The Integration Policies of Belarus and Ukraine vis-à-vis the EU and Russia. A Comparative Case Study Through the Prism of a Two-Level Game Approach

The escalating rivalry between the EU and Russia in their shared neighborhood creates important economic, political, and legal challenges for the lands in between. Belarus and Ukraine have received proposals of integration from both the EU and Russia. However, the extents to which they accepted these offers differ and result from a multitude of factors as well as their interplay affecting the policy choices of their governments. International integration is a foreign policy question, but it has a strong domestic dimension too. Explaining various integration stances demands considering a country's foreign and internal affairs. Alla Leukavets applies here Putnam's two-level game-theoretical approach in combination with findings from comparative neighborhood Europeanization and democracy promotion studies, as well as Levitsky/Way's linkages-and-leverage-model. She develops various actor-centered and structural explanatory variables and applies them in the subsequent empirical analysis. Her research results benefit from triangulation through primary documents analysis and semi-structured interviews with elites and experts in Minsk, Moscow, Brussels, and Washington, DC. The book analyses how the simultaneity of European and Eurasian integration challenged the two countries to make a major strategic integration choice. The study sheds light on the reasons for and genesis of the Ukraine Crisis, and on how external actors, such as the EU, can succeed in facilitating domestic reforms in Eastern Partnership countries. Contents Acknowledgements List of Tables Annexes Abbreviations Introduction I. Theoretical Part 1. Literature Review 1.1 Overview of Research on Integration in the Post-Soviet Region 1.2 Literature on Authoritarian Regimes 2. In Search of a Theoretical Framework of Analysis: Robert Putnam’s Two-Level Game Approach 2.1 Conventional Theoretical Approaches 2.2. Nexus of Internal-External Determinants in Foreign Policy Analysis 2.3. Putnam’s Two-Level Game Approach 2.3.1 Main Assumptions of Putnam’s Approach 2.3.2 Application of the Two-Level Game Approach in Academic Literature 2.3.3 A Critique of Putnam’s Approach 2.4. Application of Putnam’s Approach to Integration Games in the Eastern Neighbourhood II. Research Design 5. Case Study Methodology and Case Selection 6. Towards a Clearer Conceptualisation and Operationalisation of the Independent and Dependent Variables 6.1 Defining and Operationalising the Explanandum of Research 6.2 Integration Offer 6.3 Independent Variables (Explanans) 7. Data Collection III. Empirical Part 9. Belarusian Integration Policy: Caught Between Domestic Interests, Russia and the EU 9.1 International Factors Influencing Belarus’ Integration Stance 9.1.1 Attractiveness of Integration Offers for Belarus (Costs and Benefits) a. Attractiveness of Russia’s Integration Offer for Belarus (Costs and Benefits) b. Attractiveness of the EU’s Integration Offer for Belarus (Costs and Benefits) 9.1.2 Economic Linkages Between Belarus and External Actors a. Belarus-Russia Economic Linkages b. Belarus–EU Economic Linkages 9.2 Domestic Factors Influencing Belarus’ Integration Stance 9.2.1 Size of the Win-Set: Level-II Political Institutions and Ratification Procedures in the Parliament 9.2.2 Size of the Win-Set: Level-II Political Preferences and Coalitions 1) Formation and Development of the Belarusian Nomenklatura 2) Geopolitical Preferences of Deputies in the Belarusian Parliament 3) Political Opposition in Belarus 4) Regime-Linked Business Elites and Their Influence on Politics in Belarus 5) Geopolitical Preferences of Belarusians 9.2.3 Size of Win-set: Strategies of the Level-I Negotiator (Mechanisms of Elite Co-Optation and Control) 9.3 Analysis of the Integration Game in Belarus Vis-à-Vis the EU and Russia in 1994–2020 9.3.1 First Presidency of Lukashenka (1994–2001): Russian Integration Euphoria and the Freezing of Relations with the EU a. Formation and Development of Belarus’ Win-Set