The Dao of Madness : Mental Illness and Self-Cultivation in Early Chinese Philosophy and Medicine

Mental illness complicates views of agency and moral responsibility in ethics. Particularly for traditions and theories focused on self-cultivation, such as Aristotelian virtue ethics and many systems of ethics in early Chinese philosophy, mental illness offers powerful challenges. Can the mentally ill person cultivate herself and achieve a level of virtue, character, or thriving similar to the mentally healthy? Does mental illness result from failures in self-cultivation, failure in social institutions or rulership, or other features of human activity? Can a life complicated by struggles with mental illness be a good one? The Dao of Madness investigates the role of mental illness, specifically "madness" (kuang), in discussions of self-cultivation and ideal personhood in early Chinese philosophical and medical thought, and the ways in which early Chinese thinkers probed difficult questions surrounding mental health. Alexus McLeod explores three central accounts: the early "traditional" views of those, including Confucians, taking madness to be the result of character flaw; the challenge from Zhuangists celebrating madness as a freedom from standard norms connected to knowledge; and the "medicalization" of madness within the naturalistic shift of Han Dynasty thought. Understanding views on madness in the ancient world helps reveal key features of Chinese thinkers' conceptions of personhood and agency, as well as their accounts of ideal activity. Further, it exposes the motivations behind the origins of the medical tradition, and of the key links between philosophy and medicine in early Chinese thought. The early Chinese medical tradition has crucial and understudied connections to early philosophy, connections which this volume works to uncover. Mental illness complicates views of agency and moral responsibility in ethics. Particularly for traditions and theories focused on self-cultivation, such as Aristotelian virtue ethics and many systems of ethics in early Chinese philosophy, mental illness offers powerful challenges. Can the mentally ill person cultivate herself and achieve a level of virtue, character, or thriving similar to the mentally healthy? Does mental illness result from failures in self-cultivation, failure in social institutions or rulership, or other features of human activity? Can a life complicated by struggles with mental illness be a good one?The Dao of Madness investigates the role of mental illness, specifically "madness" (kuang), in discussions of self-cultivation and ideal personhood in early Chinese philosophical and medical thought, and the ways in which early Chinese thinkers probed difficult questions surrounding mental health. Alexus McLeod explores three central accounts: the early "traditional" views of those, including Confucians, taking madness to be the result of character flaw; the challenge from Zhuangists celebrating madness as a freedom from standard norms connected to knowledge; and the "medicalization" of madness within the naturalistic shift of Han Dynasty thought. Understanding views on madness in the ancient world helps reveal key features of Chinese thinkers' conceptions of personhood and agency, as well as their accounts of ideal activity. Further, it exposes the motivations behind the origins of the medical tradition, and of the key links between philosophy and medicine in early Chinese thought. The early Chinese medical tradition has crucial and understudied connections to early philosophy, connections which this volume works to uncover. "Mental illness complicates views of agency and moral responsibility in ethics. Particularly for traditions and theories focused on self-cultivation, such as Aristotelian virtue ethics and many systems of ethics in early Chinese philosophy, mental illness offers powerful challenges. Can the mentally ill person cultivate herself and achieve a level of virtue, character, or thriving similar to the mentally healthy? Does mental illness result from failures in self-cultivation, failure in social institutions or rulership, or other features of human activity? Can a life complicated by struggles with mental illness be a good one?The Dao of Madness investigates the role of mental illness, specifically "madness" (kuang), in discussions of self-cultivation and ideal personhood in early Chinese philosophical and medical thought, and the ways in which early Chinese thinkers probed difficult questions surrounding mental health. Alexus McLeod explores three central accounts: the early "traditional" views of those, including Confucians, taking madness to be the result of character flaw; the challenge from Zhuangists celebrating madness as a freedom from standard norms connected to knowledge; and the "medicalization" of madness within the naturalistic shift of Han Dynasty thought. Understanding views on madness in the ancient world helps reveal key features of Chinese thinkers' conceptions of personhood and agency, as well as their accounts of ideal activity. Further, it exposes the motivations behind the origins of the medical tradition, and of the key links between philosophy and medicine in early Chinese thought. The early Chinese medical tradition has crucial and understudied connections to early philosophy, connections which this volume works to uncover."-- Provided by publisher "This book offers a picture of madness as a category and a tool in the early Chinese tradition, giving an account of how early Chinese thinkers developed a conception of mental illness connected to both medicine and ethics, particularly in the Warring States and Han periods. Specifically, it is concerned with the connections between madness, mental illness in general, and philosophical positions on personhood, moral agency, responsibility, and social identity. Madness is a near universal category in human thought. In early China, madness (kuang ?) has particular unique forms, shaped through consideration of the features of mind and body, cultural norms, and illness and health. While madness and other forms of mental illness were taken as either foils or ideals by different thinkers in early China, they were nearly always contrasted with operability, proper communal development, and progress on a specifically moral path. This book explores these conceptions of madness in early Chinese thought"--Publisher's description In The Dao of Madness, Alexus McLeod discuss three different accounts of the concept of "madness" (kuang) in early Chinese thought, and the origins of the conception of mental illness in early China. Madness is discussed in early Chinese texts in connection with personhood, self-cultivation, and agency. The book explores the role of madness in Confucian texts, which take madness as the result of flawed character, and in the Zhuangzi andrelated texts, which celebrate madness as an alternative and unbounded view of the world. The attempt to solve some of the problems inherent in these earlier views of madness leads to the "medicalization" of madness and mental illness more generally in Han Dynasty texts, and the origin of the Chinese medical tradition.Understanding these crucial links between the medical tradition and the philosophical tradition in early China clarifies early views of personhood, agency, and self-cultivation In 'The Dao of Madness', Alexus McLeod discuss three different accounts of the concept of 'madness' (kuang) in early Chinese thought, and the origins of the conception of mental illness in early China. Madness is discussed in early Chinese texts in connection with personhood, self-cultivation, and agency. The book explores the role of madness in Confucian texts, which take madness as the result of flawed character, and in the Zhuangzi and related texts, which celebrate madness as an alternative and unbounded view of the world. The attempt to solve some of the problems inherent in these earlier views of madness leads to the 'medicalization' of madness and mental illness more generally in Han Dynasty texts, and the origin of the Chinese medical tradition "Chapter One lays out the dominant views of self, agency, and moral responsibility in early Chinese Philosophy. The reason for this is that these views inform the ways early Chinese thinkers approach mental illness, as well as the role they see it playing in self-cultivation as a whole (whether they view it as problematic or beneficial, for example). In this chapter I offer a view of a number of dominant conceptions of mind, body, and agency in early Chinese thought, through a number of philosophical and medical texts"-- Provided by publisher