The European Union Decides (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions)

European legislation affects countless aspects of daily life in modern Europe but just how does the European Union make such significant legislative decisions? How important are the formal decision-making procedures in defining decision outcomes and how important is the bargaining that takes place among the actors involved? Using a combination of detailed evidence and theoretical rigour, this volume addresses these questions and others that are central to understanding how the EU works in practice. It focuses on the practice of day-to-day decision-making in Brussels and the interactions that take place among the Member States in the Council and among the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament. A unique data set of actual Commission proposals are examined against which the authors develop, apply and test a range of explanatory models of decision-making, exemplifying how to study decision-making in other political systems using advanced theoretical tools and appropriate research design. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Series-title......Page 4 Title......Page 5 Copyright......Page 6 Contents......Page 7 Tables......Page 9 Notes on contributors......Page 14 Preface......Page 19 1.1 INTRODUCTION......Page 23 1.2 AN INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH TO EXPLAINING DECISION-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION......Page 27 1.3 A MODEL GUIDED APPROACH......Page 31 1.4 A SYNOPSIS OF EU MEMBER STATES AND LEGISLATIVE DECISION-MAKING......Page 34 1.5 OUTLINE OF THE BOOK......Page 42 2 Research design: measuring actors' positions, saliences and capabilities......Page 47 2.1 THE SELECTION OF COMMISSION PROPOSALS......Page 48 2.2 THE SELECTION OF EXPERTS......Page 53 2.3 SPECIFYING THE ISSUES AT STAKE WITH EXPERTS......Page 55 2.4 EXPERT JUDGEMENTS ON ACTORS AND THEIR POSITIONS......Page 58 2.5 ESTIMATING SALIENCE......Page 63 2.6 CAPABILITIES OF ACTORS......Page 65 Expert judgements......Page 66 Shapley Shubik Index (SSI) scores......Page 70 2.7 APPLICATION AND TESTING OF MODELS......Page 72 3.1 INTRODUCTION......Page 76 3.2.1 Who are the players?......Page 80 3.2.2 Which sequence of play is appropriate?......Page 81 3.3.1 The consultation procedure......Page 83 3.3.2 The co-decision procedure: who shapes the final proposal?......Page 88 3.4 DATA MANAGEMENT......Page 91 3.5 DECISION-MAKING ON SOCRATES: AN ILLUSTRATION......Page 92 3.6 AN EMPIRICAL TEST: QUANTITATIVE RESULTS......Page 98 3.7 CONCLUSION......Page 102 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3......Page 104 Co-decision: Commission model......Page 105 Co-decision: Parliament model......Page 106 Co-decision: Council model......Page 107 4.1 THE TWO STAGES OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING......Page 108 4.2 INSTITUTIONAL REALISM AND POLITICAL POWER......Page 112 4.3 THE COMPROMISE MODEL......Page 114 4.4 COOPERATIVE AND NON-COOPERATIVE GAME MODELS......Page 118 4.5 NASH BARGAINING AND QUADRATIC LOSSES......Page 120 4.6 THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSENSUS......Page 123 4.7 INSTITUTIONAL REALISM IS APPROXIMATED BY THE COMPROMISE MODEL......Page 125 4.8 AN APPLICATION......Page 126 4.9 THE STATE-CENTRIC ALTERNATIVE......Page 127 4.10 FORECASTING COMPARISONS......Page 129 4.11 CONCLUSION......Page 133 APPENDIX 1: THE NASH BARGAINING THEOREM......Page 134 APPENDIX 2: LEMMAS AND COROLLARY......Page 136 APPENDIX 3: APPLYING THE COMPROMISE MODEL TO DATA......Page 142 5.1 INTRODUCTION......Page 146 5.2.1 The challenge model......Page 149 5.2.2 The position exchange model......Page 153 5.2.3 Conditions favouring compromise, exchange and challenge......Page 157 5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN......Page 158 5.4 AN ILLUSTRATION: REFORM OF STRUCTURAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FISHERIES SECTOR......Page 160 5.5 ANALYSIS......Page 165 5.6 CONCLUSIONS......Page 172 6.1 INTRODUCTION......Page 