تصمیم به استفاده از بمب اتمی و معماری یک افسانه آمریکایی

One Of The Most Controversial Issues Absorbing America Today: Was It Necessary To Drop The Atomic Bombs On Hiroshima And Nagasaki? Fifty Years After The Fateful Summer Of 1945, We Are Still Debating Harry Truman's Decision. Now, In An Exhaustive, Thoroughly Documented Study Of The Events Of That Time, Gar Alperovitz Makes Plain Why The United States Did Not Need To Deploy The Bomb, How Truman Was Advised Of Alternatives To It By Nearly Every Civilian And Military Adviser, And How His Final Decision Was Later Justified By What Amounted To A Deception - The Claim That The Action Saved Half A Million To A Million American Soldiers Who Might Otherwise Have Died In An Invasion. Alperovitz Demonstrates That Japan Was Close To Surrender, That It Was Profoundly Threatened By The Prospect Of Soviet Entry Into The War, And That American Leaders Knew The End Was Near. Military Commanders Like Eisenhower, Arnold, And Leahy Saw No Need To Use The Bomb; Most Of Truman's Key Cabinet Members Urged A Clarification Of The Position Of Japan's Emperor To Speed Surrender. But The Inexperienced President Listened Most Intently To His Incoming Secretary Of State, James F. Byrnes, And Byrnes Was Convinced The Bomb Would Be An Important Diplomatic Instrument In Dealing With The Soviets. The Decision -- Unconditional Surrender -- Russian Option -- Atomic Diplomacy -- James F. Byrnes -- Potsdam -- Military Necessity -- Endgame -- Myth -- Henry L. Stimson -- President Harry S. Truman -- James F. Byrnes -- Managing History. Gar Alperovitz, With Assistance Of Sanho Tree ... [et Al.]. Includes Bibliographical References (p. [785]-811) And Index. THE DECISION TO USE THE ATOMIC BOMB and the Architecture of an American MythBy Gar AlperovitzAlfred A. KnopfCopyright © 1995 Gar Alperovitz. All rights reserved.ISBN: 0-679-44331-2Chapter One THE TRAJECTORY OF JAPAN'S DECLINE We believe that a considerable portion of the Japanese population now consider absolute military defeat to be probable. The increasing effects of sea blockade and the cumulative devastation wrought by strategic bombing, which has already rendered millions homeless and has destroyed from 25% to 50% of the builtup [sic] area of Japan's most important cities, should make this realization increasingly general. —Combined U.S.-British Intelligence Committee, July 8, 1945Among historians of World War II it is now a commonplace that Japanesepower disintegrated rapidly in the spring and summer of 1945—that from theearly months of that year, their defeat was certain. Robert J. C. Butowdescribes the dire situation as of the end of 1944: ... the scales of war had been tipped so steeply against the Japanese that no counterweights at their disposal could possibly have balanced them. Germany, which for the Japanese had been a seemingly invincible first line of defense, was facing inevitable destruction; the defense perimeter that the Japanese had created far out beyond their island base had been cracked and deeply penetrated; worst of all, Japan's military potential was dropping rapidly with her industrial capacity, as American submarines and planes cut the last of her economic lifelines to the outside world and great aerial armadas began the methodical destruction of her cities. The Pacific War had initially moved relatively slowly as President Rooseveltgave priority to the European struggle against Hitler. The famous Pacificbattles—Midway: June 1942; Guadalcanal: August-November 1942; NewGuinea: September 1942-April 1944; Marianas: June-August 1944—alongwith the U.S. Navy slowly tightening its stranglehold on Japanese shipping—weredramatic, but far different from what was about to come. In the latesummer of 1944, Japan's plight became severe. The fall of Saipan in earlyJuly and of Tinian and Guam one month later provided bases which broughtthe home islands into much better B-29 bombing range. In September, LieutenantGeneral George C. Kenney, Commander of Air Forces in the SouthwestPacific, was able to tell General "Hap" Arnold, Commander of theArmy Air Forces: The situation is developing rapidly and there are trends which indicate that the Jap is not going to last much longer. His sea power is so badly depleted that it is no match for any one of several task forces we could put into action. His air power is in a bad way. He has a lot of airplanes—probably more than he had a year ago—but he has lost his element, flight, squadron and group leaders and his hastily trained replacements haven't the skill or ability or combat knowledge to compete with us.... Without the support of his sea power and air power his land forces cannot do anything except hold out in isolated, beleaguered spots all over the map until bombs, bullets, disease and starvation kill them off.... The end-products of America's enormous industrial capacity—the battleshipsand carriers of the U.S. Navy and the heavy bombers of the Army AirForces—now began to pummel Japan mercilessly. On November 24, the warwas brought home to millions of Japanese when the Nakajima Aircraft worksin the suburbs of Tokyo were struck. A few months later the firebombing ofTokyo (March 9-10, 1945) produced a military and human catastrophe.Some sixteen square miles of one of the world's most densely packed residentialdistricts was completely burnt out, and at least 84,000 people werekilled in the firestorm; total losses may have numbered upwards of 120,000.With the collapse of Iwo Jima in the last week of March, U.S. fighter planescould provide cover for heavy bombing missions to Japan—which now wentforward on a massive scale. As another historian, Herbert Feis, has succinctlyput it: "The structure of Japanese life and production was beingsmashed and burned." On April 1, 1945, the U.S. Tenth Army—consisting of three Marine Corpsdivisions and four Army divisions—landed on Okinawa, the gateway to thehome islands. At this time, too, the Russians signaled the likely end of theirneutrality. The Koiso government, only nine months old, collapsed. An agingadmiral known for his moderation, Baron Kantaro Suzuki, took over amidstgrowing chaos. * * *What was known within the U.S. government at the time—and, specifically,how much did top officials understand the meaning both of particulardevelopments and, equally