The Least Examined Branch : The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State
معرفی کتاب «The Least Examined Branch : The Role of Legislatures in the Constitutional State» نوشتهٔ edited by Richard W. Bauman, Tsvi Kahana، منتشرشده توسط نشر Cambridge University Press (Virtual Publishing) در سال 2006. این کتاب در 3 صفحه، فرمت pdf، زبان انگلیسی ارائه شده است.
Unlike most works in constitutional theory, which focus on the role of the courts, this book, first published in 2006, addresses the role of legislatures in a regime of constitutional democracy. Bringing together some of the world's leading constitutional scholars and political scientists, the book addresses legislatures in democratic theory, legislating and deliberating in the constitutional state, constitution-making by legislatures, legislative and popular constitutionalism, and the dialogic role of legislatures, both domestically with other institutions and internationally with other legislatures. The book offers theoretical perspectives as well as case studies of several types of legislation from the United States and Canada. It also addresses the role of legislatures both under the Westminster model and under a separation of powers system. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Contents......Page 7 Foreword: Legislatures in the Constitutional State......Page 11 Contributors......Page 17 New Ways of Looking at Old Institutions......Page 21 1 Principles of Legislation......Page 35 1. The Very Idea of Legislation......Page 42 2. The duty of care......Page 43 3. The Principle of Representation......Page 44 4. Respect for disagreement and the principle of loyal opposition......Page 45 5. The principle of responsive deliberation......Page 47 6. The principle of legislative formality......Page 48 7. Political equality and the principle of majority decision......Page 49 Acknowledgments......Page 52 2 An Exact Epitome of the People......Page 53 Separation of powers......Page 54 Problems of Collective Action......Page 56 Representation......Page 57 Representation and Mutual Advantage......Page 59 Creative Destruction......Page 60 Corporate Democracy......Page 62 Concluding Remarks......Page 64 3 Political Accountability, Proxy Accountability, and the Democratic Legitimacy of Legislatures......Page 65 Accountability as Unrealized Aspiration......Page 67 Potential Theories of Accountability by Proxy......Page 69 Accountability Through Prediction......Page 70 Accountability Through Heuristics......Page 71 Accountability Through Aggregation/Disaggregation......Page 72 Why Proxy Theories Do Not Solve the Problem......Page 73 Assessing Accountability Through Prediction......Page 74 Assessing Heuristics Theory......Page 83 Aggregation/Disaggregation Theories......Page 88 Conclusion......Page 92 Acknowledgments......Page 95 4 Constitutionalism, Trade Legislation, and “Democracy”......Page 96 Tensions in democratic theory......Page 97 As related to trade policy......Page 99 The Ambiguity of Constitutional Interpretation: The Separation-of-Powers Challenge......Page 100 The relationship between constitutionality and the democratic objection......Page 101 Ambiguity in constitutional theory......Page 102 Ambiguity in the legislative power......Page 103 Ambiguity in the foreign affairs power......Page 106 Conclusion......Page 110 5 Legislative Judgment and the Enlarged Mentality: Taking Religious Perspectives......Page 113 I. Legislative Functions: Formulating Constituional Values and Collective Deliberation on the Public Good......Page 115 II. The Enlarged Mentality: Taking Others' Perspectives......Page 118 III. The Benefits of Taking Religious Perspectives......Page 119 A. Taking the public good seriously......Page 120 B. The enlarged mentality and collective deliberation: Understanding the issues......Page 125 C. The enlarged mentality and mutual respect......Page 128 D. Religious perspectives and cross-cutting values......Page 129 A. Intimate beliefs, truth claims, and pluralism......Page 131 B. Unreason and divisiveness......Page 133 