The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind (International Library of Philosophy)

Dualism is a doctrine engaged on two fronts. It affirms a thesis about the mind, in opposition to various forms of materialism and mental reductionism, and a thesis about the physical world, in opposition to various forms of mentalism and idealism. The Immaterial Self is a defense of the Cartesian account in which the immaterial contents of the mind are assigned to an immaterial mental subject. Dualism is a doctrine engaged on two fronts. It affirms a thesis about the mind, in opposition to various forms of materialism and mental reductionism, and a thesis about the physical world, in opposition to various forms of mentalism and idealism. This book is an examination of one dualist account of the mind. It is a defence of the Cartesian account in which the immaterial contents of the mind are assigned to an immaterial mental subject. The book provides a vigorous attack on alternative accounts of the mind - both those, like functionalism and the identity theories, which are opposed to dualism as such, and those which accept dualism in a Humean (non-Cartesian) form. It also tries to rebut the standard objections brought against the dualist or Cartesian positions, paying particular attention to the issues of psychophysical causation and the nature of the self. In its final sections, the book develops positive accounts of the attachment of the self to the body, its power of free agency, and its role in personal identity.; Although at many points they accord with our ordinary intuitions, the views argued for in The Immaterial Self are in radical conflict with the materialist outlook of the current philosophical establishment. Whatever their sympathies, all students of philosophy should profit from the clear and systematic way in which the issues are discussed Dualism argues that the mind is more than just the brain. It holds that there exists two very different realms, one mental and the other physical. Both are fundamental and one cannot be reduced to the other - there are minds and there is a physical world. This book examines and defends the most famous dualist account of the mind, the cartesian, which attributes the immaterial contents of the mind to an immaterial self.John Foster's new book exposes the inadequacies of the dominant materialist and reductionist accounts of the mind. In doing so he is in radical conflict with the current philosophical establishment. Ambitious and controversial, The Immaterial Self is the most powerful and effective defence of Cartesian dualism since Descartes'own Book Cover......Page 1 Title......Page 4 Contents......Page 5 Preface......Page 10 THE DUALIST DOCTRINE......Page 12 NIHILISM AND ANALYTICAL BEHAVIOURISM......Page 27 ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM......Page 58 THE TYPE-IDENTITY THESIS......Page 108 TOKEN-IDENTITY AND METAPHYSICAL REDUCTIONISM......Page 142 TOKEN-IDENTITY AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL CAUSATION......Page 169 THE MENTAL SUBJECT......Page 213 PERSONAL IDENTITY, EMBODIMENT, AND FREEDOM......Page 249 Notes......Page 292 Bibliography......Page 301 Index......Page 307 Arts, Language and Literature Book Cover 1 Title 4 Contents 5 Preface 10 THE DUALIST DOCTRINE 12 NIHILISM AND ANALYTICAL BEHAVIOURISM 27 ANALYTICAL FUNCTIONALISM 58 THE TYPE-IDENTITY THESIS 108 TOKEN-IDENTITY AND METAPHYSICAL REDUCTIONISM 142 TOKEN-IDENTITY AND PSYCHOPHYSICAL CAUSATION 169 THE MENTAL SUBJECT 213 PERSONAL IDENTITY, EMBODIMENT, AND FREEDOM 249 Notes 292 Bibliography 301 Index 307 A controversial book that attacks the current materialist and reductionist accounts of the mind, reviving the arguments for the Cartesian self. John Foster. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 281-295) And Index.