The Disappearance of the Soul and the Turn against Metaphysics: Austrian Philosophy 1874-1918 (The Oxford History of Philosophy)

"In the twentieth century English-language philosophy came to be science- and logic-oriented, and was suspicious of metaphysics. The Disappearance of the Soul and the Turn against Metaphysics traces our present philosophical outlook back to debates in Austro-German philosophy about the relation between empirical science and metaphysics: does empirical psychology depend on the metaphysics of the soul, the mental substance? The negative answer - that there is 'a psychology without a soul' - shaped Austrian philosophy and provided a model for ontologies that dispense with substances. Mark Textor tells the story of how and why (Austrian) philosophy turned against metaphysics . He introduces the key thinkers of the time, including the 'fathers of Austrian philosophy' Franz Brentano and Ernst Mach, whose Intentionalism (Brentano) and Neutral Monism (Mach) became distinctive and influential positions in the philosophy of mind. Textor goes on to use the 'psychology without a soul' view as a vantage point from which to reconstruct and assess the immediate pre-history and formation of analytic philosophy (Ward, Stout, Moore, Russell). While Austrian philosophers retired the soul, early analytic philosophers were happy to introduce a successor, the subject, and conceive of the mental as constituted by subject-object relations. The final part of the book returns to the theme of anti-metaphysics from a different perspective. In this part the early Moritz Schlick, who would soon become the leading figure of the Vienna Circle, takes centre stage. The final part of the book reconstructs Schlick's arguments for the conclusion that metaphysics lies beyond the limits of knowledge that are rooted in the philosophy of mind discussed in previous parts"-- Provided by publisher Cover The Disappearance of the Soul and the Turn against Metaphysics: Austrian Philosophy 1874–1918 Copyright Contents Acknowledgements The Players Introduction 1. Soul-Searching in Central Europe 2. Austrian Philosophy and its Significance 3. Methodology: Rug Dealers and Eccentric Colleagues Part I: The Evaporation of the Soul and Other Substances 1: Psychology, the Science of the Soul 1. Introduction 2. Herbart: Putting Metaphysics into Psychology 3. The Impossibility of Self-Observation and Metaphysical Psychology 4. Back to Parmenides: The Given and Herbart’s Eleatic Conception of Substance 5. The Neo-Soul Movement: The Herbartians and Lotze 6. The Soul and the Possibility of Psychology as an Independent Science 7. The Soul and the Unity of Consciousness 8. A False Lead: Composition via Substance 9. Active Attention and the Unity of Consciousness 10. From the Unity of the Attention Process to the Lotzean Soul 11. Looking Ahead: From the Unity of Consciousness to Cognition 2: ‘Psychology without a Soul’ 1. Introduction: Hume and Lichtenberg: No Soul in Sight 2. Lange: Psychology as a Subject without an Object 3. Introducing Brentano 4. What is Psychology a Science of? Brentano’s Answer 5. Brentano on Observing Mental Phenomena 6. Herbart’s (and Kant’s) ‘Great Error’ 7. Wundt: No Mental Substance, but a Logical Subject 8. Introducing Mach 9. Mach I: The Ego Must Be Given up! 10. Mach II: Practical Unity and the Picture Theory 11. Lotze Responds to the Empiricists: The Soul IS Observable 12. Can Sensations Be Prior to the Ego? Lotze versus Mach 3: From Substance and Accident to Complex and Element 1. Introduction 2. Lotze and Stumpf against Substance 3. Avenarius and Mach against Substance 4. Persistence: Laws Squeeze out Substances 5. Mach against the Appearance/Reality Distinction 6. Is Antimetaphysics Self-Undermining? 7. From Properties to Elements 8. Can the Same Element Be Part of Different Complexes? 