The German Question : The Stalin Note of 1952 and the Problem of Reunification

Foreword integration to German reunification and therefore did not want the West to make any overtures to the Soviet Union. Professor Steininger's critics accused him of "utopianism," of spreading a "missed-opportunity" myth, and of creating a new "stabin-the-back" legend. Yet they could not dispute the fact that he had meticulously accumulated an overwhelming amount of archival evidence to support his conclusions: Adenauer's central role in the formulation of Western policy toward the Stalin Note is now indisputable. This translation will make Professor Steininger's work more accessible to the Anglo-American scholarly community. Few historical problems can lay claim to greater contemporary importance than the question of German reunification. Contents Documents Abbreviations Foreword Preface 1. The Stalin Note and German Scholarship 2. The First Soviet Note, March 10, 1952 3. The Western Powers: Control Through Integration 4. London, Paris, and the First Note 5. Washington and the First Note 6. Opposition to Reunification in the State Department: March 25–April 9 7. The Second Soviet Note, April 9, 1952 8. The End of the Battle of the Notes 9. The Stalin Note: A Missed Opportunity 10. The Year 1953: Churchill, Adenauer, and Reunification 11. A Retrospective Look at Adenauer’s Policy Appendix: Documents Notes Index

Presents a historical account of Columbia University. Written as a guide for prospective students, along with the general public. Covers the University's beginnings, each campus quadrangle, the individual colleges, along with traditions and student life.