The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (The Princeton Economic History of the Western World)

The Great Divergence brings new insight to one of the classic questions of history: Why did sustained industrial growth begin in Northwest Europe, despite surprising similarities between advanced areas of Europe and East Asia? As Ken Pomeranz shows, as recently as 1750, parallels between these two parts of the world were very high in life expectancy, consumption, product and factor markets, and the strategies of households. Perhaps most surprisingly, Pomeranz demonstrates that the Chinese and Japanese cores were no worse off ecologically than Western Europe. Core areas throughout the eighteenth-century Old World faced comparable local shortages of land-intensive products, shortages that were only partly resolved by trade. Pomeranz argues that Europe's nineteenth-century divergence from the Old World owes much to the fortunate location of coal, which substituted for timber. This made Europe's failure to use its land intensively much less of a problem, while allowing growth in energy-intensive industries. Another crucial difference that he notes has to do with trade. Fortuitous global conjunctures made the Americas a greater source of needed primary products for Europe than any Asian periphery. This allowed Northwest Europe to grow dramatically in population, specialize further in manufactures, and remove labor from the land, using increased imports rather than maximizing yields. Together, coal and the New World allowed Europe to grow along resource-intensive, labor-saving paths. Meanwhile, Asia hit a cul-de-sac. Although the East Asian hinterlands boomed after 1750, both in population and in manufacturing, this growth prevented these peripheral regions from exporting vital resources to the cloth-producing Yangzi Delta. As a result, growth in the core of East Asia's economy essentially stopped, and what growth did exist was forced along labor-intensive, resource-saving paths--paths Europe could have been forced down, too, had it not been for favorable resource stocks from underground and overseas. CONTENTS......Page 6 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS......Page 10 INTRODUCTION Comparisons, Connections, and Narratives of European Economic Development......Page 14 Variations on the Europe-Centered Story: Demography, Ecology, and Accumulation......Page 21 Other Europe-Centered Stories: Markets, Firms, and Institutions......Page 25 Problems with the Europe-Centered Stories......Page 27 Building a More Inclusive Story......Page 28 Comparisons, Connections, and the Structure of the Argument......Page 35 A Note on Geographic Coverage......Page 36 PART ONE: A WORLD OF SURPRISING RESEMBLANCES......Page 40 ONE Europe before Asia? Population, Capital Accumulation, and Technology in Explanations of European Development......Page 42 Agriculture, Transport, and Livestock Capital......Page 43 Living Longer? Living Better?......Page 47 Birthrates......Page 51 Accumulation?......Page 53 What about Technology?......Page 54 TWO Market Economies in Europe and Asia......Page 80 Land Markets and Restrictions on Land Use in China and Western Europe......Page 81 Labor Systems......Page 91 Migration, Markets, and Institutions......Page 93 Rural Industry and Sideline Activities......Page 97 Family Labor in China and Europe: “Involution” and the “Industrious Revolution”......Page 102 Conclusion to Part 1: Multiple Cores and Shared Constraints in the Early Modern World Economy......Page 118 PART TWO: FROM NEW ETHOS TO NEW ECONOMY? CONSUMPTION, INVESTMENT, AND CAPITALISM......Page 120 INTRODUCTION......Page 122 More and Less Ordinary Luxuries......Page 125 Everyday Luxuries and Popular Consumption in Early Modern Europe and Asia......Page 127 Consumer Durables and the “Objectification” of Luxury......Page 138 Exotic Goods and the Velocity of Fashion: Global Conjuncture and the Appearance of Culturally Based Economic Difference......Page 163 Luxury Demand, Social Systems, and Capitalist Firms......Page 173 FOUR Visible Hands: Firm Structure, Sociopolitical Structure, and “Capitalism” in Europe and Asia......Page 177 Overseas Extraction and Capital Accumulation: The Williams Thesis Revisited......Page 197 The Importance of the Obvious: Luxury Demand, Capitalism, and New World Colonization......Page 200 Interstate Competition, Violence, and State Systems: How They Didn’t Matter and How They Did......Page 205 Conclusion to Part 2: The Significance of Similarities—and of Differences......Page 217 PART THREE: BEYOND SMITH AND MALTHUS: FROM ECOLOGICAL CONSTRAINTS TO SUSTAINED INDUSTRIAL GROWTH......Page 220 FIVE Shared Constraints: Ecological Strain in Western Europe and East Asia......Page 222 Deforestation and Soil Depletion in China: Some Comparisons with Europe......Page 236 Trading for Resources with Old World Peripheries: Common Patterns and Limits of Smithian Solutions to Quasi-Malthusian Problems......Page 253 SIX Abolishing the Land Constraint: The Americas as a New Kind of Periphery......Page 275 Another New World, Another Windfall: Precious Metals......Page 280 Some Measurements of Ecological Relief: Britain in the Age of the Industrial Revolution......Page 285 Comparisons and Calculations: What Do the Numbers Mean?......Page 290 Beyond and Besides the Numbers......Page 292 Into an Industrial World......Page 294 Last Comparisons: Labor Intensity, Resources, and Industrial “Growing Up”......Page 296 Appendix A Comparative Estimates of Land Transport Capacity per Person: Germany and North India, circa 1800......Page 312 Appendix B Estimates of Manure Applied to North China and European Farms in the Late Eighteenth Century, and a Comparison of Resulting Nitrogen Fluxes......Page 314 Appendix C Forest Cover and Fuel-Supply Estimates for France, Lingnan, and a Portion of North China, 1700–1850......Page 318 Appendix D Estimates of “Ghost Acreage” Provided by Various Imports to Late Eighteenth- And Early Nineteenth-Century Britain......Page 324 Appendix E Estimates of Earning Power of Rural Textile Workers in the Lower Yangzi Region of China, 