The Grand Strategy of the Russian Empire, 1650-1831

At its height, the Russian empire covered eleven time zones and stretched from Scandinavia to the Pacific Ocean. Arguing against the traditional historical view that Russia, surrounded and threatened by enemies, was always on the defensive, John P. LeDonne contends that Russia developed a long-term strategy not in response to immediate threats but in line with its own expansionist urges to control the Eurasian Heartland. LeDonne narrates how the government from Moscow and Petersburg expanded the empire by deploying its army as well as by extending its patronage to frontier societies in return for their serving the interests of the empire. He considers three theaters on which the Russians expanded: the Western (Baltic, Germany, Poland); the Southern (Ottoman and Persian Empires); and the Eastern (China, Siberia, Central Asia). In his analysis of military power, he weighs the role of geography and locale, as well as economic issues, in the evolution of a larger imperial strategy. Rather than viewing Russia as peripheral to European Great Power politics, LeDonne makes a powerful case for Russia as an expansionist, militaristic, and authoritarian regime that challenged the great states and empires of its time. - Publisher Contents 14 Maps 16 Introduction 20 I. The Formation of Russia's Grand Strategy, 1650–1743 30 1. The Geopolitical Background 32 The Western Theater 32 The Southern Theater 40 The Eastern Theater 46 2.Mobile Armies 55 Strategic Penetration 55 Concentrated Deployment 61 The Economic Foundation 69 3. Client States and Societies 78 Client States: The Western Theater 78 Client Societies: The Western and Southern Theaters 84 Client Societies: The Eastern Theater 91 II. Hegemonic Expansionism, 1743–1796 100 4. Deep Strikes 102 Sweden, France, and Prussia 102 The Russo-Turkish Wars 110 Marking Time 117 5. Peripheral Deployment 125 After the Seven Years' War: 1763 125 The Emerging Force Structure: 1765–1796 133 The Fragmentation of the Strategic Force: 1796–1801 140 6. Economy, Culture, Client Societies 149 The Economy 149 The Ideology of Russia's Grand Strategy 156 Client States and Societies 162 III. The Territorialization of the Empire, 1797–1831 170 7. Strategic Penetration 172 Italy, Holland, Sweden, and Turkey, 1799–1812 172 The War with France, 1812–1815 179 Persia, Turkey, and Poland, 1815–1831 185 8. Dispersion of the Strategic Force 194 Growth of the Army and Deployment, 1801–1812 194 War and Peace, 1812–1831 201 Peripheral Deployment 209 9. Fortress Empire 215 The Economy 215 Client States and Societies, Old and New 222 Army, Police, Ideology 229 Conclusion 236 Notes 252 Bibliography 268 Index 276 A 276 B 276 C 276 D 276 E 277 F 277 G 277 H 277 I 277 J 277 K 277 L 277 M 277 N 277 O 278 P 278 R 278 S 278 T 278 U 278 V 278 W 278 Z 278 A pioneering and powerfully argued reevaluation of Russia's military and diplomatic strategy from the 17th century to the reign of Nicholas I, this book argues that Russia took an offensive approach in the creation of its empire. It also examines the economic foundation of Russian's military power and the development of an imperial ideology.