b. Belarus-Russia Integration Game: Quick Start— Mixed Results c. Belarus-EU Integration (No) Game 9.3.2 Second Presidency of Lukashenka (2001–2006): Dismantling the Integration Myth and Switching to Economic Pragmatism a. Further Consolidation of a Homogeneous Win-Set b. Belarus-Russia Altered Integration Game: A Pragmatic Twist c. Belarus-EU Integration Game: Who Against Whom? 9.3.3 Third Presidency of Lukashenka (2006–2010): Further Marketisation of Relations and Integration in the Framework of Economic Pragmatism a. Complete “Subordination” of Belarus’ Win-Set to President’s Acceptability Set b. Belarus-Russia Integration Game as a “Sovereignty Entrepreneurship” c. Belarus-EU Virtual Integration Game 9.3.4 Fourth Presidency of Lukashenka (2010–2015): First Signs of Democratisation and Effect of the Ukraine’s Crisis on Belarusian Integration Policy a. Real or Cosmetic Changes in Belarus’ Win-Set? b. Belarus-Russia Integration Game: Business as Usual c. Belarus-EU Integration Game: Old Wine in New Bottles? 9.3.5 Fifth Presidency of Lukashenka (2015–2020): The 2020 Presidential Elections as a New Critical Juncture in Belarus’ Relations with Russia and the EU a. Domestic Developments in Belarus b. Belarus-Russia Integration Game: Fighting Off Pressure from Russia c. Belarus-EU Integration Game: An Attempt at Subtle Democratisation? 9.4 Conclusion 10. Ukraine’s Balancing Act Vis-à-Vis the EU and Russia: Integration Policy Dimension 10.1 International Factors Influencing Ukraine’s Integration Stance 10.1.1 Attractiveness of Integration Offers for Ukraine (Costs and Benefits) a. Attractiveness of Russia’s Integration Offer for Ukraine b. Attractiveness of the EU’s Integration Offer for Ukraine 10.1.2 Economic Linkages Between Ukraine and External Actors a. Ukraine—Russia Economic Linkages b. Ukraine-EU Economic Linkages 10.2 Domestic Factors Influencing Integration Stance 10.2.1 Size of the Win-set: Level-II Political Institutions and Ratification Procedures in the Parliament 10.2.2 Level-II Political Preferences and Coalitions 1) Political Parties in Ukraine and Their Foreign Policy Orientation 2) The Role of Oligarchs in Affecting Ukraine’s Win-Set 3) Geopolitical Preferences of Ukrainians Towards Integration 10.2.3. Strategies of the Level-1 Negotiator 10.2.4. Acceptability Set of the President and Its Correlation with the Win-Set 10.3 Analysis of the Integration Game in Ukraine Vis-à- Vis Russia and the EU in 1994–2020 10.3.1 Kuchma’s Presidency (1994-2004): Returning to Europe With(Out) Russia? 10.3.1.1 From Kravchuk’s to Kuchma’s First Presidency (1994–1999): First Attempt at Multi-vector Integration Stance a. Formation and Development of Ukraine’s Win-Set b. A “Pick and Choose” Approach in Ukraine’s Integration Game with Russia c. Ukraine-EU Integration Game: Institutional Confusion and European Illusion 10.3.1.2 Kuchma’s Second Presidency (1999–2004): A Rise of Pragmatic Nationalism a. Further Consolidation of the Pragmatic Eurasianists and Westernizers Shaping Ukraine’s Win-Set b. Ukraine-Russia Integration Game: A “Battle” of Kuchma’s Acceptability Set and Ukraine’s Win-Set c. A Mix of Sticks and Carrots in the Ukraine-EU Integration Game 10.3.2 Yushchenko’s Presidency (2005–2010): Ukraine’s Brief Hope of EU Integration a. A Transformation of Ukraine’s Win-Set After the Orange Revolution b. Ukraine-Russia Zero-Sum Integration Game c. Ukraine-EU Integration Game: The Door Is Neither Open, Nor Closed 10.3.3 Yanukovych’s Presidency (2010–2014): New Game with Old Rules? a. Ukraine’s Win-Set: “Everything New Is Actually Well-Forgotten Old” b. Ukraine—Russia Integration Game: Back to Old Rules c. The EU-Ukraine Integration Game: Back to a Multi-Vector Integration Stance 10.3.4 Poroshenko’s Presidency (2014–2019): Ukraine’s U-Turn and the Change of Integration Stance to Pro-European a. Transformation of Ukraine’s Win-Set: Domination of Westernizers? b. Ukraine-Russia Integration: Game Over c. Ukraine-EU Integration Game: Real This Time? 10.4 Conclusion IV. Conclusions 12. Contributions to Broader Academic Debates and Further Research Agenda Bibliography Annexes Index