The Limits of Détente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973

In the first book-length analysis of the origins of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Craig Daigle draws on documents only recently made available to show how the war resulted not only from tension and competing interest between Arabs and Israelis, but also from policies adopted in both Washington and Moscow. Between 1969 and 1973, the Middle East in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular emerged as a crucial Cold War battleground where the limits of détente appeared in sharp relief. By prioritizing Cold War détente rather than genuine stability in the Middle East, Daigle shows, the United States and the Soviet Union fueled regional instability that ultimately undermined the prospects of a lasting peace agreement. Daigle further argues that as détente increased tensions between Arabs and Israelis, these tensions in turn negatively affected U.S.–Soviet relations.

In the first book-length analysis of the origins of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Craig Daigle draws on documents only recently made available to show how the war resulted not only from tension and competing interest between Arabs and Israelis, but also from policies adopted in both Washington and Moscow.

Between 1969 and 1973, the Middle East in general and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular emerged as a crucial Cold War battleground where the limits of détente appeared in sharp relief. By prioritizing Cold War détente rather than genuine stability in the Middle East, Daigle shows, the United States and the Soviet Union fueled regional instability that ultimately undermined the prospects of a lasting peace agreement. Daigle further argues that as détente increased tensions between Arabs and Israelis, these tensions in turn negatively affected U.S.–Soviet relations. Contents 7 Acknowledgments 9 List Of Abbreviations 15 Introduction 19 One. From Confrontation To Negotiation, January–September 1969 28 Two. The Rogers Plan, October–December 1969 66 Three. The First Soviet Threat, January–May 1970 101 Four. Crisis On The Suez, June–September 1970 131 Fighting. For Sadat, October 1970–August 1971 173 Six. The Race To The Summit, September 1971–May 1972 210 Seven. Bombshells And Back Channels, June 1972–February 1973 246 Eight. The Contradictions Of Leonid Brezhnev, March–October 1973 279 Nine. The Crisis Of Détente, October 1973 312 Conclusion 350 Notes 365 Index 421