The Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism: Context, Exposition, and Repercussions (Bloomsbury Studies in Philosophy of Religion)

Contemporary discussions in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind are dominated by the presupposition of naturalism. Arguing against this established convention, James Slagle offers a thorough defence of Alvin Plantinga’s Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN) and in doing so, reveals how it shows that evolution and naturalism are incompatible. Charting the development of Plantinga’s argument, Slagle asserts that the probability of our cognitive faculties reliably producing true beliefs is low if ontological naturalism is true, and therefore all other beliefs produced by these faculties, including naturalism itself, are self-defeating. He critiques other well-known epistemological approaches, including those of Descartes and Quine, and deftly counters the many objections against the EAAN to conclude that epistemological naturalism should be rejected on the grounds of self-defeat. By situating Plantinga’s argument within a wider context and showing that science and evolution cannot entail naturalism, Slagle renders this most common metaphysical view irrational. As such, the book advocates an important reconsideration of contemporary thought at the intersection of philosophy, science and religion. Cover page Halftitle page Series page Title page Copyright page Dedication Contents Preface Religious and metaphysical beliefs Ethics and normativity All other beliefs? Scientific, logical, and mathematical beliefs Perceptual beliefs Acknowledgments Part One Context 1 The Cartesian Dream Relearning the world Cartesian epistemology 2 Quinean Tonic Naturalized epistemology Quine’s critique Critique of Quine’s critique 3 Naturalized Epistemology Reformed Plantinga vs. Descartes Warrant and justification Normativity Part Two Preliminaries 4 Terms of Engagement P, R, and some N What P(R/N&E) does not mean Defeat 5 The Evolution of the Evolutionary Argument Background of the argument The first argument Any belief vs. all beliefs Plantinga’s second argument 6 Elimination Game Content and natural selection Two false starts18 So, what is the problem? Objections Conclusions Part Three Argument 7 The Probability Thesis Indicators and depictors3 Reducing agents Teleosemantic content A difficult dichotomy Truth and consequences Nonreductive materialism Anti-materialistic atheism 8 The Defeater Thesis Conditionalization Analogue devices Defeater-deflectors Otte’s EAAN Partial defeat Can R be defeated? Alston’s EAAN 9 The End of the Argument The second-and-a-half premise The third premise The story so far Fourth premise and conclusion Part Four Objections 10 Analogies, Coherence, and Evolution There’s something about analogies Coherence Evolutionary concerns Probability and inscrutability 11 Expanding the Target Applying the EAAN to everyone Et tu quoque? 12 Loose Ends Fallacies and bad reasoning Epistemological issues Probability and defeat Evolutionary issues . . . and the rest Conclusions Problems and solutions Beyond the veil Intellect and will in God’s nature Points of contention Notes Bibliography of the EAAN Index "Contemporary discussions in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind are dominated by the presupposition of naturalism. Arguing against this established convention, Jim Slagle offers a thorough defence of Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN) and in doing so, reveals how it shows that evolution and naturalism are incompatible. Charting the development of Plantinga's argument, Slagle asserts that the probability of our cognitive faculties reliably producing true beliefs is low if ontological naturalism is true, and therefore all other beliefs produced by these faculties, including naturalism itself, are self-defeating. He critiques other well-known epistemological approaches, including those of Descartes and Quine, and deftly counters the many objections against the EAAN to conclude that epistemological naturalism should be rejected on the grounds of self-defeat. By situating Plantinga's argument within a wider context and showing that science and evolution cannot entail naturalism, Slagle renders this most common metaphysical view irrational. As such, the book advocates an important reconsideration of contemporary thought at the intersection of philosophy, science and religion"-- Provided by publisher "Contemporary discussions in metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy of mind are dominated by the presupposition of naturalism. Arguing against this established convention, Jim Slagle offers a thorough defence of Alvin Plantinga's Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN) and in doing so, reveals how it shows that evolution and naturalism are incompatible. Charting the development of Plantinga's argument, Slagle asserts that the probability of our cognitive faculties reliably producing true beliefs is low if ontological naturalism is true, and therefore all other beliefs produced by these faculties, including naturalism itself, are self-defeating. He critiques other well-known epistemological approaches, including those of Descartes and Quine, and deftly counters the many objections against the EAAN to conclude that metaphysical naturalism should be rejected on the grounds of self-defeat. By situating Plantinga's argument within a wider context and showing that science and evolution cannot entail naturalism, Slagle renders this most common metaphysical view irrational. As such, the book advocates an important reconsideration of contemporary thought at the intersection of philosophy, science and religion."-- Provided by publisher