The Control Of Corporate Europe (feem Studies In Economics)

This volume describes how listed companies are controlled in nine different European countries, and includes a chapter on the USA, allowing transatlantic comparison. Each country study provides an analysis of standardized measures of the size and distribution of voting power, and then explores the aspects of corporate control that are most prominent in the country concerned. -- Publisher description Written by an international team of authors, this book provides the first systematic account of the control of corporate Europe based on voting block data disclosed in accordance with the European Union's Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC). The study provides detailed information on the voting control of companies listed on the official markets in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, as a benchmark comparison, the United States. The authors record a high concentration of control of corporations in many European countries with single blockholders frequently controlling more than fifty per cent of corporate votes. In contrast, a majority of UK listed companies have no blockholder owning more than ten per cent of shares, and a majority of US listed companies have no blockholder with more than six per cent of shares. Those chapters devoted to individual countries illustrate how blockholders can use legal devices to leverage their voting power over their cash-flow rights, or how incumbents prevent outsiders from gaining voting control. It is shown that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is (almost) matched by its variety of corporate control arrangements. Introduction / -- M. Becht and C. Mayer -- The separation of ownership and control in Austria -- K. Gugler, S. Kalss, A. Stomper, and J. Zechner Shareholding cascades: the separation of ownership and control in Belgium -- M. Becht, A. Chapelle, and L. Renneboog Ownership and voting power in France -- L. Bloch and E. Kremp Ownership and voting power in Germany -- M. Becht and E. Bömer Pyramidal groups and the separation between ownership and control in Italy -- M. Bianchi, M. Bianco, and L. Enriques Ownership and control in the Netherlands -- A. de Jong, R. Kabir, T. Marra, and A Röell Ownership and control of Spanish listed firms -- R. Crespí-Cladera and M. A. García-Cestona Ownership and control in Sweden: strong owners, weak miorities, and social control -- J. Agnblad, E. Berglöf, P. Högfeldt, and H. Svancar Strong managers and passive institutional investors in the United Kingdom -- M. Goergen and L. Renneboog Beneficial ownership in the United States-- M. Becht. The classic study of the ownership and control of corporations is Berle and Means, 1932.