The Law of Interactions Between International Organizations: A Framework for Multi-Institutional Labour Governance (Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht, 299)

The book analyses how international law addresses interactions between international organizations. In labour governance, these interactions are ubiquitous. They offer each organization an opportunity to promote its model of labour governance, yet simultaneously expose it to adverse influence from others. The book captures this ambivalence and examines the capacity of international law to mitigate it. Based on detailed case studies of mutual influence between the International Labour Organization, the World Bank, and the Council of Europe, the book offers an in-depth analysis of the pertinent law and its key challenges, both at institutional and inter-organizational level. The author envisions a law of inter-organizational interactions as a normative framework structuring interactions and enhancing the effectiveness and legitimacy of multi-institutional governance. Preface Summary Contents Table of Contents Abbreviations 1. Introduction A. Multi-Institutional Labour Governance B. The Neglected Relevance of Inter-Organizational Interactions C. Purpose and Outline of the Study D. Preliminary Remarks on Terminology E. Preliminary Remarks on the Analytical Perspective Part I: The ILO and Inter-Organizational Interactions 2. The ILO ́s Model of Labour Governance A. The ILO: An Initial Overview I. Objectives II. Activities and Principal Instruments III. Organs and Other Bodies B. The Two Fundamental Choices Underlying the ILO ́s Model I. Universal Tripartite Social Dialogue 1. Tripartite Social Dialogue 2. Universality II. Effectuation Through Persuasion C. The Permeation of the Fundamental Choices, in Particular Tripartism I. Tripartism in the Composition of Organs and Bodies II. Tripartism in Norm-Setting: The Example of ILO Labour Conventions 1. Tripartism in the Procedure Leading to the Adoption of Conventions 2. The Impact of Tripartism on Adopted Conventions III. Tripartism in the Supervisory System 1. The Regular Supervisory Procedure 2. The Special Supervisory Procedure Regarding Freedom of Association 3. `Internalization ́ of Interpretation and `Soft Law Jurisprudence ́ as a Tripartite Constitutional Compromise IV. Conclusions D. The Model ́s Fragility I. Challenges to Universality II. Challenges to Persuasion III. Challenges to Tripartite Social Dialogue: The Post 2012 Constitutional Crisis 1. From Cold War to Crisis 2. The Employers ́ Claim Regarding `Tripartite Ownership ́ 3. Subsequent Developments 4. Assessment E. Conclusion 3. The Phenomenon and the Concept of Inter-Organizational Interactions A. Multi-Institutional Labour Governance and the Phenomenon of Inter-Organizational Interactions I. `Parallel ́ Labour Governance by Other IOs II. Interactions Between the ILO and Other IOs Engaging in Labour Governance B. Conceptualizing Inter-Organizational Interactions I. The Concept of Inter-Organizational Interactions 1. The Meanings of `Interaction ́ and `Inter-Organizational Interaction ́ 2. Choosing an Inter-Organizational Focus II. The Multidimensional Spectrum of Inter-Organizational Interactions 1. The Character: A Continuum from Conflict to Integration 2. Direct and Indirect Interaction 3. Formal and Informal Interaction 4. Interaction Across Stages C. Conclusion 4. The ILO ́s Model Under Pressure: The World Bank ́s Employing Workers Indicator A. The World Bank as an Actor in Labour Governance B. The Doing Business Reports and Their Employing Workers ́ Indicator I. Objectives, Method and Reformist Approach of the Doing Business Reports II. The Employing Workers Indicator III. Dissemination and Use by the Bank C. EWI-Induced Labour Market Reforms: Back and Forth Between the World Bank and the ILO I. The Bank ́s Undermining of ILO Activities Through Its Use of the EWI 1. Undermining ILO-Facilitated Labour Law Reforms: The Example of Nepal (2005-2007) 2. Undermining the ILO Supervisory System ́s `Naming and