The diplomacy of pragmatism : Britain and the formation of NATO, 1942-1949

The Diplomacy of Pragmatism charts the evolution of Britain's distinctive and leading role in the formation of NATO. Based on a wide range of British, American and Canadian archives the book provides a balanced assessment of British foreign and defence policies as the Cold War gathered momentum and a new system of European security was forged in the aftermath of the Second World War. The Diplomacy of Pragmatism sets Britain's role in the formation of NATO, not in the context of orthodox, revisionist or post-revisionist approaches to the Cold War, but in terms of what has become known as 'depolarization'. This approach emphasizes the distinctive and leading roles of other countries, apart from the Soviet Union and the United States, in the early Cold War period. In focusing on Britain's role there is no attempt to be chauvinistic. The key role of other states in the formation of NATO is acknowledged. Britain certainly did not establish NATO single-handedly. Nor was British diplomacy wholly consistent or completely successful throughout the period covered. Different strands of policy, focusing on the United States, Europe and a 'Third Power' global role, struggled for pre-eminence. Foreign policy and global strategy were not always well-coordinated. Nevertheless, despite the failures, it is argued that Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, made a decisive contribution to postwar diplomacy by his pragmatic and patient attempts to coordinate the policies of Western European states together with the United States and Canada. By 1949, a new system of European security had been developed in the context of rapidly changing domestic and international events. The author argues that, despite the differences, there are important lessons to be learned from postwar diplomacy by today's statesmen as they struggle to build another new European security system in the post-Cold War era Front Matter....Pages i-xi Introduction....Pages 1-7 Wartime Planning for a Postwar European Security Group, 1941–44....Pages 8-18 Emerging Differences between the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office, 1944–45....Pages 19-36 Postwar Attitudes towards the Soviet Union....Pages 37-48 Towards a Treaty with France....Pages 49-62 The Western Union and the Brussels Pact....Pages 63-75 The Chiefs of Staff and the Continental Commitment....Pages 76-91 7 The Pentagon Talks, 22 March – 1 April 1948....Pages 92-97 The Washington Talks on Security, 6 July 1948 to 9 September 1948....Pages 98-106 Last-Minute Problems, 9 September 1948 – 28 March 1949....Pages 107-115 Conclusions and Achievements....Pages 116-130 Back Matter....Pages 131-194