The Grammar of Society : The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms

In The Grammar of Society, first published in 2006, Cristina Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity, in an effort to understand their nature and dynamics, the expectations that they generate, and how they evolve and change. Drawing on several intellectual traditions and methods, including those of social psychology, experimental economics and evolutionary game theory, Bicchieri provides an integrated account of how social norms emerge, why and when we follow them, and the situations where we are most likely to focus on relevant norms. Examining the existence and survival of inefficient norms, she demonstrates how norms evolve in ways that depend upon the psychological dispositions of the individual and how such dispositions may impair social efficiency. By contrast, she also shows how certain psychological propensities may naturally lead individuals to evolve fairness norms that closely resemble those we follow in most modern societies Provided by publisher Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Dedication......Page 7 Contents......Page 9 Preface......Page 11 Acknowledgments......Page 17 Introduction......Page 19 Social Norms......Page 26 Conditions for a Social Norm to Exist......Page 29 Descriptive Norms......Page 47 Conditions for a Descriptive Norm to Exist......Page 49 Conventions......Page 52 Conditions for Conventions to Exist......Page 56 Following Social Norms......Page 60 Awareness and Choice......Page 64 Appendix to Chapter 1......Page 70 Introduction......Page 73 Experiments......Page 77 Trigger Cues......Page 81 Spreading Activation......Page 88 Local Norms......Page 94 Categories, Schemata, and Role-Playing......Page 99 Categories......Page 101 From Attention to Interpretation......Page 103 Natural and Social Kinds......Page 106 Schemata and Scripts......Page 111 Introduction......Page 118 The Ultimatum Game......Page 121 Social Preferences......Page 125 Reciprocity......Page 128 Norms Matter......Page 130 Variations on the Ultimatum Game......Page 135 Ultimatum Game with Asymmetric Information and Payoffs......Page 136 Ultimatum Game with Different Alternatives......Page 139 Ultimatum Game with Framing......Page 141 Dictators with Uncertainty......Page 143 Evasions and Violations......Page 148 Appendix to Chapter 3......Page 155 Introduction......Page 158 Experiments......Page 160 Group Identity......Page 164 Cheap Talk......Page 171 Creating Identities......Page 175 Keeping Promises......Page 180 Talking to Machines......Page 186 Cognitive Misers......Page 188 Introduction......Page 194 A Few Examples and a Fairy Tale......Page 200 Pluralistic Ignorance......Page 204 Why Misrepresentation?......Page 206 Why Do People Conform?......Page 208 Consequences of Pluralistic Ignorance......Page 211 Informational Cascades......Page 214 The Assumptions......Page 215 Results......Page 218 Distribution of the Trendsetters’ Tastes and Simulation Results......Page 219 Lifting the Veil......Page 223 Appendix to Chapter 5......Page 226 Introduction......Page 232 The Ultimatum Game......Page 235 Emerging Norms......Page 239 Updating Beliefs and Strategies......Page 246 References......Page 253 Index......Page 263 Cover 1 Half-title 3 Title 5 Copyright 6 Dedication 7 Contents 9 Preface 11 Acknowledgments 17 1 The Rules We Live By 19 Introduction 19 Social Norms 26 Conditions for a Social Norm to Exist 29 Descriptive Norms 47 Conditions for a Descriptive Norm to Exist 49 Conventions 52 Conditions for Conventions to Exist 56 Following Social Norms 60 Awareness and Choice 64 Appendix to Chapter 1 70 2 Habits of the Mind 73 Introduction 73 Experiments 77 Trigger Cues 81 Spreading Activation 88 Local Norms 94 Categories, Schemata, and Role-Playing 99 Categories 101 From Attention to Interpretation 103 Natural and Social Kinds 106 Schemata and Scripts 111 3 A Taste for Fairness 118 Introduction 118 The Ultimatum Game 121 Social Preferences 125 Reciprocity 128 Norms Matter 130 Variations on the Ultimatum Game 135 Ultimatum Game with Asymmetric Information and Payoffs 136 Ultimatum Game with Different Alternatives 139 Ultimatum Game with Framing 141 Games with Computers 143 Dictators with Uncertainty 143 Evasions and Violations 148 Appendix to Chapter 3 155 4 Covenants Without Swords 158 Introduction 158 Experiments 160 Group Identity 164 Cheap Talk 171 Creating Identities 175 Keeping Promises 180 Talking to Machines 186 Cognitive Misers 188 5 Informational Cascades and Unpopular Norms 194 Introduction 194 A Few Examples and a Fairy Tale 200 Pluralistic Ignorance 204 Why Misrepresentation? 206 Why Do People Conform? 208 Consequences of Pluralistic Ignorance 211 Informational Cascades 214 The Assumptions 215 The Model 218 Results 218 Distribution of the Trendsetters’ Tastes and Simulation Results 219 Lifting the Veil 223 Appendix to Chapter 5 226 6 The Evolution of a Fairness Norm 232 Introduction 232 The Ultimatum Game 235 Emerging Norms 239 Updating Beliefs and Strategies 246 References 253 Index 263 In The Grammar of Society, Cristina Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity, in an effort to understand their nature and dynamics, the expectations that they generate, and how they evolve and change. Drawing on several intellectual traditions and methods, including those of social psychology, experimental economics, and evolutionary game theory, Bicchieri provides an integrated account of how social norms emerge, why and when we follow them, and the situations in which we are most likely to focus on relevant norms. Examining the existence and survival of inefficient norms, she demonstrates how norms evolve in ways that depend on the psychological dispositions of the individual and how such dispositions may impair collective welfare. By contrast, she also shows how certain psychological propensities may naturally lead individuals to evolve fairness norms that closely resemble those we follow in modern societies. In The Grammar Of Society, Cristina Bicchieri Examines Social Norms, Such As Fairness, Cooperation, And Reciprocity, In An Effort To Understand Their Nature And Dynamics, The Expectations That They Generate, And How They Evolve And Change. Drawing On Several Intellectual Traditions And Methods, Including Those Of Social Psychology, Experimental Economics, And Evolutionary Game Theory, Bicchieri Provides An Integrated Account Of How Social Norms Emerge, Why And When We Follow Them, And The Situations In Which We Are Most Likely To Focus On Relevant Norms.--jacket. The Rules We Live By -- Habits Of The Mind -- A Taste For Fairness -- Covenants Without Sword -- Informational Cascades And Unpopular Norms -- The Evolution Of A Fairness Norm. Cristina Bicchieri. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 235-244) And Index. Cristina Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity, in an effort to understand their nature and dynamics, generated expectations and evolution and change. Drawing on intellectual traditions and methods, including those of social psychology, experimental economics and evolutionary game theory, Bicchieri provides an integrated account of how social norms emerge and why and when we follow them. Examining the existence and survival of inefficient norms, she demonstrates how norms evolve in ways that depend upon the psychological dispositions of the individual and how such dispositions may impair social efficiency. In The Grammar of Society, Cristina Bicchieri examines social norms, such as fairness, cooperation, and reciprocity, in an effort to understand their nature and dynamics, the expectations that they generate, and how they evolve and change. Bicchieri draws on intellectual traditions of social psychology, experimental economics and evolutionary game theory