Shaming ́: The Example of Georgia (2006-2008) II. The ILO ́s (and Other Actors ́) Critical Response 1. The Methodological Critique 2. The Critique Concerning Unbalanced Policy Suggestions 3. The Claimed Incompatibility with ILO Conventions III. The Eventual `Un-Ranking ́ of Labour Regulation Data and Inconclusive Attempts to Reform the EWI D. The Observed Inter-Organizational Interactions and Their Relevance for the ILO ́s Model I. A Sequence of Mostly Indirect and Conflictual Inter-Organizational Interactions 1. Identifying the Relevant Interactive Conduct 2. The Predominance of Indirect Interactions 3. The Largely Conflictual Character of the Observed Interactions II. The Source of Inter-Organizational Conflict: The EWI ́s Alternative Approach to Labour Regulation 1. The Conflict ́s Backdrop: A Different Model of Labour Governance 2. The EWI ́s Alternative Normative Vision of `Good ́ Labour Regulation 3. The Bank ́s Alternative Modus of Implementing That Vision III. The World Bank ́s Interactive Conduct as a Multilevel Challenge to the ILO ́s Model of Labour Governance 1. Thwarting ILO Efforts at Country Level 2. Challenge on a Normative Level: Reaching Out for the `Spirit ́ of ILO Instruments a) The EWI ́s Inconsistence with the `Spirit ́ of ILO Conventions b) The Bank ́s Subliminal Second-Guessing of Tripartite Social Dialogue 3. Accentuating Differences Between the ILO ́s Tripartite Constituents IV. Small Opportunities for the ILO Resulting from the Bank ́s Conduct 1. Reaffirming Support from Actors 2. The EWI Episode as a Potential Opportunity for the ILO E. Conclusion 5. The ILO ́s Model and `Benevolent Unilateralism ́: The ECtHR ́s Reception of ILO Instruments and Practice A. The CoE and the ECtHR as Actors in Labour Governance B. Reception of ILO Instruments and Practice: The ECtHR ́s Evolving Stance on Collective Bargaining and the Right to Strike I. Background: The Rights to Bargain Collectively and to Strike in the ILO and in the ECHR II. Earlier Case-Law: `Safe Distance ́ From ILO Instruments and Practice III. The Reversal in Demir and Baykara and Enerji Yapi-Yol Sen IV. The Wider Repercussions of the Reversal 1. Creating an External `Enforcement Mechanism ́ 2. The ECtHR ́s Influence on Domestic and International Law and Jurisprudence C. Reception as the Court ́s Unilateral Choice I. The Reversal in Demir and Baykara as a Deliberate Interpretative Choice II. Reversal Rooted in the Court ́s Evolved General Interpretative Approach III. Assertion of Control Over the Interpretative Approach D. Choosing `Against ́ the ILO I. Functional Deviations: The Example of Sympathy Strikes II. Discretionary Deviations: The Example of the Definition of Forced or Compulsory Labour III. `Detachment ́ of Aligned Jurisprudence from Subsequent Developments in the ILO 1. The ECtHR ́s Jurisprudence as a Factor in the ILO ́s Post-2012 Constitutional Crisis 2. `Detaching ́ the ECtHR ́s Jurisprudence from the ILO E. The Observed Inter-Organizational Interactions and Their Relevance for the ILO ́s Model I. A Sequence of Exclusively Indirect and Non-conflictual Interactions 1. Identifying the Relevant Interactive Conduct 2. Indirect and Largely Non-Conflictual Interactions II. The Court ́s `Benevolent Unilateralism ́ and Its Implications for the ILO 1. Expanding the ILO ́s Outreach and Validation of Its Work 2. The Ambivalent Dependence on a Unilateral Choice F. Conclusion 6. The ILO ́s Model ́s Cooperative Promotion: The ILO ́s Influence on the European Social Charter A. The ESC and the ECSR in Labour Governance B. The ILO ́s Influence on the ESC ́s Text I. The ILO ́s Role in the Drafting of the ESC II. The Institutional Link with the ILO in the ESC and the ECSR ́s Rules III. The ILO ́s Role in Reforming the ESC C. ILO Instruments and Practice in the ECSR ́s Supervisory Practice I. The Use of ILO Instruments and Practice in the ECSR ́s Work II. The Relevance of the Institutional Link Between the ILO and the ECSR 1. The Working Relationship at Secretariat Level 2. An Example: The ECSR ́s Examination of