 Chapter Thirteen The First Phase: Seminal Ideation, C.1960–1980: The Focus Upon Definition and Hypothesis 217 A. Philosophy of History 217 Hayden White (1928–2018) 217 B. Drama 220 Judith Malina (1926–2015) 220 C. Group Dynamics: Advent of the Encounter Group 224 Morton A. Lieberman, Irvin D. Yalom (1931–Present) and Matthew B. Miles 224 Chapter Fourteen The Second Phase: Developing a Systematic Structure For Guiding New Inquiry and Explanation C.1970–1990 229 A. Historiography 229 Hayden White (1928–2018) 229 B. Drama 235 Judith Malina (1926–2015) 235 C. Group Dynamics: The Guiding Principles of Encounter Groups 238 Morton A. Lieberman, Irvin D. Yalom (1931–Present) and Matthew B. Miles 238 Chapter Fifteen The Third Phase: Material Inquiry Into the Verifiability of Specific Concepts, and Conflict Over the Implications of The Findings C.1990–C. 2020 241 A. Philosophy of History 241 Hayden White (1928–2018) 241 B. Literature 244 Elfriede Jelinek (1946–Present) 244 Elfriede Jelinek, The Piano Teacher, A Novel9 244 C. Group dynamics—The Focus Group 249 Charles E. Basch 249 Conclusion 253 End Matter 257 Bibliography 257 Index 265 When one organizes events over periods of years and gives them an appellation such as “Modernism,” the organization of facts is guided by concepts and values discerned throughout these periods, comparable facts sufficient to call it an “era,” or an “epoch,” or other terms that insist on the shared aspects of those years, regardless of differences seen as well over the span considered. One can call such an effort a “metahistory,” in that what is tracked is not merely human events that are political, economic, ideological, sociological, or other disciplinary descriptors, but an overview that critically links all the years under consideration. Even more, to have a “metahistory” is to discern how the people of eras, epochs, or the other organizational labels, thought. Human history is generated by choices, choices informed by intuitions and more intentional understandings. One of the aspects the book dwells upon in this “metahistory” of Modernism is the presence of “perspective,” how one sees in a time what is there to be addressed and dealt with. Perspectives can be poorly informed or in their very nature not adequate for a sufficient knowledge of what is addressed, even as one must as a human judge what faces one. To discern from evidence how one’s perspective configures an event is the “meta” of “metahistory”. Modernism, the epoch from 1648 to the Present, can be described among its tenets as a period where the notion of “objectivity” has been developed. This has occurred in every field of the emergent arts and sciences in these years. Post-modernism, as will be addressed, is a more critical modernism that has brought to light the idea of multiple perspectives of objectivity as a univocal perspective of ‘objectivity’. Other modernist ideas have expanded in all fields and the ideas of what is human consciousness, epistemologies of both a reflective and a pre-reflective consciousness (called by some the ‘unconscious’) have emerged in art, aesthetics, psychology, philosophy, the social sciences, as well as the neurosciences To have “meta” knowledge is this comprehension of the scope and benefits, yet limitations, of one’s “perspective” and that of others of a time. Only a historian interested in such perspectives can be called a “metahistorian.” The book uses the concept of the “metaparadigm,” taken from Thomas Kuhn, to track the evolution of how in a period of time the problems of the existing disciplines of knowledge are articulated, and how inquiry methods are used to flesh out a solvable problem and effectively resolve it. The book details four phases that constitute the period of time in which a metaparadigm develops. The first phase is a new set of concepts that challenge the existing approach to knowledge in each discipline. The second phase is a systematic theory that will guide inquiry. The third phase is the actual practice of the discipline in solving problems, a phase that can conflict with the older approach or be congruent with it. The fourth phase integrates the older approaches in the new one, and thus expands in an augmented manner the discipline. The four phases of each metaparadigm have certain durations. The initial three phases usually endure for about 30–40 years, and the fourth phase for over 50 years. These phases each recur in the next period of time; that is the next metaparadigmatic period. Four evolving metaparadigms are shown in Western thought in this book, tracking one or more disciplines in the social sciences, the humanities, and the natural sciences through each of the four phases of a metaparadigm, and the four metaparadigms that occur between 1648 and the present.