The Fiery Test of Critique : A Reading of Kant's Dialectic

## Abstract The book aims to provide a comprehensive study of the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ of Kant’s first Critique. It argues that Kant conceives of ‘critique’ as a kind of winnowing exercise, aimed to separate the wheat of good metaphysics from the chaff of bad. However, he uses a less familiar metaphor to make this point, namely, that of ‘the fiery test of critique’. This turns out to be, not a medieval ordeal (a trial by fire), but rather a metallurgical assay: so-called ‘cupellation’—a procedure in which ore samples are tested for their precious-metal content. The upshot is that critique has a positive, investigatory side: it seeks not merely to eliminate the dross of bad ‘dogmatic’ metaphysics but also to uncover any hidden nuggets of value that might be contained in traditional speculative metaphysics. There are both gold and silver to be found. The gold is the indirect proof of Transcendental Idealism afforded by the resolution of the Antinomies, the silver Kant’s defence of theoretically grounded ‘doctrinal beliefs’ in a wise and great originator and in an afterlife. In the course of making these points, the book engages with Kant’s views on a number of central problems in philosophy and meta-philosophy, including: the explanation of the enduring human impulse towards metaphysics, correct philosophical method, the limits of self-knowledge, the possibility of human freedom, the resolution of metaphysical paradox (‘Antinomy’), the justification of faith, the nature of scepticism, and the role of ‘as if’ reasoning in natural science. Cover 1 The Fiery Test of Critique: A Reading of Kant’s Dialectic 4 Copyright 5 Dedication 6 Contents 8 List of Figures 14 Introduction 16 0.1 The fiery test of critique 23 0.2 Method and experiment 29 0.3 The sceptical method 30 0.4 Pyrrhonian postponement 37 0.5 Kantian charity 39 0.6 Denying knowledge 40 0.7 Speculation 42 0.8 The pre-eminence of the Antinomies 44 0.9 Four masters of method 45 0.10 Approach 46 0.11 Rigour 47 0.12 Typographical conventions 48 0.13 Jargon and dating the reflections 48 0.14 Acknowledgements 49 Part I: Rational Psychology 52 Chapter 1: Transcendental Illusion 54 1.1 Introduction 54 1.2 Illusions: logical, empirical, and transcendental 55 1.3 The sources of transcendental illusion 57 1.4 The simplified account 67 1.5 The necessity of transcendental illusion 68 1.6 Some recalcitrant texts 70 Chapter 2: Empirical and Rational Psychology 74 2.1 Introduction 74 2.2 Wolff 75 2.3 Gottsched 82 2.4 Baumgarten 84 2.5 Meier 86 2.6 Rational psychology in the Metaphysics L1 87 2.7 Pure rational psychology 93 2.8 Pure rational psychology as the science of self-consciousness 94 2.9 The critique of pure rational psychology 100 2.10 Two ways of proceeding in pure rational psychology 102 Chapter 3: The First Paralogism: Preliminaries 105 3.1 Introduction 105 3.2 Substance 107 3.3 Transcendental illusion in the first Paralogism 108 3.4 Kant’s notion of a paralogism 112 3.5 Transcendental paralogism 117 Chapter 4: The B-Edition First Paralogism 119 4.1 Introduction 119 4.2 The paralogism 119 4.3 Objections and replies 126 4.4 Ameriks’s interpretation 140 Chapter 5: The A-edition First Paralogism 142 5.1 Introduction 142 5.2 A closer look at transcendental illusion 145 5.3 Wuerth’s interpretation 149 5.4 A problem with Kant’s characterization of a paralogism 152 5.5 Two ways of viewing a paralogism 153 Chapter 6: The Second Paralogism 155 6.1 Introduction 155 6.2 The Achilles 156 6.3 The A-edition second paralogism as a paralogismk 163 6.4 Kant’s criticism evaluated 164 6.5 A Cartesian application of the major premise 166 6.6 The I as ‘simple in concept’ 169 6.7 The B-edition second Paralogism 171 6.8 The possibility of monism 173 Chapter 7: The Third Paralogism 176 7.1 Introduction 176 7.2 The major premise 179 7.3 The minor premise 181 7.4 The practical use of the concept of a person 185 7.5 The B-edition third Paralogism 188 7.6 Immortality 190 7.7 Mendelssohn’s argument 192 7.8 Fordyce’s argument 193 7.9 Fordyce’s argument evaluated 203 Chapter 8: The Fourth Paralogism 205 8.1 Introduction 205 8.2 The paralogism 206 8.3 External-world scepticism rejected 208 8.4 Anti-materialism 211 8.5 Monism 212 8.6 The B-edition fourth Paralogism 213 8.7 Transcendental illusion again 214 8.8 Architectonic and method 215 8.9 Descartes 218 Part II: Rational Cosmology 222 Chapter 9: The Mathematical Antinomies Presented 224 9.1 Introduction 224 9.2 The phenomenon of antinomy 227 9.3 The form of an antinomy 232 9.4 The thesis of the first antinomy: time 236 9.5 Infinity 238 9.6 The antithesis of the first antinomy: time 242 9.7 The thesis of the first antinomy: space 246 9.8 The antithesis of the first antinomy: space 249 9.9 The second antinomy: preliminaries 251 9.10 The thesis of the second antinomy 252 9.11 The antithesis of the second antinomy 255 Chapter 10: The Mathematical Antinomies Resolved 260 10.1 Introduction 260 10.2 The first line of resolution 261 10.3 The second line of resolution 264 10.4 Proofs by reductio 269 10.5 Regresses ad infinitum and ad indefinitum 270 10.6 The cosmological syllogism 272 10.7 The sceptical representation 276 10.8 The Lambert analogy 278 10.9 The indifferentists 280 10.10 The indirect argument for Transcendental Idealism 285 10.11 The road not taken: nonsense 288 10.12 Zeno 290 Chapter 11: The Third Antinomy Presented 292 11.1 Introduction 292 11.2 The thesis and antithesis 292 11.3 Terminology 296 11.4 Causes in Kant 299 11.5 Kant’s determinism 302 11.6 The antinomies: lessons learned 304 11.7 The thesis argument 304 11.8 The antithesis argument 308 Chapter 12: The Third Antinomy Resolved 314 12.1 Introduction 314 12.2 Empirical and intelligible character 316 12.3 What kind of freedom? 