Compulsory Arbitration in Norway III. Limits of ILO Influence 1. Deviations Due to Pressure from Member States 2. Jointly Deviating from ILO Instruments and Practice with the ECtHR: The Example of Closed Shop Arrangements D. The Observed Interactions ́ Relevance for the ILO ́s Model I. The Nature of the Observed Interactions II. Decisive and Continuous Expansion of the ILO ́s Outreach III. Dormant Challenges 1. The Persisting Potential for Deviations 2. Repercussions of the ILO ́s Interactional `Forum-Shopping ́ on Tripartism? E. Conclusion 7. The Impact of Inter-Organizational Interactions on the ILO ́s Model of Labour Governance A. The Ambivalence of Inter-Organizational Interactions and Its Impact on the ILO I. Opportunities and Challenges: The Ambivalence of Inter-Organizational Interactions II. The Impact on the ILO ́s Model of Labour Governance 1. Adding Complexity to Tripartite Decision-Making 2. The Impact on the ILO ́s Effectivity 3. The Impact on Accountability 4. The Impact on the ILO ́s Model ́s Legitimacy B. The ILO ́s Dilemma C. The Potential of International Law as an Existing Normative Framework D. Conclusion Part II: `Egocentric ́ Institutional Laws and the ILO ́s Relativization 8. Inter-Organizational Interactions in the ILO ́s Institutional Law: A `Carte Blanche ́ for the ILO A. Overview on the Relevant Sources of the ILO ́s Institutional Law B. The ILO ́s Competences and Obligations to Engage in Inter-Organizational Interaction I. The ILO Constitution ́s Decision for Integration into the UN System II. The General Competence (and Obligation) to Cooperate with Other IOs 1. The Meaning of `Cooperation ́ 2. The Subject-Matters of Cooperation 3. The Potential Partners for Cooperation 4. Conclusion III. The Competence to Invite Other IOs as Observers IV. The Competence to Review Other IOs ́ Economic and Financial Policies 1. The Initial Idea: Installing the ILO as a ``Master Agency ́ ́ Within the UN System 2. The More Modest Reading in the 2008 Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization V. Supplementary Implied Competences for Other Types of Indirect Interactions 1. Room for Implied Competences 2. Example: An Implied Competence to Influence Other IOs Through the Adoption of Labour Conventions and Recommendations VI. Conclusion C. The Constitutional Embeddedness of the ILO ́s Competences to Interact I. The ILO ́s Obligation to Comply with Its Institutional Law During Interactions II. The Extent of the Predetermination III. The Prioritization of the ILO ́s Agenda and the Relativization of Other IOs ́ Governance Models, Needs and Demands D. Consequence: The ILO ́s Constitutional Carte Blanche for Protecting and Promoting Its Model E. Conclusion 9. The ILO ́s Relativization in the Institutional Laws of the World Bank and the CoE A. The World Bank ́s and CoE ́s Legal Independence from ILO Institutional Law I. No Binding Effect Via Acceptance in Treaties II. No Binding Effect Via Customary Law III. No Relaxation of the pacta tertiis Rule IV. No `Inherited ́ Obligations 1. Nemo plus juris transferre potest quam ipse habet 2. Functional Succession 3. Arguments Against Both Bases V. Conclusion B. The ILO ́s Model in the World Bank ́s Institutional Law I. Overview on the Relevant Sources of the World Bank ́s Institutional Law II. Competences and Obligations to Engage in Inter-Organizational Interaction 1. The Competence (and Obligation) to Cooperate with Other IOs 2. Implied Further Competences to Interact III. The Embeddedness of the World Bank ́s Competences to Interact 1. The World Bank ́s Obligation to Comply with Its Institutional Law During Interactions 2. The Obligation to Pursue the Bank ́s Objectives 3. Interaction-Specific Institutional and Procedural Rules 4. The Prohibition of `Political ́ Activity a) The Clauses and Their Elements aa) Wording, Context and Telos bb) The Distinction of `Political ́ and Other Activities in Subsequent Practice b) The Prohibition as an Inherently Volatile Limit for Inter-Organizational Interactions c) Conclusion 5. The Bank ́s