The Correspondence Theory of Truth: An Essay on the Metaphysics of Predication (Cambridge Studies in Philosophy)

This work presents a version of the correspondence theory of truth based on Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Russell's theory of truth and discusses related metaphysical issues such as predication, facts, and propositions. Like Russell and one prominent interpretation of the Tractatus, it assumes a realist view of universals and argues that facts as real entities are not needed. It will intrigue teachers and advanced students of philosophy interested in the conception of truth and in the metaphysics related to the correspondence theory of truth. Cover......Page 1 Half-title......Page 3 Series-title......Page 5 Title......Page 7 Copyright......Page 8 Contents......Page 11 Acknowledgements......Page 14 Introduction......Page 15 1.1 THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSALS......Page 24 1.2 THEORIES OF UNIVERSALS......Page 29 1.3 PREDICATION, PARTICIPATION, AND INHERENCE......Page 34 1.4 UNIVERSALS, TRUTH, AND DEVITT......Page 40 2.1 HORWICH AND DEFLATIONARY THEORIES OF TRUTH......Page 47 2.2 ALSTON AND MINIMALIST REALISM ABOUT TRUTH......Page 51 2.3 THE PROBLEM OF THE UNIVOCITY OF TRUTH......Page 56 2.4 REALITY AND THE ELEATIC PRINCIPLE......Page 61 3.1 DIFFICULTIES ABOUT STATES OF AFFAIRS IN THE TRACTATUS......Page 67 3.2 TRUTH AS ISOMORPHISM BETWEEN SENTENCE AND STATE OF AFFAIRS......Page 72 A. Tractarian Correspondence......Page 74 3.3 THE NOMINALIST ACCOUNT OF ATOMIC FACTS......Page 75 3.4 THE REALIST CCOUNT OF ATOMIC FACTS......Page 80 B. Correspondence with Facts......Page 86 C. Correspondence without Facts......Page 90 3.6 THE NOTION OF CONTENT......Page 91 3.7 AUSTIN’S THEORY OF TRUTH......Page 93 Appendix 3.1: The Role o Mental Sentences in Tractarian Belief......Page 97 Appendix 3.2: The Tractatus’s Attitude to Truth......Page 100 4.1 THE VIRTUES OF RUSSELL’S THEORY OF TRUTH......Page 102 4.2 THE VARIANTS OF RUSSELL’S THEORY OF TRUTH......Page 104 4.3 THE MAJOR PROBLEMS OF RUSSELL’S THEORY......Page 110 4.4 THE PROBLEM OF TWOFOLD ROLE OF THE RELATION......Page 111 4.5 THE MODES OF COMPOSITION OF ENTITIES......Page 116 5.1 THE OBJECTIONS TO RUSSELL’S THEORY ANALYSED AS DILEMMAS......Page 122 Second Dilemma, Concerning the Relation......Page 123 5.2 A FORMAL HYPOTHESIS IN DEFENCE OF RUSSELL’S THEORY......Page 125 5.3 INFORMAL JUSTIFICATION OF THE FORMAL HYPOTHESIS......Page 129 5.4 CORRESPONDENCE FOR PREDICATIVE BELIEFS......Page 131 5.5 CRITERION OF IDENTITY FOR RUSSELLIAN PROPOSITIONS......Page 135 5.7 RUSSELLIAN PROPOSITIONS AS CONSTRUCTIONS......Page 141 5.8 THE IDENTITY THEORY OF TRUTH......Page 144 Appendix 5.1: Answers to Other Objections to Russell’s Theory......Page 146 6.1 METAPHYSICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE NATURE OF FACTS......Page 154 6.2 ARMSTRONG AND FACTS AS TRUTH MAKERS......Page 163 6.3 THE LINGUISTIC VIEW OF FACTS AND STATES OF AFFAIRS......Page 168 6.4 OLSON’S ACCOUNT OF FACTS......Page 173 6.5 THE SLINGSHOT AND THE GREAT FACT......Page 182 7.1 CURRENT THEORIES OF PROPOSITIONS......Page 186 7.2 MINIMALISM ABOUT PROPOSITIONS......Page 190 7.3 THE ONTOLOGICAL CASE FOR PLATONISM ABOUT PROPOSITIONS......Page 196 7.4 BEALER ON STRUCTURELESS PLATONIC PROPOSITIONS......Page 199 7.5 THE STRUCTURE OF PLATONIC PROPOSITIONS......Page 204 7.6 IMMANENT RUSSELLIAN PROPOSITIONS......Page 207 8.1 COMPLEX PROPOSITIONS AND COMPOUND PROPOSITIONS......Page 210 8.2 PROPOSITIONS AS SUBJECTS OF PREDICATION......Page 214 8.3 CONJUNCTION AS A FUNCTION......Page 220 8.4 NEGATION AND POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ENTITIES......Page 221 8.5 NEGATIVE PREDICATIVE SENTENCES, THEIR TRUTH CONDITIONS AND TRUTH MAKERS......Page 225 8.6 THE CONCEPT OF NEGATION AND NEGATIVE PROPOSITIONS......Page 227 8.7 UNIVERSAL SENTENCES......Page 230 8.8 NEGATIVE EXISTENTIALLY QUANTIFIED SENTENCES......Page 234 8.9 THE PROBLEM OF IDENTITY SENTENCES......Page 235 Appendix 8.1: Logical Constants as Functions......Page 244 Bibliography......Page 250 Index......Page 259 This work presents a version of the correspondence theory of truth based on Wittgenstein's Tractatus and Russell's theory of truth and discusses related metaphysical issues such as predication, facts, and propositions. Like Russell and one prominent interpretation of the Tractatus it assumes a realist view of universals. Part of the aim is to avoid Platonic propositions, and although sympathy with facts is maintained in the early chapters, the book argues that facts as real entities are not needed. It includes discussion of contemporary philosophers such as David Armstrong, William Alston, and Paul Horwich, as well as those who write about propositions and facts, and a number of recent students of Bertrand Russell. It will interest teachers and advanced students of philosophy who are interested in the realistic conception of truth and in issues in metaphysics related to the correspondence theory of truth, and those interested in Russell and the Tractatus.