C. Religion as authority......Page 134 V. Respecting Tensions in the Mode of Discourse: Toward the Optimal Tenor of Debate......Page 136 VI. Constitutional Values and the Contribution of Religiously Based Argument......Page 141 Conclusion......Page 143 Acknowledgment......Page 144 1. Two applications of coherence to the law......Page 145 3. The scope of integrity......Page 146 4. The meaning of legislative integrity......Page 147 5. Conflict and contradiction......Page 148 6. The background of value pluralism......Page 149 B. The Argument from Pluralism......Page 150 1. Division of legislative power......Page 155 2. Logrolling and compromise......Page 156 3. Partisan realignment and the continuity of law......Page 157 Acknowledgments......Page 158 7 Nondelegation Principles......Page 159 A. Intelligible principles (?)......Page 161 B. Problems, institutional and otherwise......Page 163 II. Hidden Nondelegation Principles......Page 166 B. Trumping Chevron: three categories of nondelegation canons......Page 167 A. Judicial administrability and congressional lawmaking......Page 172 B. Qualifications and futures......Page 173 Acknowledgments......Page 174 Populism......Page 175 The constitution......Page 178 II. The Populist Reinvention of the Legislature......Page 181 Conclusion: Populism, governance, and the constitution......Page 196 Acknowledgments......Page 199 9 Legislatures as Constituent Assemblies......Page 201 Acknowledgments......Page 217 10 Legislatures and the Phases and Components of Constitutionalism......Page 218 A. Three phases of constitutionalism......Page 220 B. Components of constitutions......Page 224 C. Institutional implications......Page 226 II. Conclusion......Page 232 Acknowledgments......Page 233 11 Legislatures and Constitutional Agnosticism......Page 234 I. Constitutional agnosticism: a brief overview......Page 235 II. Legislatures and constitutional agnosticism......Page 237 III. Conclusion......Page 247 Acknowledgments......Page 248 12 Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law......Page 249 I. The Relevance of Constitutional Amendments......Page 251 A. Counterfactuals, causation, and constitutional amendment......Page 252 B. Irrelevance and generalization......Page 258 II. The Generic Case Against Constitutional Amendment......Page 262 B. The generic arguments......Page 264 C. Voting rules, public norms, and Article V......Page 276 A Preliminaries......Page 279 B. Institutions and updating......Page 282 C. Relative superiority: Some variables......Page 287 Conclusion......Page 290 Acknowledgments......Page 291 I. Prologue......Page 293 II. Two Theses......Page 294 III. Thesis 1: The Simple Argument......Page 297 IV. Thesis 2: The Constitution as Statutoid......Page 301 V. Thesis 2: Statutoids and "Ultimate Rules of Recognition''......Page 302 VI. Thesis 2: "I've Been Working on the URR''......Page 307 VII. Thesis 2: Two-Tiered Versus Three-Tiered Constructions......Page 311 14 Conditions for Framework Legislation......Page 314 I. Necessary Conditions for Congress to Have the Option of a Framework Law......Page 317 A. A concrete, well-defined problem......Page 318 B. Congressional parties and framework laws......Page 320 II. Conditions Leading to Adoption of Frameworks in Statutory Form......Page 327 A. Statutes as signals of the extent of the change......Page 330 B. Enacting bargains as a package......Page 332 C. Path dependency......Page 337 Acknowledgments......Page 339 15 Super-Statutes: The New American Constitutionalism......Page 340 I. The Standard Account of American Constitutionalism......Page 341 II. Alternative Perspectives About Constitutionalism......Page 348 III. Super-Statutes......Page 352 IV. Some Examples: Super- and Not-So-Super-Statutes......Page 357 V. The Life Cycle of a Super-Statute......Page 361 VI. The New American Constitutionalism......Page 364 VII. The Evolution of Modern Constitutional Law......Page 369 VIII. Conclusion: Gay Rights and the New American Constitutionalism......Page 370 Acknowledgments......Page 373 16 Interpretation