Institutional Law ́s View on Other IOs ́ Governance Models, Needs and Demands a) Obligation to Consider Views and Recommendations of Other IOs b) The Abandoned IBRD Advisory Council c) The `Prioritization ́ Over Other IOs ́ Governance Models, Needs and Demands IV. Consequence: The Relativization of the ILO ́s Model in the Law of the World Bank V. Conclusion on the World Bank ́s Institutional Law C. The ILO ́s Model in the CoE ́s Institutional Law I. Overview on the Sources of the CoE ́s Institutional Law II. Competences and Their Embeddedness 1. The Basis: Implied Competences to Interact 2. Explicit Competence to Conclude Inter-Organizational Agreements 3. Specific Competences to Interact in the ECHR 4. Specific Competences in the ESC III. The Embeddedness of the CoE ́s Competences to Interact 1. The CoE ́s Objectives 2. Interaction-Specific Rules a) The Subsidiarity Clause in Art. 1 lit. c CoE Statute b) The Lis Alibi Pendens Rule in Art. 35(2) lit. b ECHR 3. Limitation Through Narrow Mandates and Formalized Procedures IV. Consequence: The ILO ́s Relativization in the Law of the CoE V. Conclusion on the CoE ́s Institutional Law D. The Implications of the ILO ́s Relativization in the Bank ́s and CoE ́s Institutional laws E. Conclusion 10. The ILO ́s Relativization: Predetermination and Dynamic Evolution A. Predetermination in Constituent Instruments B. The Malleability of Relativization Through Constitutional Dynamics I. Interpretative Dynamics 1. Choosing Interpretative Approaches and Methods 2. Rendering Authoritative and `Simple ́ Interpretations II. `Specialization ́ of the Applicable Rules of General International Law C. Conclusion 11. Mitigating Relativization via Coherent Interpretation? A. Specifying the Question Pursued in This Chapter B. Fundamental Issues I. Do Interpretative Rules Resemble Legal Obligations? II. Are the World Bank and the CoE Addressees of Interpretative Obligations? III. Conclusion C. The Faint General Obligation to Coherent Interpretation (Art. 31(3) lit. c VCLT) I. Institutional Practice as Part of the ``Relevant Rules ́ ́ II. The Meaning of ``Applicable in the Relations Between the Parties ́ ́ III. The Obligation to `Take into Account ́ IV. Conclusion D. Systemic Integration and Special Interpretative `Rules of the Organization ́ I. Deviating from Art. 31(3) lit. c VCLT by `Specializing ́ Rules on Interpretation II. The Structural Issue: A Multiplication of Normative Parameters for Interpretation and the Gradual Erosion of the Common St... III. Example: The ECtHR ́s Recourse to ILO Instruments and Practice Revisited 1. `Living Instrument ́ and `European Consensus ́ as Special Interpretative Rules 2. An Enhanced Role for the ILO Through Special Rules on Coherent Interpretation 3. The ILO ́s Own Special Interpretative (and Other) Rules 4. `Relativization ́ Recurring: The Unresolved `Art. 5 VCLT2 Constellation ́ IV. Conclusion E. Conclusion on Chap. 11 12. Mitigating Relativization via Member States ́ Loyalty and Sincere Cooperation? A. The Principal Means of ILO Member States to Influence Other IOs B. ILO Member States ́ Exceptional Obligation to Actively Promote the ILO ́s Model in Other IOs I. The Duty to Fulfil ILO Membership Obligations Regardless of Parallel Membership Obligations 1. A Brief Outline of ILO Membership Obligations 2. ILO Law ́s Indifference Regarding Parallel Membership Obligations a) ILO Member States ́ Freedom to Participate in Other IOs b) The Persisting Duty to Fulfil ILO Membership Obligations c) Can Adherence to Parallel Membership Obligations Justify Violating ILO Membership Obligations? II. Loyalty and Sincere Cooperation as a Legal Basis for Obligations to Promote 1. No General Obligation to Promote the ILO in Other IOs 2. Obligation to Promote the ILO ́s Model in Other IOs as a Matter of Loyalty and Sincere Cooperation a) The EU as a Leading Case for the Concept of Loyalty and Sincere Cooperation b) Obligations to Loyalty and Sincere Cooperation Beyond EU Law c) Loyalty and Sincere Cooperation in the ILO Context 3. The High Threshold