The EEC Crisis of 1963: Kennedy, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Adenauer in Conflict (Contemporary History in Context)

## Preface The idea for this book began when I stayed in Bonn during September and October 1993. I intended to work on newly released (or, in fact, not yet publicly released) documents in the archives, and had also arranged a number of interviews with key personalities of the early 1960s (Osterheld, Barth, von Hase, et al.). Fortunately, this coincided with the introduction of the source-edition of the Auswärtiges Amt for 1963, which had annoyed quite a few of the eye-witnesses I was going to see. Again, fortunately, I was seeing some of them not for the first time and we had established a certain trust between us. What I then heard -though obviously coloured by the heat of the moment -was almost a historian's dream come true. I was directed from one interviewee to another, because 'x can tell you more on that aspect'. So, with recommendations from such key people, everyone else showed an extraordinary openness to me in order to put 'the record straight'. The interpreters proved to be particularly good witnesses. I had plenty of opportunities to cross-check information between the 'Atlanticists' and the 'Gaullists' (i.e. those who favoured German foreign policy to follow an American or French lead) which turned out to be far closer on many issues than I had expected. 1 Front Matter....Pages i-xvi Introduction....Pages 1-3 Front Matter....Pages 5-9 Macmillan’s Grand Design (1959–60) as a Starting Point for the Application....Pages 10-19 The Main Obstacle: de Gaulle....Pages 20-29 A Quid Pro Quo Deal?....Pages 30-36 Different American Ideas....Pages 37-43 Kennedy Reconsiders the American Offer....Pages 44-51 Adenauer Takes His Stand....Pages 52-69 Front Matter....Pages 71-71 Nassau: A New Look at its Meaning and its Promotion....Pages 73-85 Heath and the Atlanticists — Heath’s ‘Big Push’....Pages 86-101 Before the Veto....Pages 102-107 De Gaulle’s Infamous Press Conference....Pages 108-116 The Ministerial Meeting — A First Dramatic Encounter....Pages 117-128 Anglo-American Co-ordination towards a Breakdown in Brussels....Pages 129-150 Adenauer and de Gaulle’s Plan for a Compromise....Pages 151-164 Hysteria in the Western Camp: The Days between 22–28 January 1963....Pages 165-206 The Breakdown in Brussels — Purely the Fault of the French?....Pages 207-233 Conclusion....Pages 234-237 Back Matter....Pages 238-291 "This fresh look at the 1963 crisis in the western alliance following de Gaulle's veto of the British EEC application uses much new unpublished source material to offer a fascinating insight into the personal relationships of the western leaders. It challenges the orthodox view that it was de Gaulle who was solely to blame for the breakdown of the negotiations in January 1963. Instead, while Adenauer was still trying to find a deal with de Gaulle to avoid a complete breakdown, British cooperation with the American administration and with other members of the German cabinet was meant to make de Gaulle the sole scapegoat, in order to isolate France within the EEC."--BOOK JACKET. "In October 1962 the world went to the brink of Armageddon. This study provides an archive-based account of the Cuban missile crisis from the British perspective. The diplomatic, military and intelligence dimensions of British policy are scrutinised. New material is presented and existing interpretations of UK-US relations at this crucial moment are reassessed. The book contributes a new aspect to the literature on the Cuban missile crisis by exploring where the views of Washington and its closest ally converged and diverged."--BOOK JACKET. This fresh look at the 1963 crisis in the western alliance following de Gaulle's veto of the British EEC application uses much new unpublished source material to offer a fascinating insight into the personal relationships of the western leaders. It challenges the orthodox view, showing that the ultimate breakdown came after Anglo-German and Anglo-American cooperation to ensure that de Gaulle was made the sole scapegoat, in order to isolate France within the EEC. "The essays collected here explore the popular press since 1896 - from Harmsworth's Daily Mail to Maxwell's Mirror. The history of the popular press has always been about more than big headlines and big profit margins. Personal ambition, partisan loyalty, institutional rivalry, and public accountability join commercial opportunism as the book's recurrent themes."--Jacket The essays in this collection explore the popular press from Harmsworth's Daily Mail to Maxwell's Mirror. Topics include: early dealings with the BBC; the role of photojournalism; the contribution of Reuters; and the roots of financial journalism This fresh examination of the 1963 crisis in the Western alliance following De Gaulle's veto of the British EEC application uses much unpublished source material, to offer new insights into the personal relationships of the Western leaders This book is the first detailed analysis of the causes and course of the European Crisis of 1963. The European Payments Union was founded in 1950, the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951.