9. Objects Perceived by Different Individuals: Schlick against Mach 10. Summary Part II: Managing Without the Soul: Intentionality, Dualism, and Neutral Monism 4: The Mental and the Physical, Only a Matter of Perspective 1. Introduction 2. Fechner, the Pioneer of Neutral Monism 2.1 The Inner and the Outer Standpoint 2.2 Neutral Appearances in Fechner’s Atomenlehre 3. Neutral Monism: Main Theme and Problems 4. Mach: Dual Dependence and Neutrality 5. Wundt: Two Standpoints or Neutral Monism with a Subject 6. Lipps: Neutral Monism and the Will 7. Riehl: Neo-Kantian Neutral Monism 8. Preview 5: The Mental and the Physical, an Intrinsic Distinction 1. Introduction 2. Another Way down: Brentano’s Concept-Empiricism 3. Clarifying ‘Mental Phenomenon’ and ‘Physical Phenomenon’ 4. The Basics of the Aristotelian-Scholastic View of the Mind 5. The Fundamentality of Intentionality 6. Akt/Inhalt/Object: The Tripartite Distinction 7. Diaphaneity AKA Wahrnehmungsflüchtigkeit in Austro-German Philosophy 8. Diaphaneity and the Spectre of Neutral Monism 6: The Intentionality Challenge 1. Introduction 2. The Intentionality of Sensation 2.1 Against Mach’s Identity Thesis 2.2 Perceptual Constancies: Husserl against Mach 3. The Intentionality of Thought 3.1 Mach’s Picture Theory of Judgement and Cognition 3.2 Brentano’s Self-Fulfilling Expectation Argument 3.3 Intellectual Unease 4. Preview Part III: From Psychology Without a Soul to Psychology with a Self and Beyond: The Anglo-Austro-German Axis 1886-1918 Introduction to Part III: ‘Shocked and Disappointed’ 7: Cambridge Psychology between Lotze and Brentano 1. Ward: Psychology with a Subject, but without an Object/Content Distinction 1.1 The Metaphysically Neutral Subject 1.2 The Biological Dog, the Individual Mind, and the Psychological Subject 1.3 The Personification of Consciousness and the‘ Ghost of the Subject' 1.4 On the Wrong Track 2. Stout: Psychology without a Subject, but with an Act/Content/Object Distinction 2.1 The Brentanian Tripartite Distinction and Perceptual Constancy 2.2 Expunging the Subject 8: The Rise and Fall of the Subject: A Case Study 1. Introduction: The Fundamental Role of the Subject 2. Russell 1911–13: Saving the Subject from the Neutral Monists 3. Russell 1913: Making the Subject Intelligible and the Unity of Experience 4. Russell 1918: Persistent Persons and Momentary Subjects 9: Act/Content/Object, Act/Object, or Just Object? 1. Introduction: Four Positions 2. Background: Idealism and Intentionality 2.1 ‘Getting Outside the Circle of Our Own Ideas 2.2 Russell’s ‘Exceedingly Simple Argument’ against idealism 2.3 The Fundamental Distinction between Mind and Matter 3. Against the Content/Object Distinction 3.1 Is Intentionality an Internal Relation? 3.2 Are Contents Superfluous? 4. The Debate about the Act/Object Distinction 4.1 Diaphaneity, or Has Moore Shot Himself in the Foot? 4.2 James’s Response to Moore 4.3 James on Mental Pointing 4.4 Moore’s Search for the Act/Object Distinction from 1903 to 1910 4.5 Russell Changes Tack: A Non-Introspective Act/Object Distinction 4.6 Russell’s Argument for the Neutrality of Sensation 4.7 Russell’s Defence of the Tripartite Distinction for Thought 5. Conclusion of Part III Part IV: Intuition, Metaphysics, and the Limits of Knowledge Introduction to Part IV: 1. German Pragmatism andVoluntarism 2. Schopenhauer and Mach on How Cognition Serves the Will 3. Mach’s Ally: Jerusalem’s Voluntarism 4. Constructive Criticism and Synthesis with Criticism: Schlick 5. The Road Ahead: Two Terms or One? 10: Brentano’s One-Term View of Judgement 1. Introduction 2. The Two-Term Dogma 3. Brentano’s Empiricism at Work 4. Brentano’s Argument from Perception 5. Brentano against the Two-Term Prejudice 6. Summary 11: Judgement in the Service of the Will: Mach and Jerusalem 1. Mach: Memory, Judgement, and