The Importance of Assent: A Theory of Coercion and Dignity (Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, Vol. 25)

The view that persons are entitled to respect because of their moral agency is commonplace in contemporary moral theory. What exactly this respect entails, however, is far less uncontroversial. In this book, Van der Rijt argues powerfully that this respect for persons' moral agency must also encompass respect for their subjective moral judgments - even when these judgments can be shown to be fundamentally flawed. Van der Rijt scrutinises the role persons' subjective moral judgments play within the context of coercion and domination. His fresh, original analysis of Kant's third formulation of the Categorical Imperative reveals how these judgments are intimately connected to a person's dignity. The result is an insightful new account of coercion, a novel Kantian reformulation of the republican notion of non-domination and a compelling, innovative argument in favour of retributive justice. "In this admirably clear and insightful work, Van der Rijt develops an original account of coercion and dignity. On the basis of his analysis of the relation between these two concepts, he also provides an intriguing new angle on the nature of republicanism. I recommend this book to anyone interested in freedom and power and their roles in normative political theory." Ian Carter - University of Pavia "In this carefully argued and original study Jan-Willem van der Rijt offers an analysis of coercion, a broadly Kantian argument that coercion is an affront to dignity, and an illuminating contrast with Philip Pettit's republicanism. A most welcome contribution." Thomas E. Hill, Jr. - University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill "Jan-Willem van der Rijt has written a well argued, original book that will prove to be extremely helpful for the philosophical inquiry of the relationship between coercion and human dignity as well as for the assessment of republicanism and its consequences." Ralf Stoecker - University of Potsdam Acknowledgments 7 Contents 9 1 Introduction 11 Part I Coercion 13 2 The Analysis of Coercion 14 2.1 Introduction 14 2.1.1 Examples 16 2.2 Evaluating Coercion Accounts 20 2.2.1 The Primacy of Non-moralised Accounts 20 2.2.2 Intuitions 22 2.2.3 Distinctiveness 23 2.2.4 Justified Coercion 24 2.3 The Position of the Coerced 26 2.4 The Role of the Coercer 33 2.4.1 Zimmerman's Non-moralised Account 34 2.4.2 Wertheimer's Moralised Account 36 2.4.3 Prima Facie Moralisation 38 2.5 Summary 39 3 Coercion and Moral Judgment 41 3.1 A Definition of Coercion 41 3.2 Discussion 45 3.3 Applications 50 3.3.1 Coercion and Responsibility 50 3.3.2 The Coerciveness of the Law 52 3.3.3 Coercion and Autonomy 55 Part II Dignity and Interference 56 4 A Kantian Perspective 57 4.1 Introduction 57 4.2 Considering Oneself Wronged 59 4.3 Moral Agents, Chosen Ends, and Wrongful Interference 62 5 Moral Objections and the Categorical Imperative 67 5.1 Introduction 67 5.2 Coercion and Disagreement 69 5.2.1 Moral Conflict 70 5.2.1.1 The Rawlsian Approach to Moral Conflict 71 5.2.1.2 Moral Conflict and the Kantian Framework 71 5.3 The Formulae of Universal Law and End-in-Itself 73 5.3.1 The Formula of Universal Law and Sincere Moral Conflict 75 5.3.2 The Formula of the End-in-Itself and Sincere Moral Conflict 78 5.3.3 The Role of Practical Judgment 80 5.4 The Formula of the Commonwealth of Ends 81 5.4.1 Outline 81 5.4.2 The Commonwealth of Ends and the Affront of Coercion 83 5.4.2.1 Dignity and Legislation 85 5.4.2.2 Dignity and Autonomy 89 5.4.3 The Commonwealth of Ends and How to Deal with Coercion 92 5.4.4 Completing the Interpretation of the Commonwealth of Ends 96 5.4.4.1 The Interpretation of the Commonwealth of Ends 96 5.4.4.2 Dealing with Sincere Moral Conflict 97 5.4.5 Wronging Through Maxims and Motives 100 5.5 Conclusion 104 Part III A Kantian Reconstruction of Republicanism 107 6 Republicanism 108 6.1 Introduction 108 6.2 Republican Freedom 110 6.2.1 Positive and