of Illoyalty a) The Case-Dependence of the Threshold b) Loyalty and Concrete Action 4. Conclusion III. Excursus: ILO Member States ́ Means of Promotion and Their Constraints 1. Organizational and Procedural Independence of Bodies 2. Limitations Within State-Driven Organs 3. Limited Capacity to Induce Systemic Changes IV. Conclusion on Section B C. Conclusion on Chap. 12 D. Conclusion on Part II Part III: The Silence of Inter-Organizational Law 13. Bilateral Inter-Organizational Treaties Between the ILO, the World Bank and the CoE A. The ILO and Inter-Organizational Treaties B. The Absence of Relevant Binding Treaties Between the ILO and the World Bank I. Agreements Regarding Consultation, Representation and Observer Status II. Agreements on Technical and Country-Level Cooperation III. Agreements on Cooperation in Pluri-Organizational Contexts and the UN System IV. Conclusion C. The Modest Regulation of Direct and Cooperative Interactions in the ILO-CoE I. The ILO-CoE: A Legal Framework for `Cooperation for Coordination ́ 1. The ILO-CoE ́s Two Objectives 2. The Operative Provisions ́ Focus on Procedural Matters and the Provision of Services 3. The Commitments ́ Reticent Character 4. Conclusion II. The ILO-CoE ́s Limited Relevance as a Common Legal Framework for Interactions 1. The ILO-CoE ́s Focus on Direct and Cooperative Inter-Organizational Interactions 2. No Obligation to Enhance the ILO ́s Role and Relevance III. Conclusion D. Conclusion on Chap. 13 14. The ILO and the World Bank Within the UN System ́s Legal Framework A. Overview on the UN System ́s Legal Framework I. Coordinating Bodies II. Instruments of Coordination III. Legal Bases for Specialized Agencies ́ Rights and Obligations B. Can the ILO Rely on `Protection ́ Through UN Coordination? I. Is the UN Obliged to Coordinate the Conduct of Other Agencies to Protect the ILO? 1. The 1946 UN-ILO Relationship Agreement a) Recognition of the ILO ́s Status b) Obligations Regarding Coordinating Measures by the UN 2. Other UN-ILO Agreements 3. A Duty to `System Loyalty ́ and Sincere Cooperation? 4. Conclusion II. Coordination Without the Consent of the World Bank? The UN ́s Coordination Constraints 1. Coordination Constraints Under the UN-IBRD Relationship Agreement a) Stronger Emphasis on Institutional Independence b) Relaxed Obligations Regarding Coordinating Measures 2. Coordination Constraints in Practice: Continued World Bank Support for South Africa and Portugal a) Background: The UN ́s and ILO ́s Policies Against Racial Discrimination and Colonialism b) The Inter-Organizational Dispute Concerning the Bank ́s Loans to South Africa and Portugal 3. The Limited Role of Art. 103 UN Charter a) The Scope and Function of Art. 103 UN Charter b) Effects on the World Bank ́s Obligations to Comply with UN Coordinative Measures Under Inter-Organizational Law c) Effects on the World Bank ́s Institutional Law 4. Inferences for the UN ́s Capacity to Coordinate Without the Consent of the Bank III. Conclusion C. The UN System as a Legal Framework for Promoting the ILO ́s Model? I. Promotion in Practice: Mainstreaming the ILO ́s Decent Work Agenda Within the UN System 1. Including Decent Work into the UN Development Agendas 2. The Modest Success of Institutionalizing and Operationalizing Decent Work in the World Bank 3. Conclusion II. The Weak Legal Framework for Promotion 1. Participatory Rights 2. The Right to Propose Agenda Items 3. Conclusion III. Conclusion on Section C D. Conclusion on Chap. 14 15. Beyond Treaties: The Silence of Unwritten Inter-Organizational Law A. Moving Beyond the `International Legal Personality Shortcut ́: The Need to Determine Specific Rights and Obligations I. Invocations of International Legal Personality As a Basis for Rights and Obligations II. The Problem of Deriving Specific Rights and Obligations from Personality 1. From the `Capacity to Possess ́ to Actual Possession of Rights and Obligations 2. Difficulties to Pinpoint Specific Rights and Obligations a) Approximation Using a Taxonomy of Legal Subjectivity? b) Externalizing the Constitutional Allocation of Competences? c) Inherent Rights Emanating from `Organizationhood ́? 