175 6.2 BARGAINING WITH DOMESTICALLY CONSTRAINED ACTORS: THE BASELINE MODEL......Page 177 6.3 RESEARCH DESIGN......Page 185 6.4 THE CHOCOLATE DIRECTIVE AS AN ILLUSTRATION......Page 189 6.5 THE PREDICTIVE ACCURACY OF FOUR VERSIONS OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION......Page 193 6.6 CONCLUSION......Page 197 7.1 INTRODUCTION......Page 200 7.2.1 Voting games......Page 202 7.2.2 Spatial voting games......Page 204 7.2.3 Theory of conflict......Page 205 7.2.4 Conflict indices......Page 206 7.2.5 Models of conflict: description......Page 210 7.2.6 Models of conflict: solutions......Page 211 7.3.1 Winning coalitions in EU decision-making......Page 213 7.3.2 Solutions to the problem of indifferent actors......Page 215 7. 3.3 The measurement of capabilities......Page 217 7.4 CASE STUDY: PRODUCTION AID FOR COTTON......Page 218 7.5 PREDICTIVE ACCURACY OF THE MODELS......Page 227 7.6 CONCLUSION......Page 231 8.1 INTRODUCTION......Page 233 8.2 EXCHANGE AND VOTING: COMBINING COLEMAN/KÖNIG AND TSEBELIS/GARRETT......Page 236 8.2.1 The Tsebelis/Garrett spatial model......Page 237 8.2.2 The Coleman/König exchange model......Page 238 8.2.3 A procedural exchange model of EU legislative politics......Page 239 8.3.1 Independent variables......Page 245 8.3.2 Case selection: strategies and samples......Page 247 8.4 MODEL ILLUSTRATION: EXCHANGES AND VOTING IN THE HONEY DIRECTIVE......Page 248 8.5 RESULTS: PREDICTIVE ACCURACY OF THE PROCEDURAL EXCHANGE MODEL......Page 254 8.6 CONCLUSION......Page 256 A.1 The original Coleman model and extensions regarding the type of resources......Page 257 9.1 INTRODUCTION......Page 261 9.2 THE MODELS......Page 265 EU procedures on the issues lines......Page 270 9.3 RESEARCH DESIGN......Page 273 9.4 AN ILLUSTRATION......Page 274 Predictions of the base model, compromise model and the issues line models (SSI-IL and SSSI-IL)......Page 277 9.5 RESULTS......Page 278 9.6 CONCLUSIONS......Page 283 10.1 HOW WELL DO THE MODELS FORECAST?......Page 286 10.2 FORECASTS AND BASELINES......Page 288 10.3 DOWNSIAN AND RELATED BASELINES......Page 290 10.4 MEASURES OF MODEL SUCCESS......Page 293 10.5 THE ISSUE OF FREE PARAMETERS......Page 295 10.6 MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR PER ISSUE: THE MAE......Page 297 10.7 MEAN EUCLIDEAN ERROR PER PROPOSAL: THE MEE......Page 303 10.8 CORRELATIONS SIMPLISTIC AND SENSIBLE......Page 306 10.9 PAIRWISE COMPARISONS OF MODELS......Page 310 10.10 HIT RATES......Page 313 10.11 WHICH MODELS ARE BEST?......Page 315 10.12 CONCLUSIONS......Page 316 11.1 INTRODUCTION......Page 321 11.2 THE MAIN FINDINGS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS......Page 324 11.3 THE LIMITS OF PREDICTIVE POWER AND THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL DATA......Page 330 11.4 THEORETICAL ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH......Page 332 11.5 THEORETICAL TOOLS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ON EU POLITICS......Page 334 11.6 THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION......Page 336 11.7 CONCLUSION......Page 337 Appendix I Selection of Commission proposals......Page 339 66 COMMISSION PROPOSALS WITH FINAL DECISION OUTCOMES......Page 340 Appendix II Comparison of expert judgements with each other and with information from Council documentation......Page 351 AII.1 THE DIRECTIVE ON THE MANUFACTURING AND SALE OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS: COMPARING EXPERT JUDGEMENTS AND COUNCIL DOCUMENTATION......Page 352 AII .2 THE DIRECTIVE ON RESALE RIGHTS FOR ARTISTS: A COMPARISON OF EXPERT JUDGEMENTS AND COUNCIL DOCUMENTATION......Page 359 AII.3 THE DECISION ON THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE FUND: A COMPARISON OF TWO SETS OF EXPERT JUDGEMENTS......Page 363 AII .4 CONCLUSIONS......Page 368 References......Page 370 Index......Page 389 Cover 1 Half-title 3 Series-title 4 Title 5 Copyright 6 Contents 7 Figures 9 Tables 9 Notes on contributors 14 Preface 19 1 Explaining legislative decision-making in the European Union 23 1.1 