Negative Freedom 111 6.2.2 Freedom as Non-domination 113 6.2.3 Republican Freedom More Demanding than Negative Freedom 116 6.2.4 Negative Freedom More Demanding than Republican Freedom 118 7 Non-domination and Dignity 122 7.1 Introduction 122 7.2 Dignity and Avowed Interests 125 7.3 Immunity vs. Impunity 130 7.4 Implications I 132 7.4.1 Discursive Means and Contestability 132 7.4.2 Abject Moral Beliefs 136 7.4.3 Non-domination, Authority and Equality 137 7.5 Implications II: Retributive Justice 138 7.5.1 Impunity and Retribution 138 7.5.2 Republican Sentencing Policy 139 7.5.3 Retribution vs. Vengeance 143 7.5.4 Mercy and Mandatory Sentencing 145 7.6 Summary 146 8 Conclusion 148 8.1 Summary 148 8.2 Dignity and Sincerity 151 Abbreviations to Kant's Works 152 References 153 Index 157 Annotation The view that persons are entitled to respect because of their moral agency is commonplace in contemporary moral theory. What exactly this respect entails, however, is far less uncontroversial. In this book, Van der Rijt argues powerfully that this respect for personsâ moral agency must also encompass respect for their subjective moral judgments â even when these judgments can be shown to be fundamentally flawed. Van der Rijt scrutinises the role personsâ subjective moral judgments play within the context of coercion and domination. Â His fresh, original analysis of Kant's third formulation of the Categorical Imperative reveals how these judgments are intimately connected to a person's dignity. The result is an insightful new account of coercion, a novel Kantian reformulation of the republican notion of non-domination and a compelling, innovative argument in favour of retributive justice."In this admirably clear and insightful work, Van der Rijt develops an original account of coercion and dignity. On the basis of his analysis of the relation between these two concepts, he also provides an intriguing new angle on the nature of republicanism. I recommend this book to anyone interested in freedom and power and their roles in normative political theory."Ian Carter - University of Pavia"In this carefully argued and original study Jan-Willem van der Rijt offers an analysis of coercion, a broadly Kantian argument that coercion is an affront to dignity, and an illuminating contrast with Philip Pettit's republicanism. A most welcome contribution."Thomas E. Hill, Jr. - University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill"Jan-Willem van der Rijt has written a well argued, original book that will prove to be extremely helpful for the philosophical inquiry of the relationship between coercion and human dignity as well as for the assessment of republicanism and its consequences."Ralf Stoecker - University of Potsdam This book argues that respecting persons as moral agents requires considerable consideration be paid to the subjective moral judgments of individual persons. It shows that such judgments are important independently of their validity or even their reasonableness. Despite the great emphasis on respect for persons in present-day moral theory, the importance of a person's subjective moral judgments has largely been neglected in existing literature. The book focuses particularly on the context of coercion and domination, both key notions in moral and political theory. The book combines Kantian and Front Matter....Pages i-x Introduction....Pages 1-2 Front Matter....Pages 3-3 The Analysis of Coercion....Pages 5-31 Coercion and Moral Judgment....Pages 33-47 Front Matter....Pages 49-49 A Kantian Perspective....Pages 51-60 Moral Objections and the Categorical Imperative....Pages 61-100 Front Matter....Pages 101-101 Republicanism....Pages 103-116 Non-domination and Dignity....Pages 117-142 Conclusion....Pages 143-146 Back Matter....Pages 147-157 This book argues that respect for persons as moral agents requires consideration of individuals' subjective moral judgments, independent of their validity or reasonableness. The focus is on coercion and domination, key ideas in moral and political theory.