3. The Methodological Issue: Personality As a Chiffre for Rights and Obligations III. Conclusion B. Customary Inter-Organizational Law I. Preliminary Methodological Remarks 1. IOs As Adressees and Creators of Customary Inter-Organizational Law 2. The Role of Analogous Reasoning II. Shards of Customary Inter-Organizational Law: The VCLT-IO, DARIO and Others III. An Inter-Organizational Prohibition of Interference? 1. The Proposal of a Prohibition of Interference 2. Discussion a) Externalization of the Constitutional Allocation of Competences b) The Ideal of Clear-Cut Competences and the Reality of Competencial Overlaps c) Delimiting Competences in the Inter-Organizational Constellation 3. Conclusion IV. A Law of Inter-Organizational Good-Neighbourliness? 1. Blokker ́s Proposal of ``Inter-Organizational Good-Neighbourliness ́ ́ 2. Nature and Content of (Good-)Neighbourliness in International Law a) Neighbourliness Between Contingent States b) Good-Neighbourliness As a Hesitant Conceptual Expansion c) Good-Neighbourliness in the Context of IOs 3. Discussion a) The ``Hands Off ́ ́ Principle and the Distinction Between the `Neighbours ́ b) The Obligation to Cooperate and the Demarcation of the `Neighbourhood ́ c) The Unclear Legal Parameters for Cooperation 4. Conclusion V. An Obligation to Cooperate in Good Faith (Pactum de Negotiando)? VI. The Structural Peculiarities of the Inter-Organizational Constellation 1. Jurisdictional Overlaps Among IOs a) The Ubiquity of Jurisdictional Overlaps b) No Overlaps of IOs ́ Organic Jurisdiction c) The Limited Relevance of This Exception 2. Exclusionary External Effect of IOs ́ Jurisdictional Spheres? 3. The Basic Character of IOs ́ Mutual Relations: A Principle of Inter-Organizational Equality? a) The Debate Concerning Equal Rights and Obligations for All IOs b) The Unclear Basic Character of IOs ́ Mutual Relations 4. Conclusion VII. Conclusion on Section B C. General Principles of (Inter-Organizational) Law I. Methodological Issues Concerning General Principles of Inter-Organizational Law II. The Irrelevance of Some General Principles in the Present Context III. The Accessory Nature of Good Faith and Its Corollaries 1. The Contents of Good Faith 2. The Accessory Nature of Good Faith IV. The Vagueness of Other General Principles D. Conclusion 16. The Undefined Inter-Organizational Legal Default Rule A. Meaning and Relevance of the Inter-Organizational Legal Default Rule B. The Inter-Organizational Default Rule: Possibilities and Contingencies C. Consequences for Regulating Interactions Between the ILO, the World Bank and the CoE D. Conclusion E. Conclusion on Part III Part IV: The Role of Law in the ILO ́s Inter-Organizational Interactions: An Evaluation 17. The Current Role of Law in the ILO ́s Inter-Organizational Interactions A. The Legal Status Quo I. IOs ́ `Structurally Egocentric ́ Institutional Laws II. The Absence of an Inter-Organizational Legal Corrective III. Conclusion: The Underdeveloped Law of Inter-Organizational Interactions B. Consequences for the Role of Law in the ILO ́s Inter-Organizational Interactions I. The Practical Relevance of Other Factors for Structuring Inter-Organizational Interactions II. Law as Potential Rhetoric Reinforcement C. Conclusion 18. The Legal Status Quo: An Adequate Way of Regulating the ILO ́s Interactions? A. The Law of Inter-Organizational Interactions in Search for a Narrative I. The Permeation and the Limits of Functionalism 1. The Permeation of Functionalist Thought in the Legal Status Quo 2. Functionalism at Its Limits II. The Neglected Dimension(s) of Fragmentation III. A Case of `De-Constitutionalization ́? IV. Global Administrative Law ́s Underestimation of Inter-Organizational Interactions V. The `Factuality ́ of Legal Pluralism B. Is the Legal Status Quo Adequate? An Assessment of Selected Arguments I. Moving Beyond (Ostensible) Pragmatism 1. The Argument of `Working ́ Interactions 2. The Legal Status Quo as a `Normal ́ Situation? II. Voluntarist Arguments 1. The Legal Status Quo as a Sovereign Choice of Member States? 