INTRODUCTION 23 1.2 AN INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH TO EXPLAINING DECISION-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 27 1.3 A MODEL GUIDED APPROACH 31 1.4 A SYNOPSIS OF EU MEMBER STATES AND LEGISLATIVE DECISION-MAKING 34 1.5 OUTLINE OF THE BOOK 42 2 Research design: measuring actors' positions, saliences and capabilities 47 2.1 THE SELECTION OF COMMISSION PROPOSALS 48 2.2 THE SELECTION OF EXPERTS 53 2.3 SPECIFYING THE ISSUES AT STAKE WITH EXPERTS 55 2.4 EXPERT JUDGEMENTS ON ACTORS AND THEIR POSITIONS 58 2.5 ESTIMATING SALIENCE 63 2.6 CAPABILITIES OF ACTORS 65 Expert judgements 66 Shapley Shubik Index (SSI) scores 70 2.7 APPLICATION AND TESTING OF MODELS 72 3 Testing procedural models of EU legislative decision-making 76 3.1 INTRODUCTION 76 3.2 PROCEDURAL MODELS OF LEGISLATIVE CHOICE 80 3.2.1 Who are the players? 80 3.2.2 Which sequence of play is appropriate? 81 3.3 MODELS AND THEIR DIFFERENT SPECIFICATIONS 83 3.3.1 The consultation procedure 83 3.3.2 The co-decision procedure: who shapes the final proposal? 88 3.4 DATA MANAGEMENT 91 3.5 DECISION-MAKING ON SOCRATES: AN ILLUSTRATION 92 3.6 AN EMPIRICAL TEST: QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 98 3.7 CONCLUSION 102 APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 104 Consultation 105 Co-decision: Commission model 105 Co-decision: Parliament model 106 Co-decision: Council model 107 4 Institutional realism and bargaining models 108 4.1 THE TWO STAGES OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKING 108 4.2 INSTITUTIONAL REALISM AND POLITICAL POWER 112 4.3 THE COMPROMISE MODEL 114 4.4 COOPERATIVE AND NON-COOPERATIVE GAME MODELS 118 4.5 NASH BARGAINING AND QUADRATIC LOSSES 120 4.6 THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSENSUS 123 4.7 INSTITUTIONAL REALISM IS APPROXIMATED BY THE COMPROMISE MODEL 125 4.8 AN APPLICATION 126 4.9 THE STATE-CENTRIC ALTERNATIVE 127 4.10 FORECASTING COMPARISONS 129 4.11 CONCLUSION 133 APPENDIX 1: THE NASH BARGAINING THEOREM 134 APPENDIX 2: LEMMAS AND COROLLARY 136 APPENDIX 3: APPLYING THE COMPROMISE MODEL TO DATA 142 5 Compromise, exchange and challenge in the European Union 146 5.1 INTRODUCTION 146 5.2 MODELS 149 5.2.1 The challenge model 149 5.2.2 The position exchange model 153 5.2.3 Conditions favouring compromise, exchange and challenge 157 5.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 158 5.4 AN ILLUSTRATION: REFORM OF STRUCTURAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FISHERIES SECTOR 160 5.5 ANALYSIS 165 5.6 CONCLUSIONS 172 6 Nash versus Schelling? The importance of constraints in legislative bargaining 175 6.1 INTRODUCTION 175 6.2 BARGAINING WITH DOMESTICALLY CONSTRAINED ACTORS: THE BASELINE MODEL 177 6.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 185 6.4 THE CHOCOLATE DIRECTIVE AS AN ILLUSTRATION 189 6.5 THE PREDICTIVE ACCURACY OF FOUR VERSIONS OF THE NASH BARGAINING SOLUTION 193 6.6 CONCLUSION 197 7 A.cooperative approach to decision-making in the European Union 200 7.1 INTRODUCTION 200 7.2 CONFLICT MODELS OF COALITION-FORMATION 202 7.2.1 Voting games 202 7.2.2 Spatial voting games 204 7.2.3 Theory of conflict 205 7.2.4 Conflict indices 206 7.2.5 Models of conflict: description 210 7.2.6 Models of conflict: solutions 211 7.3 RESEARCH STRATEGIES AND DESIGN 213 7.3.1 Winning coalitions in EU decision-making 213 7.3.2 Solutions to the problem of indifferent actors 215 7. 3.3 The measurement of capabilities 217 7.4 CASE STUDY: PRODUCTION AID FOR COTTON 218 7.5 PREDICTIVE ACCURACY OF THE MODELS 227 7.6 CONCLUSION 231 8 A procedural exchange model of EU legislative politics 233 8.1 INTRODUCTION 233 8.2 EXCHANGE AND VOTING: COMBINING COLEMAN/KÖNIG AND TSEBELIS/GARRETT 236 8.2.1 The Tsebelis/Garrett spatial model 237 8.2.2 The Coleman/König exchange model 238 8.2.3 A procedural exchange model of EU legislative politics 239 8.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 245 8.3.1 Independent variables 245 8.3.2 Case selection: strategies and samples 247 8.4 MODEL ILLUSTRATION: EXCHANGES AND VOTING IN THE HONEY DIRECTIVE 248 8.5 RESULTS: PREDICTIVE ACCURACY OF THE PROCEDURAL EXCHANGE MODEL 254 8.6 CONCLUSION 256 APPENDIX: THE COLEMAN/KÖNIG EXCHANGE MODEL 257 A.1 The original Coleman model and extensions regarding the type of resources 257 9 Beyond informal compromise: testing conditional formal procedures of EU decision-making 261 9.1 INTRODUCTION 261 9.2 THE MODELS 265 EU procedures on the issues lines 270 9.3 RESEARCH DESIGN 273 9.4 AN ILLUSTRATION 274 Predictions of the base model, compromise model and the issues line models (SSI-IL and SSSI-IL) 277 9.5 RESULTS 278 9.6 CONCLUSIONS 283 10 Evaluating political decision-making models 286 10.1 HOW WELL DO THE MODELS FORECAST? 286 10.2 FORECASTS AND BASELINES 288 10.3 DOWNSIAN AND RELATED BASELINES 290 10.4 MEASURES OF MODEL SUCCESS 293 10.5 THE ISSUE OF FREE PARAMETERS 295 10.6 MEAN ABSOLUTE ERROR PER ISSUE: THE MAE 297 10.7 MEAN EUCLIDEAN ERROR PER PROPOSAL: THE MEE 303 10.8 CORRELATIONS SIMPLISTIC AND SENSIBLE 306 10.9 PAIRWISE COMPARISONS OF MODELS 310 10.10 HIT RATES 313 10.11 WHICH MODELS ARE BEST? 315 10.12 CONCLUSIONS 316 11 Evidence with insight what models contribute to EU research 321 11.1 INTRODUCTION 321 11.2 THE MAIN FINDINGS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 324 11.3 THE LIMITS OF PREDICTIVE POWER AND THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL DATA 330 11.4 THEORETICAL ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 332 11.5 THEORETICAL TOOLS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ON EU POLITICS 334 11.6 THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 336 11.7 CONCLUSION 337 Appendix I Selection of Commission proposals 339 66 COMMISSION PROPOSALS WITH FINAL DECISION OUTCOMES 340 Appendix II Comparison of expert judgements with each other and with information from Council documentation 351 AII.1 THE DIRECTIVE ON THE MANUFACTURING AND SALE OF TOBACCO PRODUCTS: COMPARING EXPERT JUDGEMENTS AND COUNCIL DOCUMENTATION 352 AII .2 THE DIRECTIVE ON RESALE RIGHTS FOR ARTISTS: A COMPARISON OF EXPERT JUDGEMENTS AND COUNCIL DOCUMENTATION 359 AII.3 THE DECISION ON THE EUROPEAN REFUGEE FUND: A COMPARISON OF TWO SETS OF EXPERT JUDGEMENTS 363 AII .4 CONCLUSIONS 368 References 370 Index 389 Explaining Legislative Decision Making In The European Union / Robert Thomson And Madeleine O. Hosli -- Research Design : Measuring Actors' Positions, Saliences And Capabilities / Robert Thomson And Frans N. Stokman -- Testing Procedural Models Of Eu Legislative Decision-making / Bernard Steunenberg And Torsten J. Selck -- Institutional Realism And Bargaining Models / Christopher H. Achen -- Compromise, Exchange And Challenge In The European Union / Javier Arregui, Frans N. Stokman And Robert Thomson -- Nash Versus Schelling? : The Importance Of Constraints In Legislative Bargaining / Stefanie Bailer And Gerald Schneider -- A Cooperative Approach To Decision-making In The European Union / Vincent Boekhoorn, Adrian M.a. Van Deemen And Madeleine O. Hosli -- A Procedural Exchange Model Of Eu Legislative Politics / Thomas König And Sven Oliver Proksch -- Beyond Informal Compromise : Testing Conditional Formal Procedures Of Eu Decision-making / Mika Widgrén And Antti Pajala -- Evaluating Political Decision-making Models / Christopher H. Achen -- Evidence With Insight : What Models Contribute To Eu Research / Gerald Schneider, Bernard Steunenberg And Mika Widgrén -- Appendix I : Selection Of Commission Proposals -- Appendix Ii : Comparison Of Expert Judgements With Each Other And With Information From Council Documentation / Robert Thomson -- References -- Index. Edited By Robert Thomson ... [et Al.]. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 348-366) And Index. How are decisions taken in the European Union? How important are the formal decision-making procedures in defining decision outcomes and the bargaining that takes place among the actors involved? This volume addresses questions that are central to understanding how the EU works and how it makes important legislative decisions