318 12.4 Another indirect argument for Transcendental Idealism 319 12.5 Moral responsibility, moral growth, and rational blame 320 12.6 The moral argument for freedom 324 12.7 Is Kant a compatibilist? 328 12.8 Against Leibnizian compatibilism 329 12.9 Kant’s alleged libertarianism 332 Chapter 13: The Fourth Antinomy 340 13.1 Introduction 340 13.2 The thesis argument 341 13.3 The antithesis argument 342 13.4 The resolution 344 13.5 De Mairan and the moon 346 Part III: Rational Theology 350 Chapter 14: The Ontological Argument 352 14.1 Introduction 352 14.2 Kant’s presentation of the ontological argument 354 14.3 What is a ‘real predicate’? 361 14.4 Wolff and Baumgarten on existence 363 14.5 The ‘inconsistency’ objection 366 14.6 Existence, being, and actuality 368 14.7 Actuality is not a real predicate 369 14.8 The ‘hundred thalers’ argument 371 14.9 Evaluation of the argument 374 14.10 The disputational form of Kant’s criticism 377 Chapter 15: The Cosmological Argument 379 15.1 Introduction 379 15.2 Kant’s presentation of the cosmological argument 382 15.3 The role of contingency 386 15.4 The remaining phases of the argument 388 15.5 Contingency and the PSR 398 15.6 Kant’s third main criticism: the nervus probandi and its converse 399 Chapter 16: The First Critique on the Physico-Theological Argument 405 16.1 Introduction 405 16.2 The ordinary physico-theology 406 16.3 Kant’s revised physico-theology 411 16.4 The pre-critical revised physico-theology: concluding remarks 418 16.5 The revised physico-theology in the first Critique 419 16.6 The first Critique on the physico-theological argument 421 16.7 Kant’s criticisms of the dogmatic physico-theological argument 425 16.8 Do we observe end-directedness? 430 16.9 The doctrinal belief in an Author of Nature 433 16.10 The non-dogmatic argument: criticisms and prospects 434 Chapter 17: The Regulative Use of the Ideas 437 17.1 Introduction 437 17.2 The Idea of the soul as a regulative principle 441 17.3 The Idea of God as a regulative principle 442 17.4 Laws expressing the purposes of nature 445 17.5 Lazy reason and perverted reason 447 17.6 The Idea of systematic unity 447 17.7 The first Critique on the courses of the heavenly bodies 455 17.8 The transcendental principles 460 17.9 The co-applicability of the logical principles 463 17.10 The focus imaginarius 463 Chapter 18: Closing Reflections 468 18.1 Further conclusions 469 18.2 Denying knowledge (again) 472 18.3 Transcendental Realism as a logical impossibility 474 18.4 The loss of innocence 475 18.5 Exhaustiveness 476 Appendix: Abbreviations 478 Abbreviations of Works 479 Bibliography 482 Index 490 Kant conceived of 'critique' as a kind of winnowing exercise, with the aim of separating the wheat of good metaphysics from the chaff of bad. He used a less familiar metaphor to make this point, namely, that of 'the fiery test of critique'-not a medieval ordeal of trial by fire, but rather a metallurgical assay, or cupellation, a procedure in which ore samples are tested for their precious-metal content. When seen in this light, critique has a positive, investigatory side: it seeks not merely to eliminate bad, 'dogmatic' metaphysics but also to uncover what of philosophical value might be contained in traditional speculative metaphysics. In this comprehensive study of the Transcendental Dialectic in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Proops argues that Kant uncovered two nuggets of value: the indirect proof of Transcendental Idealism afforded by the resolution of the Antinomies, and a defence of theoretically grounded 'doctrinal beliefs' in a wise and great originator, on the one hand, and in an afterlife, on the other. This examination of critique engages with Kant's views on a number of central problems in philosophy and meta-philosophy: the explanation of the enduring human impulse towards metaphysics, the correct philosophical method, the limits of self-knowledge, the possibility of human freedom, the resolution of metaphysical paradox ('Antinomy'), the justification of faith, the nature of scepticism, and the role of 'as if' reasoning in natural science. Ian Proops illuminates the idea of 'critique', the 'fiery test' which was central to Kant's philosophical project. He shows how Kant conceived it as a process for separating good metaphysics from bad, and explores what the positive results of this process were in one of the most famous sections of his work, the Transcendental Dialectic.