in Legislatures and Courts: Incentives and Institutional Design......Page 375 I. A Constitution-Based Standard of Evaluation......Page 376 A. The individual level: legislators’ motivations......Page 380 B. Courts and legislators......Page 385 III. The Institutional Level: Evaluating Legislative Performance......Page 389 IV. Executive Officials and State and Local Legislatures in the United States......Page 392 A. Executive officials......Page 393 B. Subordinate legislatures......Page 394 V. Conclusion......Page 396 17 Constitutional Engagement “Outside the Courts” (and “Inside the Legislature”): Reflections on Professional Expertise and the Ability to Engage in Constitutional Interpretation......Page 398 Debunking a Myth......Page 405 Invalidation: not a new role......Page 406 Invalidation: never discretionary......Page 407 A theoretical approach to constitutional interpretation......Page 408 APPENDIX I. Supreme Court decisions rendered between 1945 and 1982 resulting in complete or partial invalidation of statutes......Page 411 APPENDIX II. Supreme Court decisions rendered between 1983 and 2003 resulting in complete or partial invalidation of statutes on Charter grounds......Page 412 Decisions originating from Quebec......Page 414 Decisions originating from other provinces......Page 415 19 The Constitution and Congressional Committees: 1971–2000......Page 416 Data and Approach......Page 417 Partisan Factors......Page 421 Internal Institutional Factors......Page 423 The Judiciary Committees......Page 425 External Institutional Factors......Page 428 Conclusion......Page 429 20 Democratic Decision Making as the First Principle of Contemporary Constitutionalism......Page 431 I. The Role of the Courts......Page 432 II. The Foundational Problem of Defining the Public Voice......Page 438 III. Democratic decision making as the First Principle of Contemporary Constitutionalism......Page 442 IV. Conclusion......Page 449 Acknowledgments......Page 450 21 Legislative Constitutionalism in a System of Judicial Supremacy......Page 451 A. The Westminster model as nonstarter......Page 452 B. Supremacy versus hegemony......Page 454 II. Traces of Legislative Constitutionalism in the American Legal Regime......Page 455 A. Constitutional interpretation: shaping, extending, and overruling judicial doctrine......Page 456 B. Independent interpretative authority......Page 462 C. Constitution making by Congress: constructing the structure of government......Page 465 III. Implications for Constitutional Theory......Page 469 Historical roots of legislative constitutionalism......Page 472 Two forms of legislative constitutionalism......Page 479 Acknowledgments......Page 487 I......Page 488 II......Page 489 III......Page 491 IV......Page 492 V......Page 495 VI......Page 498 Acknowledgments......Page 499 A. Two Conceptions of Constitutionalism......Page 500 B. Constitutional Crises: Secessions and Revolutionary Legality......Page 501 C. Secession Clauses as Constitutional Precommitments to Avoid Constitutional Crises......Page 504 D. Popular Constitutionalism and Constitutional Precommitments: The Clarity Act and Bill 99......Page 508 E. From Popular Revolution to Popular Constitutionalism?......Page 511 F. Conclusion......Page 516 Acknowledgments......Page 518 25 Disobeying Parliament? Privative Clauses and the Rule of Law......Page 519 Kinds of Privative Clauses......Page 522 Evisceration, Reconciliation, and Deference......Page 523 (i) Evisceration......Page 524 (ii) Reconciliation......Page 525 (iii) Deference......Page 530 Legality and Constitutionality......Page 533 Acknowledgments......Page 538 26 Look Who's Talking Now: Dialogue Theory and the Return to Democracy......Page 539 I. The Demise of Legislative Supremacy......Page 540 II. The Rebirth of Legislative Supremacy......Page 541 III. Dialogue and Democracy......Page 544 IV. Taking Democracy Seriously......Page 546 V. Conclusion......Page 550 A. Legal Transplants and Legislation......Page 552 B. The Dialogue Discourse in Legal Scholarship......Page 553 C. Legislation