The Concept of Justice and Equality : On the Dispute Between John Rawls and Gerald Cohen

Unless considered on a practical level, where a precise distribution of social goods is chosen, John Rawls’s and Gerald Cohen’s approaches to social justice cannot be complementary. Their disagreement about justice and its principles calls for a choice, which opts either for the Rawlsian theory or for the Cohenian one. What is the more plausible approach to social justice? This work compares both approaches and aims to defend Cohen’s position in the light of two considerations. It answers the philosophical question about the analysis of the idea of justice, which puts the virtue of justice in its philosophical context. It, however, presents a method everyone can apply in order to arrive at the fundamental principles of justice by employing the power of reason. An analysis of the concept of justice based on the power of reason should seek to uncover the ultimate nature of justice, which is independent of facts and of other virtues. Once exposed, the understanding of justice arrived at should inform social institutions and determine people’s daily decisions. A just society is therefore a society where just persons and just institutions exhibit the virtue of justice.-- Provided by Publisher Contents Introduction The Role of Political Philosophy The Question of Justice The Approaches to Justice The Relationship between Justice and Equality The Principles of Distributive Justice The Cohenian Critique of the Difference Principle Is the Cohenian Critique Justified? 1 The Rawlsian Theory of Justice 1.1 Justice as Fairness 1.2 A Fair System of Cooperation 1.3 Free and Equal Citizens 1.4 The Basic Structure of a Well-Ordered Society 1.5 The Original Position 1.6 The Principles of Justice 1.6.1 The First Principle of Justice 1.6.2 Justifying the Principles of Justice 2 A Meta-Ethical Theory: Cohen’s Idea of Justice 2.1 Cohen’s Thesis 2.2 The Argument 2.3 The Defenses 2.4 The Requirements 2.5 Challenges, Critiques and Replies 2.6 Pogge’s Critique of the Cohenian Meta-Ethical Method 3 A Meta-Ethical Theory: Cohen’s Rescue of Justice 3.1 Rescue of Justice from Constructivism 3.2 Weak and Strong Defenses 3.3 Illustrations 3.4 What is not Justice? 3.5 Objections and Replies 3.6 Justice Is Not the First Virtue of Social Institutions 3.7 The Justification of the Two Principles Is Not Contractarian 4 The Difference Principle 4.1 The Rawlsian General Conception of Justice 4.2 Justice as Fairness: The Second Principle of Justice 4.3 Fair Equality of Opportunity 4.4 The Interpretation of the Second Principle of Justice 4.4.1 The System of Natural Aristocracy 4.4.2 The System of Natural Liberty 4.4.3 The Liberal Interpretation 4.4.4 The Difference Principle within the Democratic Interpretation 4.5 The Argument for the Second Principle of Justice 5 The Rescue of Equality from the Rawlsian Theory of Justice 5.1 Cohen’s Critique of the Difference Principle 5.2 Rescue of Equality from the Incentives Argument 5.3 The Interpersonal Test 5.4 Two Readings of the Difference Principle: Rawls’s Contradiction 5.5 Rescue of Equality from the Pareto Argument 5.6 Rescue of Equality from the Contradiction of the Difference Principle 5.7 The Cohenian Conception of Justice 6 Scrutinizing the Cohenian Rescue of Equality 6.1 The Cohenian Critique of the Incentives Argument 6.2 Challenges to Cohen’s Critique of the Incentives Argument 6.2.1 Need for a Psychology of Egalitarianism 6.2.2 Legitimacy of Applying the Interpersonal Test 6.3 Removing Inequalities: Just or Unjust? 6.4 The Cohenian Critique of the Difference Principle 6.5 Analysis of the Cohenian Critique of the Difference Principle 6.5.1 Two Complementary Levels 6.5.2 Justificatory Level: Equality 6.5.3 Rule of Distribution: Equality 6.5.4 Particular Distributions: Equality 6.6 The Cohenian Rejection of the Difference Principle 6.7 Examination of the Cohenian Rejection of the Difference Principle 6.8 The Legitimacy of the Move from Moral Arbitrariness to Equality 7 The Cohenian Alternative 7.1 The Rawlsian Move 7.2 The Cohenian Illustration of the Move 7.3 A Pareto-Improving Equality-Preserving Move 7.4 Scrutinizing the Cohenian Alternative 7.5 A Further Rescue of Equality: The Cohenian Reply to the Trilemma Objection 7.6 The Rawlsian Challenge to the Cohenian Alternative 7.7 The Rescue of Equality from the Basic Structure 7.8 Pogge’s Defense of the Basic Structure 7.9 Scheffler’s Defense of the Basic Structure 8 Disagreement on the Status of Principles 8.1 Principles in the Rawlsian Understanding 8.2 Principles in the Cohenian Understanding 8.3 Focusing on Fundamental Principles 8.4 Cohen versus Rawls 8.5 The Thesis 8.5.1 Theoretical Level 8.5.2 Practical Level 8.6 A Discussion of the Role of Facts 9 Disagreement on the Status of Facts 9.1 Cohen’s Search for Justice: What Is Justice? 9.2 The Cohenian Critique of the Rawlsian Constructivism 9.3 Two Complementary Cohenian Theses 9.4 Cohen’s Reply 9.5 Cohen’s View: A Socratic-Platonic View 9.6 Two Different Approaches 9.6.1 Two Different Questions 9.6.2 Terminology 9.7 Rawls’s Question: “What Is a Just Social System?” 9.7.1 A Factual Question 9.8 The Meaning of Fairness 9.9 The Autonomy of the Rawlsian Citizens 9.10 Important Facts in Shaping a Just Social System 9.10.1 Facts about the Human Condition 9.10.2 Facts about Human Nature 9.10.3 Facts about the Political System 9.10.4 Available Facts in the Original Position 9.10.5 The Role of the Facts in the Stability of Justice as Fairness 10 Different Understandings of Justice 10.1 Different Treatments of Justice 10.2 Different Conceptions of Society 10.2.1 The Liberal Democratic Society 10.2.2 The Cohenian Community 10.3 Different Moral Feelings 10.3.1 The Rawlsian Sense of Justice 10.3.2 The Rawlsian Ethos of Justice 10.3.3 The Cohenian Egalitarian Ethos 10.4 The Role of Education 10.4.1 In the Rawlsian Conception of Justice 10.4.2 In the Cohenian Conception of Justice 10.5 Different Approaches to Social Justice 10.5.1 The Rawlsian Constructivist Approach 10.5.2 The Cohenian Conceptual Approach 10.6 Different Conceptions of Justice 10.6.1 Fundamental Principles of Justice 10.6.2 Rules of Regulation 10.6.3 Justice as Fairness 10.6.4 An Egalitarian Conception of Justice 10.7 Different Principles of Distributive Justice 10.8 The Cohenian Ethos for Personal Justice Conclusion References Author Index Subject Index Diese Reihe präsentiert innovative Studien in deutscher oder englischer Sprache, die aktuelle Themen der praktischen Philosophie aus analytischer Perspektive behandeln. Dazu gehören Fragen aus den Bereichen der Metaethik, der normativen und der ‚angewandten' Ethik ebenso wie Fragen der politischen Philosophie, der Rechtsphilosophie und der Handlungstheorie. This work scrutinizes different elements of a philosophical disagreement about the understanding of justice between John Rawls and Gerald Cohen. Rawls uses the original position device where representative members of society hypothetically meet to select the best principles for their social cooperation.