The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box: Electoral Manipulation, Economic Maneuvering, and Political Order in Autocracies (Emerging Democracies)

Contrary to our stereotypical views, dictators often introduce elections in which they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud. Why do electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box argues that strong autocrats who can garner popular support become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Cover Half title Series title Title Copyright Dedication Contents Acknowledgments List of Figures List of Tables List of Abbreviations Note on Translation and Transliteration Part I | Puzzles and Arguments 1 | Introduction 1.1 | Twin Puzzles of Autocratic Elections 1.2 | Argument in Brief 1.3 | Contributions 1.4 | Research Design, Key Empirical Findings, and the Organization of the Book 2 | A Theory of Autocratic Elections 2.1 | Introduction 2.2 | Fundamental Problems of Autocratic Rule and the Roles of Elections in Dictatorships 2.3 | The Electoral Dilemma in Dictatorships 2.4 | The Game of Autocratic Elections: The Dictator, Ruling Elites, and the Opposition 2.5 | The Dictator’s Tools at the Ballot Box: Electoral Manipulation and Economic Maneuvering 2.6 | The Distribution of Mobilization Capabilities and Autocratic Election Design 2.7 | Unintended Consequences of Autocratic Elections: Post-Electoral Political Conflicts 2.8 | Operationalization and Preliminary Analysis: Mobilization Capabilities and the Correlates of Victory Margins 2.9 | Conclusion Part II | Cross-National Explorations 3 | Blatant Electoral Fraud 3.1 | Variation in Blatant Electoral Fraud under Authoritarian Regimes 3.2 | Literature on Electoral Fraud 3.3 | Blatant Electoral Fraud and the Dictator’s Mobilization Capabilities 3.4 | Cross-National Statistical Analysis of Blatant Electoral Fraud 3.5 | Conclusion 4 | Institutional Manipulation 4.1 | The Puzzle of Electoral System Choice in Dictatorships 4.2 | Literature on Electoral System Design 4.3 | The Costs and Benefits of SMD and PR in Authoritarian Regimes 4.4 | The Dictator’s Mobilization Capabilities and the Strategic Choice of Electoral Systems 4.5 | Cross-National Statistical Analysis of Institutional Manipulation 4.6 | Conclusion 5 | Economic Maneuvering 5.1 | Autocracies and Political Business Cycles 5.2 | A Trade-off between Electoral Manipulation and Economic Maneuvering 5.3 | Cross-National Statistical Analysis of Economic Maneuvering 5.4 | Conclusion 6 | Backfiring at the Ballot Box 6.1 | Popular Protests and Leadership Turnover in the Aftermath of Autocratic Elections 6.2 | Literature on Post-Electoral Political Order 6.3 | Destabilizing Effects of Autocratic Elections 6.4 | Cross-National Statistical Analysis of Post-Electoral Political Conflicts 6.5 | Conclusion Part III | Comparative Case Studies 7 | From Electoral Manipulation to Economic Maneuvering: Nazarbaev’s Kazakhstan 7.1 | Introduction 7.2 | Limited Liberalization and Autocratization 7.3 | Electoral Manipulation in Kazakhstan 7.4 | The Strengthening of Nazarbaev’s Mobilization Capabilities 7.5 | Economic Maneuvering in Kazakhstan 7.6 | Conclusion 8 | From Electoral Manipulation to Autocratic Breakdown: Akaev’s Kyrgyzstan 8.1 | Introduction 8.2 | From Electoral Democracy to Electoral Authoritarianism 8.3 | Electoral Manipulation and Post-Electoral Protests in Kyrgyzstan 8.4 | The Weakening of Akaev’s Mobilization Capabilities 8.5 | Economic Maneuvering in Kyrgyzstan 8.6 | Conclusion 9 | Conclusion 9.1 | The Main Findings 9.2 | Policy Implications 9.3 | Future Research Avenues Appendix References Index Modern dictatorships hold elections. Contrary to our stereotypical views of autocratic politics, dictators often introduce elections with limited manipulation wherein they refrain from employing blatant electoral fraud and pro-regime electoral institutions. Why do such electoral reforms happen in autocracies? Do these elections destabilize autocratic rule? The Dictator's Dilemma at the Ballot Box explores how dictators design elections and what consequences those elections have on political order. It argues that strong autocrats who can effectively garner popular support through extensive economic distribution become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies. When autocrats fail to design elections properly, elections backfire in the form of coups, protests, and the opposition's stunning election victories. The book's theoretical implications are tested on a battery of cross-national analyses with newly collected data on autocratic elections and in-depth comparative case studies of the two Central Asian republics--Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. The book's findings suggest that indicators of free and fair elections in dictatorships may not be enough to achieve full-fledged democratization. Explores how dictators design elections and what consequences those elections have on political order. The book argues that strong autocrats who can effectively garner popular support through extensive economic distribution become less dependent on coercive electioneering strategies.