during Transitions......Page 554 (2) Opening up to the west......Page 555 (3) Transitions of legal regimes......Page 556 (2) Following model laws......Page 557 E. The Impact of Foreign Legislatures in Ordinary Circumstances......Page 558 (1) Cultural tendencies favorable or adverse to external influences......Page 559 (2) Institutional capabilities for the study of comparative law......Page 560 (4) Competition between states and economic incentives......Page 561 (6) Legislation impinging on foreign states......Page 562 F. The Case of "From Welfare to Work"......Page 563 G. Inspiration without a Community......Page 564 Acknowledgments......Page 566 28 Legislatures in Dialogue with One Another: Dissent, Decisions, and the Global Polity......Page 567 I. Dissenting by Deciding......Page 568 II. Dissenting by Deciding and the Marketplace of Ideas......Page 570 A. Decisional dissent and its role in making disagreement visible......Page 571 B. The dynamics of decision making – conformity, polarization, and cascades – and the appropriate institutional cure......Page 574 III. Interlegislative Dialogue in a Global Era......Page 578 A. Dissent and the global polity......Page 579 B. Practical policy implications for fostering productive interlegislative dialogue......Page 581 Conclusion......Page 583 Acknowledgments......Page 585 Index......Page 587 Unlike Most Works In Constitutional Theory, Which Focus On The Role Of The Courts, This Book Addresses The Role Of Legislatures In A Regime Of Constitutional Democracy. Bringing Together Some Of The World's Leading Constitutional Scholars And Political Scientists, The Book Addresses Legislatures In Democratic Theory, Legislating And Deliberating In The Constitutional State, Constitution-making By Legislatures, Legislative And Popular Constitutionalism, And The Dialogic Role Of Legislatures, Both Domestically With Other Institutions And Internationally With Other Legislatures. The Book Offers Theoretical Perspectives As Well As Case Studies Of Several Types Of Legislation From The United States And Canada. It Also Addresses The Role Of Legislatures Both Under The Westminster Model And Under A Separation Of Powers System. Introduction. New Ways Of Looking At Old Institutions / Richard W. Bauman And Tsvi Kahana -- Pt. 1. Legislatures And Democratic Theory. Principles Of Legislation / Jeremy Waldron ; An Exact Epitome Of The People / Russell Hardin ; Political Accountability, Proxy Accountability, And The Democratic Legitimacy Of Legislatures / Jane S. Schacter ; Constitutionalism, Trade Legislation, And 'democracy' / Chantal Thomas -- Pt. 2. Legislating And Deliberating In The Democratic Legislature. Legislative Judgment And The Enlarged Mentality: Taking Religious Perspectives / Jennifer Nedelsky ; Should We Value Legislative Integrity? / Andrei Marmor ; Nondelegation Principles / Cass Sunstein ; Populism, The Legislative Process And The Canadian Constitution / Harry Arthurs --^ Pt. 3. Constitution-making By Legislatures: The Explicit Version. Legislatures As Constituent Assemblies / Jon Elster ; Legislatures And The Phases And Components Of Constitutionalism / Ruth Gavison ; Legislatures And Constitutional Agnosticism / Patricia Hughes ; Constitutional Amendments And The Constitutional Common Law / Adrian Vermeule -- Pt. 4. Constitution-making By Legislatures: The Implicit Version. What Do Constitutions Do That Statutes Don't (legally Speaking)? / Frank I. Michelman ; Conditions For Framework Legislation / Elizabeth Garrett ; Super-statutes: The New American Constitutionalism / William N. Eskridge, Jr. And John Ferejohn --^ Pt. 5. Constitutional Interpretation And Application By The Legislature. Interpretation In Legislatures And Courts: Incentives And Institutional Design / Mark Tushnet ; Constitutional Engagement 'outside The Courts' (and 'inside The Legislature'): Reflections On Professional Expertise And The Ability To Engage In Constitutional Interpretation / Sanford Levinson ; Legislation As Constitutional Interpretation: Another Dialogue / Andree Lajoie