Well-Being 2. Jerusalem’s Urteilsfunktion 3. Jerusalem’s Circularity Argument against Brentano’s Judgement Primitivism 4. The Token Complexity Thesis and the Linguistic Articulation Argument 5. The Argument from the Function of Judgement 6. A Response to the Argument from the Function of Judgement 12: The Nature of Knowledge: Avenarius and Schlick 1. Introduction 2. Riehl’s Criticism + Avenarius’ Economy Theory = Schlick’s Erkenntnislehre 3. Avenarius and Schlick: ‘Cognition is Re-Cognition’ 4. Scientific Knowledge, Cognitive Sloth, and Theoretical Economy 5. Cognitive Economy and Intellectual Hedonism 6. Mundane Knowledge and General Presentations 7. Scientific Knowledge and Concepts 8. Scientific Concepts and Implicit Definition 9. The Concept of Existence and Necessary Ignorance 10. Schlick versus Brentano 13: Drawing the Limits of Knowledge 1. Introduction 2. Metaphysics and Intuitive Knowledge 2.1 What is Metaphysics? 2.2 Inductive Metaphysics and Intuition 3. Intuition as the Source of Metaphysical Knowledge 3.1 Schopenhauer and Bergson 3.2 Lotze: Cognitio Rei versus Cognitio Circa Rem 3.3 Husserl on the a Priori Science of Essence 3.4 Avenarius and Mach 4. Schlick against Intuitive Knowledge 4.1 Overview 4.2 The Argument from the Metaphysics of the Knowledge Relation 4.3 From the Aim of Cognition to its Metaphysics 4.4 Knowledge, Foreknowledge, and Factivity 14: Beyond the Limits of Knowledge: Intuition and Value 1. Introduction 2. The Drive to Perceive and Sensory Pleasure 3. The Theoretical versus the Practical Standpoint 4. Non-Conceptual Evaluation and Life 5. Schlick and Schopenhauer on Acquaintance as Immersion 6. Conclusion References Index En el siglo XX, la filosofía en lengua inglesa llegó a estar orientada hacia la ciencia y la lógica, y sospechaba de la metafísica. La desaparición del alma y el giro contra la metafísica remonta nuestra perspectiva filosófica actual a los debates de la filosofía austro-alemana sobre la relación entre ciencia empírica y metafísica: ¿la psicología empírica depende de la metafísica del alma, la sustancia mental? La respuesta negativa - que hay "una psicología sin alma" - dio forma a la filosofía austriaca y proporcionó un modelo para las ontologías que prescinden de las sustancias. Mark Textor cuenta la historia de cómo y por qué la filosofía (austriaca) se volvió contra la metafísica. Presenta a los pensadores clave de la época, incluidos los 'padres de la filosofía austriaca' Franz Brentano y Ernst Mach, cuyo Intencionalismo (Brentano) y Monismo neutral (Mach) se convirtieron en posiciones distintivas e influyentes en la filosofía de la mente. Textor continúa utilizando la visión de la 'psicología sin alma' como una punto de edad desde el cual reconstruir y evaluar la prehistoria inmediata y la formación de la filosofía analítica (Ward, Stout, Moore, Russell). Mientras que los filósofos austriacos retiraron el alma, los primeros filósofos analíticos se complacieron en presentar un sucesor, el sujeto, y concebir lo mental como constituido por relaciones sujeto-objeto. La parte final del libro vuelve al tema de la antimetafísica desde una perspectiva diferente. En esta parte, el primer Moritz Schlick, que pronto se convertiría en la figura principal del Círculo de Viena, ocupa un lugar central. Reconstruye los argumentos de Schlick para la conclusión de que la metafísica se encuentra más allá de los límites del conocimiento que están arraigados en la filosofía de la mente discutida en partes anteriores Textor Reveals The Roots Of Analytic Philosophy In A Great Age Of Austro-german Philosophy In The Late 19th And Early 20th Centuries. He Introduces Brentano, Mach, And Other Key Figures, And Traces The Development Of The Landmark Ideas That There Can Be 'psychology Without A Soul', And That Metaphysics Lies Beyond The Limits Of Knowledge.