1750–1840......Page 327 Appendix F Estimates of Cotton and Silk Production, Lower Yangzi and China as a whole, 1750 and Later—With Comparisons to United Kingdom, France, and.........Page 338 BIBLIOGRAPHY......Page 350 C......Page 384 D......Page 385 F......Page 386 H......Page 387 L......Page 388 M......Page 389 P......Page 390 S......Page 391 T......Page 392 Z......Page 393 This Text Offers Insight Into One Of The Classic Questions Of History: Why Did Sustained Industrial Growth Begin In Northwest Europe, Despite Surprising Similarities Between Advanced Areas Of Europe And East Asia? As The Author Shows, As Recently As 1750, Parallels Between These Two Parts Of The World Were Very High In Life Expectancy, Consumption, Product And Factor Markets, And The Strategies Of Households. Perhaps Most Surprisingly, He Demonstrates That The Chinese And Japanese Cores Were No Worse Off Ecologically Than Western Europe. Core Areas Throughout The Eighteenth-century Old World Faced Comparable Local Shortages Of Land-intensive Products, Shortages That Were Only Partly Resolved By Trade. The Author Argues That Europe's Nineteenth-century Divergence From The Old World Owes Much To The Fortunate Location Of Coal, Which Substituted For Timber.^ This Made Europe's Failure To Use Its Land Intensively Much Less Of A Problem, While Allowing Growth In Energy-intensive Industries. Another Crucial Difference That He Notes Has To Do With Trade. Fortuitous Global Conjunctures Made The Americas A Greater Source Of Needed Primary Products For Europe Than Any Asian Periphery. This Allowed Northwest Europe To Grow Dramatically In Population, Specialize Further In Manufactures, And Remove Labor From The Land, Using Increased Imports Rather Than Maximizing Yields. Together, Coal And The New World Allowed Europe To Grow Along Resource-intensive, Labor-saving Paths. Meanwhile, Asia Hit A Cul-de-sac. Although The East Asian Hinterlands Boomed After 1750, Both In Population And In Manufacturing, This Growth Prevented These Peripheral Regions From Exporting Vital Resources To The Cloth-producing Yangzi Delta.^ As A Result, Growth In The Core Of East Asia's Economy Essentially Stopped, And What Growth Did Exist Was Forced Along Labor-intensive, Resource-saving Paths, Paths Europe Could Have Been Forced Down, Too, Had It Not Been For Favorable Resource Stocks From Underground And Overseas. Comparisons, Connections, And Narratives Of European Economic Development -- A World Of Surprising Resemblances. Europe Before Asia? Population, Capital Accumulation, And Technology In Explanations Of European Development -- Market Economies In Europe And Asia -- From New Ethos To New Economy? Consumption, Investment, And Capitalism. Luxury Consumption And The Rise Of Capitalism -- Visible Hands: Firm Structure, Sociopolitical Structure, And Capitalism In Europe And Asia -- Beyond Smith And Malthus: From Ecological Constraints To Sustained Industrial Growth. Shared Constraints: Ecological Strain In Western Europe And East Asia -- Abolishing The Land Constraint: The Americas As A New Kind Of Periphery. Kenneth Pomeranz. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [339]-371) And Index. The Great Divergence brings new insight to one of the classic questions of history: Why did sustained industrial growth begin in Northwest Europe, despite surprising similarities between advanced areas of Europe and East Asia? As Ken Pomeranz shows, as recently as 1750, parallels between these two parts of the world were very high in life expectancy, consumption, product and factor markets, and the strategies of households. Perhaps most surprisingly, Pomeranz demonstrates that the Chinese and Japanese cores were no worse off ecologically than Western Europe. Core areas throughout the eighteenth-century Old World faced comparable local shortages of land-intensive products, shortages that were only partly resolved by trade.Pomeranz argues that Europe's nineteenth-century divergence from the Old World owes much to the fortunate location of coal, which substituted for timber. This made Europe's failure to use its land intensively much less of a problem, while allowing growth in energy-intensive industries. Another crucial difference that he notes has to do with trade. Fortuitous global conjunctures made the Americas a greater source of needed primary products for Europe than any Asian periphery. This allowed Northwest Europe to grow dramatically in population, specialize further in manufactures, and remove labor from the land, using increased imports rather than maximizing yields. Together, coal and the New World allowed Europe to grow along resource-intensive, labor-saving paths.Meanwhile, Asia hit a cul-de-sac. Although the East Asian hinterlands boomed after 1750, both in population and in manufacturing, this growth prevented these peripheral regions from exporting vital resourcesto the cloth-producing Yangzi Delta. As a result, growth in the core of East Asia economy essentially stopped, and what growth did exist was forced along labor-intensive, resource-saving paths -- paths Europe could have been forced down, too, had it not been for favorable resource stocks from underground and overseas. "Why did sustained industrial growth begin in Northwest Europe, despite surprising similarities between advanced areas of Europe and East Asia?". "Pomeranz argues that Europe's nineteenth-century divergence from the Old World owes much to the fortunate location of coal, which substituted for timber. This made Europe's failure to use its land intensively much less of a problem, while allowing growth in energy-intensive industries. Another crucial difference that he notes has to do with trade. Fortuitous global conjunctures made the Americas a greater source of needed primary products for Europe than any Asian periphery. This allowed Northwest Europe to grow dramatically in population, specialize further in manufactures, and remove labor from the land, using increased imports rather than maximizing yields. Together, coal and the New World allowed Europe to grow along resource-intensive, labor-saving paths."--BOOK JACKET.