With Cecile Bergada And Eric Gelineau ; The Constitution And Congressional Committees: 1971--2000 / Keith E. Whittington, Neal Devins, And Hutch Hicken --^ Pt. 6. Is Legislative Constitutionalism Possible?. Democratic Decision-making As The First Principle Of Contemporary Constitutionalism / Jeremy Webber ; Legislative Constitutionalism In A System Of Judicial Supremacy / Daniel A. Farber ; Between Supremacy And Exclusivity / Owen Fiss ; Legislatures As Rule-followers / Frederick Schauer ; Popular Revolution Or Popular Constitutionalism? Reflections On The Constitutional Politics Of Quebec Secession / Sujit Choudhry -- Pt. 7. The Legislature In Dialogue: Domestic And International Contexts. Disobeying Parliament? Privative Clauses And The Rule Of Law / David Dyzenhaus ; Look Who's Talking Now: Dialogue Theory And The Return To Democracy / Andrew Petter ; An International Community Of Legislatures? / Daphne Barak-erez ; Legislatures In Dialogue With One Another: Dissent, Decisions, And The Global Polity / Heather K. Gerken. Edited By Richard Bauman, Tsvi Kahana. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. New ways of looking at old institutions / Richard W. Bauman and Tsvi Kahana pt. 1. Legislatures and democratic theory. Principles of legislation / Jeremy Waldron ; An exact epitome of the people / Russell Hardin ; Political accountability, proxy accountability, and the democratic legitimacy of legislatures / Jane S. Schacter ; Constitutionalism, trade legislation, and "democracy" / Chantal Thomas pt. 2. Legislating and deliberating in the democratic legislature. Legislative judgment and the enlarged mentality: taking religious perspectives / Jennifer Nedelsky ; Should we value legislative integrity? / Andrei Marmor ; Nondelegation principles / Cass R. Sunstein ; Vox populi: populism, the legislative process and the Canadian Constitution / Harry Arthurs pt. 3. Constitution-making by legislatures: the explicit version. Legislatures as constituent assemblies / Jon Elster ; Legislatures and the phases and components of constitutionalism / Ruth Gavison ; Legislatures and constitutional agnosticism / Patricia Hughes ; Constitutional amendments and the constitutional common law / Adrian Vermeule pt. 4. Constitution-making by legislatures: the implicit version. What do constitutions do that statutes don't (legally speaking)? / Frank I. Michelman ; Conditions for framework legislation / Elizabeth Garrett ; Super-statutes: the new American constitutionalism / William N. Eskridge, Jr. and John Ferejohn pt. 5. Constitutional interpretation and application by the legislature. Interpretation in legislatures and courts: incentives and institutional design / Mark Tushnet ; Constitutional engagement "outside the courts" (and "inside the legislature"): reflections on professional expertise and the ability to engage in constitutional interpretation / Sanford Levinson ; Legislatures as constitutional interpretation: another dialogue / Andrée Lajoie, Cécile Bergada and Éric Gélineau ; The Constitution and congressional committees: 1971 2000 / Keith E. Whittington, Neal Devins, and Hutch Hicken pt. 6. Is legislative constitutionalism possible?. Democratic decision-making as the first principle of contemporary constitutionalism / Jeremy Webber ; Legislative constitutionalism in a system of judicial supremacy / Daniel A. Farber ; Between supremacy and exclusivity / Owen Fiss ; Legislatures as rule-followers / Frederick Schauer ; Popular revolution or popular constitutionalism?: reflections on the constitutional politics of Quebec Secession / Sujit Choudhry pt. 7. The legislature in dialogue: domestic and international contexts. Disobeying parliament?: privative clauses and the rule of law / David Dyzenhaus ; Look who's talking now: dialogue theory and the return to democracy / Andrew Petter ; An international community of legislatures? / Daphne Barak-Erez ; Legislatures in dialogue with one another: dissent, decisions, and the global polity / Heather K. Gerken.
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