The Fate of Choice: Freedom and Imputability in Kant and His Early Successors (New Research in the History of Western Philosophy, 7)

This book reconstructs the intense early post-Kantian debate on freedom of the will, choice, and moral imputability for the first time. It addresses the following questions: How is freedom of choice possible given the causal predetermination of the world? How can we escape skepticism about freedom of the will? What are the characteristics of moral freedom? Are we free to act immorally, and if so, how exactly? And finally: How can we conceive of our individual freedom as being compatible with nature and society? Front Cover Half Title Series Informations Title Page Copyrights Page Contents Preface Translations and Abbreviations Introduction: Kant and the Fate of Autonomy Reconsidered 1 Beyond Intelligible Fatalism and Indifferentism: A Debate Still to be Explored 1.1 Moral Freedom, Autonomy, and Choice 1.2 Reinhold’s Dilemma 1.3 The Post-Kantian Debate on Freedom Reconsidered 2 A Road Map between Intelligible Fatalism and Indifferentism 2.1 Harry Frankfurt’s Account of Will as an Analytic Framework Part 1: Freedom, Autonomy, and Choice: Kant and the Pre-Kantian Tradition 1 liberum arbitrium: Kant and the Problem of Willkür 1 The Conceptual History of Willkür 2 Summary (I): Beyond Indifferentism and Intelligible Fatalism: The Fundamental Dilemma after Kant 3 The Pre-Kantian Conception of Willkür 4 Leibniz 5 Wolff 6 Wagner 7 Baumgarten 8 Crusius 9 Kant on Willkür – a Short Overview 2 Transcendental Freedom: Kant on Spontaneity 3 Practical Freedom: Kant on Autonomy and Moral Respect 1 Motivational Reason 2 The Systematic Framework of Moral Respect 3 The Autonomy of Respect 4 Avoiding Self-conceit: The Impact of Respect 5 Feeling Reason: The Phenomenology of Moral Respect 6 Conclusion 4 Individual Freedom: Kant on Choice and Responsibility 1 The Reason of Evil Part 2: Freedom, Determinism, and Imputability 5 Freedom and Necessity: Johann August Heinrich Ulrich 6 Against Ulrich’s Determinism: Christian Jacob Kraus 7 Intelligible Fatalism: Carl Christian Erhard Schmid 8 Against Intelligible Fatalism: Karl Leonhard Reinhold (I) 9 Excursus. The Incapacity of Freedom Part 3: Freedom, Reason, and Skepticism 10 The Deduction of Freedom: Johann Heinrich Abicht 11 Skepticism and Freedom: Leonhard Creuzer Schmid’s Reply 12 Beyond Intelligible Fatalism and Indifferentism: Friedrich Karl Forberg 13 Critique of Mere Choice: Christoph Gottfried Bardili 14 The Reflection of Will: Fichte’s Volitional Anti-Skepticism 15 Excursus. Reason’s Responsibility 1 Kant on Reason’s Imputability 2 The Logic of Practical Self-Deception 3 Rationalizing 4 Forms of Incapacity 5 The Concept of Evil 6 Lying and the Duty of Self-Knowledge 7 How to Avoid Rationalizing Part 4: Freedom, Individuality, and Compatibility 16 Individuality at Risk: Rehberg’s Critique of Pure Practical Reason 17 Freedom as Choice: Karl Leonhard Reinhold (II) 1 Reinhold’s Critique of Pure Practical Reason 18 Against Choice: Maimon’s Reply to Reinhold 19 Heautonomy: Schiller’s Aesthetic Compatibilism 1 The Mood of Will: Schiller on Freedom as Heautonomy 2 “Freedom in appearance” in Schiller’s Kallias Letters 3 Aesthetic Freedom in Schiller’s On Grace and Dignity 4 The Nature of Freedom in Schiller’s Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man 5 The Freedom of Mind 20 “Will is primal being”: Schelling’s Real Compatibilism 1 Freedom “from the standpoint of consciousness”: Schelling’s Early Dispute with Kant and Reinhold 2 Freedom as “the capacity for good and evil” 3 Schelling’s Real Compatibilism 4 The Reality of Evil 5 Conclusion: Situating Freedom Conclusion: Revisiting Choice Bibliography Index of Persons Back Cover