The Law And Economics Of Public Health (foundations And Trends(r) In Microeconomics)

The Law and Economics of Public Health synthesizes the empirical research findings on the relationship between law and the public's health that are found scattered in different literature ranging from economic journals to medical journals, journals on addictive behaviors, law reviews, and books. This is the only study to date that has assembled the empirical evidence from many areas ranging from motor vehicle liability and dram shop liability to medical malpractice, products liability as it applies to pharmaceutical products, and medical devices. The Law and Economics of Public Health addresses the fundamental question as to whether or not and the extent to which imposing tort liability on potential injurers improves the public's health. Does the threat of litigation on potential injurers make them exercise more caution? Does insurance coverage counter incentives to be careful? Does the tort system operate as perfectly as the theory would have it? This monograph answers these questions on the basis of empirical evidence. The Law and Economics of Public Health discusses both theory and empirical evidence in several areas of personal injury to which tort liability has been applied. The monograph starts by describing the general law and economics framework used to assess both positive and normative issues relating to tort liability. It then presents the rationale for and empirical evidence on particular applications of tort liability as it applies to personal injury. Abstract Introduction Government intervention in markets: alternative approaches Tort law in an economic framework Alternative liability rules Contracts versus torts Unilateral versus bilateral precautions to avoid accidents When will applying the negligence rule lead private parties to select a socially optimal precaution level? Four markets Tort liability under attack Motor vehicle accidents, insurance, and tort liability Context Four markets Empirical evidence Dram shop and social host liability Rationale Four markets Empirical evidence Medical malpractice Background and context Four markets Empirical evidence International medical no-fault programs Tobacco litigation Rationale for regulation of tobacco products Latency of tobacco-related injuries Four markets Empirical evidence Litigation involving pharmaceutical, medical device, and vaccine manufacturers Rationale Background: regulation of pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and vaccines in the United States Four markets Empirical evidence: case studies Medical no-fault for vaccines International experience Empirical evidence: consumer risk perceptions, static and dynamic efficiency Workers' compensation Rationale Four markets Empirical evidence on effects of workers' compensation on injury-illness duration Experience rating of workers compensation premiums and rates of occupational injuries and illnesses The experiences compared Does tort liability improve the public's health? If not tort, what are the alternatives? Public policy implications Future research Bottom line Acknowledgements References Updates. The fundamental question addressed by this paper is whether or not and the extent to which imposing tort liability on potential injurers improves the public's health. Conceptually, imposing the threat of litigation on potential injurers gives them an incentive to exercise more care than they would absent the threat. While the conclusion might seem to be obvious at first glance, in reality, the conclusion is far from obvious. For one, insurance coverage may blunt incentives to take care. Also, the tort system may operate far less perfectly than the theory would have it. In the end, the question must be answered on the basis of empirical evidence.