2. The Legal Status Quo as a Choice Made by IOs Themselves? III. A Pluralist Argument: The Status Quo as a Counter-Hegemonic Opportunity for the ILO? IV. Conclusion C. Conclusion on Chap. 18 Part V: Developing the Law of Inter-Organizational Interactions 19. Perspectives for Law as a Normative Framework for Inter-Organizational Interactions A. The Potential of Governing the ILO ́s Inter-Organizational Interactions Through Law I. Fragmented Societal Rationalities as a Structural Limit? II. The Risk of Overestimating Law ́s Potential III. Realistic Perspectives for Law B. The Road Ahead I. The Creative Role of Conceptual, `Political ́ and De Lege Ferenda Debates II. The Additional Task of Developing a Normative Scaffold for Inter-Organizational Law C. Walking First Steps I. A Duty Not to Compromise Accomplished and Ongoing Work II. Establishing a Normative Scaffold for the Duty 20. Final Remarks Table of Treaties Table of Official Documents and Publications 1. Council of Europe 1.1 Resolutions, Decisions and Recommendations 1.2 Other Documents and Publications 2. European Free Trade Area 3. European Union 4. League of Arab States 5. International Labour Organization 5.1 Declarations of the International Labour Conference 5.2 Recommendations 5.3 Resolutions of the International Labour Conference 5.4 Standing Orders etc. 5.5 Reports, Meeting Documents and Records of the International Labour Conference and Committees 5.6 Reports, Meeting Documents and Records of the Governing Body and Committees (incl. CEACR and Commissions of Inquiry) 5.7 Reports of the International Labour Office and the Director-General 5.8 Memoranda of Understanding, Exchanges of Letters etc. with Other Institutions 5.9 Other Documents and Publications 6. International Monetary Fund 7. MERCOSUR 8. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 9. Southern African Development Community 10. United Nations 10.1 Resolutions and Decisions of the General Assembly 10.2 Resolutions of the Security Council 10.3 Resolutions, Declarations and Decisions of the Economic and Social Council 10.4 Reports of the Secretary-General 10.5 International Law Commission 10.6 Rules of Procedure and Regulations 10.7 UN Funds, Programmes etc. 10.8 UN Conference Reports and Records 10.9 Other Documents and Publications 11. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 12. World Bank Group 12.1 Resolutions by the Board of Governors 12.2 World Development Reports 12.3 Doing Business Reports 12.4 Other Reports 12.5 By-laws, Terms of Reference etc. 12.6 Press Releases 12.7 Other Documents and Publications 13. World Health Organization 14. World Trade Organization 15. World Tourism Organization 16. Domestic Legislation and Documents Table of Cases and Supervisory Practice ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations ILO Committee on Freedom of Association European Court of Human Rights and European Commission of Human Rights European Committee of Social Rights (incl. Committee of Independent Experts) Conclusions Collective Complaint Procedures Inter-American Court of Human Rights African Commission of Human Rights Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights UN Committee on Migrant Workers UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women UN Committee on the Rights of the Child UN Human Rights Committee International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Special Court for Sierra Leone International Court of Justice Permanent Court of International Justice International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea World Trade Organization Decisions in Inter-State Arbitrations Court of Justice of the European Union (incl. Predecessors) Decisions in International Investment Disputes Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organization Domestic Courts Table of Websites Bibliography Index Max-Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht