The Ethics of Killing : Problems at the Margins of Life

## Abstract A comprehensive study of the ethics of killing in cases in which the metaphysical or moral status of the individual killed is uncertain or controversial. Among those beings whose status is questionable or marginal in this way are human embryos and fetuses, newborn infants, animals, anencephalic infants, human beings with severe congenital and cognitive impairments, and human beings who have become severely demented or irreversibly comatose. In an effort to understand the moral status of these beings, this book develops and defends distinctive accounts of the nature of personal identity, the evaluation of death, and the wrongness of killing. The central metaphysical claim of the book is that we are neither nonmaterial souls nor human organisms but are instead embodied minds. In ethical theory, one of the central claims is that the morality of killing is not unitary; rather, the principles that determine the morality of killing in marginal cases are different from those that govern the killing of persons who are self‐conscious and rational. Another important theme is that killing in marginal cases should be evaluated in terms of the impact it would have on the victim at the time rather than on the value of the victim's life as a whole. What primarily matters is how killing would affect that which would be rational for the victim to care about at the time of death. By appealing to various foundational claims about identity, death, and the morality of killing, this book yields novel conclusions about such issues as abortion, prenatal injury, infanticide, the killing of animals, the significance of brain death, the termination of life support in cases of persistent vegetative state, the use of anencephalic infants as sources of organs for transplantation, euthanasia, assisted suicide, and advance directives in cases of dementia. In particular, the book defends the moral permissibility of abortion, infanticide, and euthanasia in certain cases and argues that brain death is not the appropriate criterion of death either for a person or a human organism. 9780195079982 CONTENTS 13 1. IDENTITY 19 1. Preliminaries 19 2. The Soul 23 2.1. Hylomorphism 23 2.2. The Cartesian Soul 30 2.3. Divided Consciousness 35 3. Are We Human Organisms? 40 3.1. When Does a Human Organism Begin to Exist? 40 3.2. Organisms, Embryos, and Corpses 45 3.3. Brain Transplantation 47 3.4. Dicephalus 51 4. The Psychological Account 55 4.1. Identity and Egoistic Concern 55 4.2. Beginning to Exist and Ceasing to Exist 59 4.3. “Pre-persons” and “Post-persons” 62 4.4. Revisions and a Note on Method 64 4.5. Replication and Egoistic Concern 71 4.6. Psychological Connectedness and Continuity 75 5. The Embodied Mind Account 82 5.1. The Embodied Mind Account of Identity 82 5.2. The Basis of Egoistic Concern 85 5.3. Possible Divergences Between Identity and Egoistic Concern 98 5.4. The Individuation of Minds 102 5.5. Mind, Brain, and Organism 104 2. DEATH 111 1. Preliminaries 111 2. The Problem of Comparison 114 2.1. Immortality 114 2.2. The Token Comparison 119 3. The Metaphysical Problem 123 3.1. A Plurality of Comparisons 123 3.2. Criteria for Determining the Appropriate Comparison 128 4. The Problem of Overdetermination 133 4.1. When Death Would Have Occurred Soon From a Different Cause 133 4.2. The Inheritance Strategy and the Problem of the Terminus 136 4.3. Overall Losses in Dying 143 4.4. The Previous Gain Account 152 4.5. Discounting Misfortunes for Previous Gains 156 5. Overall Lifelong Fortune 161 5.1. The Standard for Assessing Fortune 161 5.2. A Hierarchy of Being? 175 5.3. The Overall Fortune of Those Who Die in Infancy 178 6. The Deaths of Fetuses and Infants 181 6.1. The Time-Relative Interest Account 181 6.2. Narrative Unity, Retroactive Effects, Desert, and Desire 190 7. A Paradox 201 3. KILLING 205 1. The Wrongness of Killing and the Badness of Death 205 1.1. Two Accounts 205 1.2. The Killing of Animals 210 2. Animals and Severely Cognitively Impaired Human Beings 219 2.1. The Options 219 2.2. Membership in the Human Species 225 2.3. Comembership in a Species as a Special Relation 233 2.4. Convergent Assimilation 244 3. Equality and Respect 248 3.1. The Time-Relative Interest Account 248 3.2. The Requirement of Respect 256 3.3. The Basis of the Worth of Persons 267 4. BEGINNINGS 283 1. Early Abortion 283 2. Late Abortion 285 3. Prenatal Harm 296 4. Is a Later Abortion Worse? 304 5. Time-Relative Interests and Adaptation 310 6. Potential 318 6.1. Potential and Identity 318 6.2. Potential as a Basis for Moral Status 324 6.3. Potential, Cognitive Impairment, and Animals 332 7. The Sanctity of Human Life 345 8. Infanticide 354 8.1. Abortion and Infanticide 354 8.2. Are Infants “Replaceable?" 361 9. Abortion as the Denial of Life-Support 378 9.1. The Argument 378 9.2. Responsibility for the Fetus’s Need for Aid 380 9.3. Parental Responsibility 389 9.4. Killing and Letting Die 394 9.5. The Dependent Child Case 408 10. Abortion and Self-Defense 414 10.1. Self-Defense Against a Nonresponsible Threat 414 10.2. Proportionality, Third-party Intervention, and Forfeiture 427 10.3. The Decisive Asymmetry 434 5. ENDINGS 439 1. When Do We Die, or Cease to Exist? 439 1.1. Two Concepts of Death 439 1.2. Brain Death 442 1.3. Persistent Vegetative State and Deep Coma 459 1.4. Anencephalic Infants 466 2. Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide 471 2.1. From Suicide to Euthanasia 471 2.2. The Sanctity of Life, Again 480 2.3. Respect for the Worth of Persons 489 2.4. Nonvoluntary Euthanasia 501 3. The Withering Away of the Self 509 3.1. The Metaphysics of Progressive Dementia 509 3.2. The Moral Authority of Advance Directives 512 NOTES 521 REFERENCES 537 INDEX OF CASES 547 A 547 B 547 C 547 D 547 E 547 F 547 G 547 I 547 L 547 M 547 N 547 O 547 P 547 S 547 T 548 U 548 W 548 Y 548 GENERAL INDEX 549 A 549 B 549 C 550 D 550 E 551 F 551 G 551 H 552 I 552 J 552 K 552 L 552 M 552 N 553 O 553 P 553 Q 554 R 554 S 555 T 555 U 556 V 556 W 556 X 556 # Publisher: Oxford University Press,USA # Number Of Pages: 560 # Publication Date: 2002-01-03 # ISBN-10 / ASIN: 0195079981 #,Publisher:,Oxford University Press,USA,# Number Of Pages:,560,# Publication Date:,2002-01-03,# ISBN-10 / ASIN:,0195079981 CONTENTS......Page 13 1. Preliminaries......Page 19 2.1. Hylomorphism......Page 23 2.2. The Cartesian Soul......Page 30 2.3. Divided Consciousness......Page 35 3.1. When Does a Human Organism Begin to Exist?......Page 40 3.2. Organisms, Embryos, and Corpses......Page 45 3.3. Brain Transplantation......Page 47 3.4. Dicephalus......Page 51 4.1. Identity and Egoistic Concern......Page 55 4.2. Beginning to Exist and Ceasing to Exist......Page 59 4.3. “Pre-persons” and “Post-persons”......Page 62 4.4. Revisions and a Note on Method......Page 64 4.5. Replication and Egoistic Concern......Page 71 4.6. Psychological Connectedness and Continuity......Page 75 5.1. The Embodied Mind Account of Identity......Page 82 5.2. The Basis of Egoistic Concern......Page 85 5.3. Possible Divergences Between Identity and Egoistic Concern......Page 98 5.4. The Individuation of Minds......Page 102 5.5. Mind, Brain, and Organism......Page 104 1. Preliminaries......Page 111 2.1. Immortality......Page 114 2.2. The Token Comparison......Page 119 3.1. A Plurality of Comparisons......Page 123 3.2. Criteria for Determining the Appropriate Comparison......Page 128 4.1. When Death Would Have Occurred Soon From a Different Cause......Page 133 4.2. The Inheritance Strategy and the Problem of the Terminus......Page 136 4.3. Overall Losses in Dying......Page 143 4.4. The Previous Gain Account......Page 152 4.5. Discounting Misfortunes for Previous Gains......Page 156 5.1. The Standard for Assessing Fortune......Page 161 5.2. A Hierarchy of Being?......Page 175 5.3. The Overall Fortune of Those Who Die in Infancy......Page 178 6.1. The Time-Relative Interest Account......Page 181 6.2. Narrative Unity, Retroactive Effects, Desert, and Desire......Page 190 7. A Paradox......Page 201 1.1. Two Accounts......Page 205 1.2. The Killing of Animals......Page 210 2.1. The Options......Page 219 2.2. Membership in the Human Species......Page 225 2.3. Comembership in a Species as a Special Relation......Page 233 2.4. Convergent Assimilation......Page 244 3.1. The Time-Relative Interest Account......Page 248 3.2. The Requirement of Respect......Page 256 3.3. The Basis of the Worth of Persons......Page 267 1. Early Abortion......Page 283 2. Late Abortion......Page 285 3. Prenatal Harm......Page 296 4. Is a Later Abortion Worse?......Page 304 5. Time-Relative Interests and Adaptation......Page 310 6.1. Potential and Identity......Page 318 6.2. Potential as a Basis for Moral Status......Page 324 6.3. Potential, Cognitive Impairment, and Animals......Page 332 7. The Sanctity of Human Life......Page 345 8.1. Abortion and Infanticide......Page 354 8.2. Are Infants “Replaceable?"......Page 361 9.1. The Argument......Page 378 9.2. Responsibility for the Fetus’s Need for Aid......Page 380 9.3. Parental Responsibility......Page 389 9.4. Killing and Letting Die......Page 394 9.5. The Dependent Child Case......Page 408 10.1. Self-Defense Against a Nonresponsible Threat......Page 414 10.2. Proportionality, Third-party Intervention, and Forfeiture......Page 427 10.3. The Decisive Asymmetry......Page 434 1.1. Two Concepts of Death......Page 439 1.2. Brain Death......Page 442 1.3. Persistent Vegetative State and Deep Coma......Page 459 1.4. Anencephalic Infants......Page 466 2.1. From Suicide to Euthanasia......Page 471 2.2. The Sanctity of Life, Again......Page 480 2.3. Respect for the Worth of Persons......Page 489 2.4. Nonvoluntary Euthanasia......Page 501 3.1. The Metaphysics of Progressive Dementia......Page 509 3.2. The Moral Authority of Advance Directives......Page 512 NOTES......Page 521 REFERENCES......Page 537 S......Page 547 Y......Page 548 B......Page 549 D......Page 550 G......Page 551 M......Page 552 P......Page 553 R......Page 554 T......Page 555 X......Page 556 This Book Is A Comprehensive Study Of The Ethics Of Killing In Cases In Which The Metaphysical Or Moral Status Of The Individual Killed Is Uncertain Or Controversial. Among The Beings Whose Status Is Questionable Or Marginal In This Way Are Human Embryos And Fetuses, Neonates, Animals, Anencephalic Infants, Human Beings With Severe, Congenital, Cognitive Impairments, And Human Beings Who Have Become Severely Demented Or Irreversibly Comatose. In An Attempt To Understand The Moral Status Of These Beings, Jeff Mcmahan Develops And Defends Distinctive Accounts Of The Nature Of Personal Identity, The Evaluation Of Death, And The Wrongness Of Killing. He Contends That The Morality Of Killing Is Not Unitary; Rather, The Principles That Determine The Morality Of Killing In Marginal Cases Are Different From Those That Govern The Killing Of Persons Who Are Self-conscious And Rational.--book Jacket. 1. Identity: Preliminaries -- The Soul -- Are We Human Organisms? -- The Psychological Account -- The Embodied Mind Account -- 2. Death: Preliminaries -- The Problem Of Comparison -- The Metaphysical Problem -- The Problem Of Overdetermination -- Overall Lifelong Fortune -- The Death Of Fetuses And Infants -- A Paradox -- 3. Killing: The Wrongness Of Killing And The Badness Of Death -- Animals And Severely Cognitively Impaired Human Beings -- Equality And Respect -- 4. Beginnings: Early Abortion -- Late Abortion -- Prenatal Harm -- Is A Later Abortion Worse? -- Time-relative Interests And Adaptation -- Potential -- The Sanctity Of Human Life -- Infanticide -- Abortion As The Denial Of Life Support -- Abortion And Self-defense -- 5. Endings: When Do We Die, Or Cease To Exist? -- Euthanasia And Assisted Suicide -- The Withering Away Of The Self. Jeff Mcmahan. Includes Bibliographical References (p. 521-529) And Indexes. Spoiler: The Ethics of Killing does find some abortion to be acceptable. This is probably the basis of most mainstream(i.e. simple) criticism of this work. However, even for someone that disagrees with some of Jeff McMahan's positions, the Ethics of Killing is well written, and helps the reader, both professionals as well as students, gain a deeper, physical and metaphysical conception of what is wrong with killing. The writing style uses many examples that appeal to intuition, both positively and negatively, and appeals to which are used by McMahan to make sensible arguments. This work, intended as the first part of a two part series on Killing, attempts to find exactly what is morally wrong with killing. One answer that is dealt with is what exactly is morally wrong with ending a life. McMahan attempts to resolve such fundamental questions by starting with a notable focus on identity. In identifying what is essentially 'us' as embodied minds, and not something simply biological, McMahan opens new considerations by which to explore the ethical issues in killing. Ultimately, McMahan succeeds in providing a well written examination, that, while can be questioned, must be taken seriously. This magisterial work is the first comprehensive study of the ethics of killing, where the moral status of the individual killed is uncertain. Drawing on philosophical notions of personal identity and the immorality of killing, McMahan looks carefully at a host of practical issues, including abortion, infanticide, the killing of animals, assisted suicide, and euthanasia. Drawing on philosophical notions of personal identity and the immorality of killing, Jeff McMahan looks at various issues, including abortion, infanticide, the killing of animals, assisted suicide, and euthanasia