The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology (Philosophy of Mind Series)

Most philosophers writing about personal identity in recent years claim that what it takes for us to persist through time is a matter of psychology. In this groundbreaking new book, Eric Olson argues that such approaches face daunting problems, and he defends in their place a radically non-psychological account of personal identity. He defines human beings as biological organisms, and claims that no psychological relation is either sufficient or necessary for an organism to persist. Rejecting several famous thought experiments dealing with personal identity, he instead argues that one could survive the destruction of all of one's psychological contents and capabilities as long as the human organism remains alive. What does it take for you to persist from one time to another? What sorts of changes could you survive, and what would bring your existence to an end? What makes it the case that some past or future being, rather than another, is you? So begins Eric Olson's pathbreaking new book, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. You and I are biological organisms, he claims; and no psychological relation is either necessary or sufficient for an organism to persist through time. Conceiving of personal identity in terms of life-sustaining processes rather than bodily continuity distinguishes Olson's position from that of most other opponents of psychological theories. And only a biological account of our identity, he argues, can accommodate the apparent facts that we are animals, and that each of us began to exist as a microscopic embryo with no psychological features at all. Surprisingly, a biological approach turns out to be consistent with the most popular arguments for a psychological account of personal identity, while avoiding metaphysical traps. And in an ironic twist, Olson shows that it is the psychological approach that fails to support the Lockean definition of "person" as (roughly) a rational, self-conscious moral agent, an attractive view that fits naturally with a biological account.

most Philosophers Writing About Personal Identity In Recent Years Claim That What It Takes For Us To Persist Through Time Is A Matter Of Psychology. In This Groundbreaking New Book, Eric Olson Argues That Such Approaches Face Daunting Problems, And He Defends In Their Place A Radically Non-psychological Account Of Personal Identity. He Defines Human Beings As Biological Organisms, And Claims That No Psychological Relation Is Either Sufficient Or Necessary For An Organism To Persist.
olson Rejects Several Famous Thought-experiments Dealing With Personal Identity. He Argues, Instead, That One Could Survive The Destruction Of All Of One's Psychological Contents And Capabilities As Long As The Human Organism Remains Alive—as Long As Its Vital Functions, Such As Breathing, Circulation, And Metabolism, Continue.

## Abstract This book argues that our identity over time involves no psychological facts. Psychological accounts of personal identity lead to grave metaphysical problems, and the arguments for them are inconclusive. The book argues that we are animals, and thus have the purely biological identity conditions of animals. Olson presents a defence of a radically non-psychological account of personal identity. Continuity of mental contents or capacities is neither necessary nor sufficient for us to persist through time. Our identity consists in biological processes