important, of the trajectory and developing trend ofevents? Although most of the American public and servicemen in the field wereled to envisage a long and fierce battle—and the high probability of aninvasion—now, a half century later, we know a great deal more both aboutwhat was actually happening and about what was known by Washington.Clearly, Japan was defeated and preparing to surrender before the atomicbomb was used. Though the question of timing was in dispute, it is alsocertain that this was generally understood in the U.S. government at thetime. Shortly after the Suzuki government took over, a confidential internal U.S.government assessment by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) concluded: Admiral Suzuki stands a world apart from the Kwantung Army faction which has exercised a paramount influence in Japanese politics since the February 26th military revolt in 1936.... Suzuki's appointment has all the appearance of a desperate stop-gap arrangement, an effort to by-pass these extremists and yet provide a new political alignment which can lay the basis for peace negotiations if possible. At the same time, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the JointChiefs of Staff put forward a devastating report on Japan's situation. "Withrespect to essential raw materials for her war industries," it observed, "Japanis even more dependent than Great Britain upon imports from overseas...." Due to the shortage of ocean shipping, Japan's main rail lines are already overburdened, while motor transport is totally inadequate.... The continued heavy destruction of machinery and equipment will make it impossible for Japan to replace losses with her existing or potential machine tool and heavy equipment industry.... Under these circumstances the Japanese "will" to continue the war may be expected to weaken progressively. Entirely apart from the physical results obtained by air-sea blockade combined with strategic bombing, the psychological effects upon the Japanese people as a whole will be most detrimental and will progressively undermine their confidence in victory or even confidence in the hope of avoiding complete and inevitable defeat. Major international developments added to the crisis. In early April theSoviet Union gave notice that it would not renew its existing Neutrality Pactwith Japan. If Stalin was no longer prepared to maintain neutrality once hisvast armies had completed their work against Hitler, it would be disastrous: We have great moral superiority through being the victim of her first sneak attack. In a similar vein, the Combined U.S.-British Intelligence Committee submitteda report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the first week of Julywhich stated: The Japanese ruling groups are aware of the desperate military situation.... We believe that a considerable portion of the Japanese population now consider absolute military defeat to be probable. The increasing effects of sea blockade and the cumulative devastation wrought by strategic bombing, which has already rendered millions homeless and has destroyed from 25% to 50% of the builtup [sic] area of Japan's most important cities, should make this realization increasingly general. As if to underscore these assessments, in the first week of July the Japanesegovernment publicly announced a 10 percent cut in staple rations, togetherwith new plans to manufacture starch from potato vine and otherplants. The Board of Technology stated that it would begin processing 150million acorns as a substitute for rice. Radio Tokyo went "all out" in praiseof acorns—and declared that a campaign to popularize the idea of eatingacorns would follow. At this time Radio Tokyo also noted that pine-root oil was now beingworked on as an experimental airplane fuel and that a "wooden aircraftproduction department" had been established in the Japanese MunitionsMinistry. Contents Preface Introduction: A Personal Note Book One: The Decision Chapter 1: The Trajectory of Japan’s Decline Chapter 2: General Efforts to End the War Part I: Unconditional Surrender Chapter 3: April-May 1945 Chapter 4: To June 18, 1945 Chapter 5: June 18, 1945 Chapter 6: From June 18 to July 2, 1945 Part II: The Russian Option Chapter 7: Phase I: From Pearl Harbor to the Death of Roosevelt Chapter 8: Phase II: April 1945 Chapter 9: Phase III: The New Reality Part III: Atomic Diplomacy Chapter 10: Preliminaries: April and May 1945 Chapter 11: Postponing a Confrontation with Stalin Chapter 12: The Interim Committee Chapter 13: The “Second Track” and Asia Chapter 14: The Concerned Scientists Part IV: James F. Byrnes Chapter 15: “A Very Machiavellian Character”; “An Operator” Chapter 16: Sly and Able Policies Chapter 17: The Shadow of Yalta Part V: Potsdam Chapter 18: To the Big Three Meeting Chapter 19: Clear Alternatives; First Decisions Chapter 20: Removing the Soviet Blackout from Europe Chapter 21: Second Decision Chapter 22: The Bomb and Germany Chapter 23: Third Decision Chapter 24: Theories and Choices Chapter 25: Unanswerable Questions Part VI. “Military Necessity” Chapter 26: Navy Leaders Chapter 27: Air Force Leaders Chapter 28: Army Leaders Chapter 29: Additional Perspectives Part VII. Endgame Chapter 30: Relations of Frankness Chapter 31: Navy Initiatives Chapter 32: “Mokusatsu” Chapter 33: Race to the Finish Chapter 34: The End of the War Book Two: The Myth Part I: Henry L. Stimson Chapter 35: A Direct Approach to Russia Chapter 36: A Thin Line of Criticism Chapter 37: “A Mere Recital of the Facts” Chapter 38: “An Exact Description” Chapter 39: “We Have Followed the Record” Chapter 40: “Omissions Merely for Brevity Part II: President Harry S. Truman Chapter 41: The Man from Missouri Chapter 42: Main Elements of the Official Rationale Chapter 43: Nagasaki and '‘Year of Decisions" Chapter 44: Certain Classes of Papers Chapter 45: “The Most Terrible Bomb,” “The Most Terrible Thing” Part III: James F. Byrnes Chapter 46: Disappearing From—and Revising— Part IV: Managing History Chapter 47: Leslie R. Groves Chapter 48: Censorship and Secrecy: Rules and Exceptions Chapter 49: Final Perspectives Conclusion: The Complicity of Silence Afterword: Questions, Issues, and Major Theories Appendix: Byrnes’ Activities: April to July 1945 Notes Selected Bibliography Acknowledgments Index