The Common Mind: An Essay on Psychology, Society, and Politics with a new postscript

What makes human beings intentional and thinking subjects? How does their intentionality and thought connect with their social nature and their communal experience? How do the answers to these questions shape the assumptions which it is legitimate to make in social explanation and political evaluation? These are the broad-ranging issues which Pettit addresses in this novel study. The Common Mind argues for an original way of marking off thinking subjects, in particular human beings, from other intentional systems, natural and artificial. It holds by the holistic view that human thought requires communal resources while denying that this social connection compromises the autonomy of individuals. And, in developing the significance of this view of social subjects—this holistic individualism—it outlines a novel framework for social and political theory. Within this framework, social theory is allowed to follow any of a number of paths: space is found for intentional interpretation and decision-theoretic reconstruction, for structural explanation and rational choice derivation. But political theory is treated less ecumenically. The framework raises serious questions about contractarian and atomistic modes of thought and it points the way to a republican rethinking of liberal commitments. What makes human beings intentional and thinking subjects? How does their intentionality and thought connect with their social nature and their communal experience? How do the answers to these questions shape legitimate assumptions in social explanation and political evaluation? In this innovative study, Philip Pettit addresses these broad-ranging issues and defends a connected set of responses. The book argues for an original way of distinguishing thinking subjects, in particular human beings, from other intentional systems, natural and artificial. It defends the holistic view that human thought requires communal resources while denying that this social connection compromises the autonomy of individuals. And, in developing the significance of this view of social subjects - this holistic individualism - it outlines a novel framework for social and political theory. Within this framework, social theory is allowed to follow a number of paths: Space is found for intentional interpretation and decision-theoretic reconstruction as well as for structural explanation and rational choice derivation. But political theory is treated less ecumenically. The framework raises serious questions about contractarian and atomistic modes of thought and it points the way to a republican rethinking of liberal commitments. Designed to be accessible to readers in a number of disciplines and on the student as well as professional level, The Common Mind will interest philosophers as well as political scientists, economists, sociologists, cognitive scientists, and scholars of law Contents......Page 16 I: MIND......Page 18 Preview......Page 20 Intentional Agents......Page 27 Intentional States......Page 41 Theories of Intentionality......Page 60 2. Thought......Page 71 Two Requirements of Thought......Page 77 The First Requirement: Intentional Ascent......Page 86 The Second Requirement: Rule-Following......Page 93 II: MIND AND SOCIETY......Page 126 Preview......Page 128 3. For Individualism, against Collectivism......Page 134 The Issue......Page 136 Do Structural Regularities Override Intentional?......Page 160 Do Structural Regularities Outflank Intentional?......Page 172 The Issue......Page 182 The Argument for Holism......Page 192 Holism and Relativism......Page 210 III: MIND, SOCIETY, AND THEORY......Page 232 Preview......Page 234 5. Social Theory......Page 245 Intentional Interpretation......Page 246 Structural and Historicist Theory......Page 265 Rational Choice Theory......Page 281 6. Political Theory......Page 301 Contract-Centred Thought......Page 305 Value-Centred Thought......Page 319 Institution-Centred Thought......Page 339 Postscript: A Common Mind in Three Senses......Page 357 References......Page 374 B......Page 388 C......Page 389 E......Page 390 G......Page 391 I......Page 392 L......Page 393 P......Page 394 R......Page 395 S......Page 396 W......Page 397 Contents 16 I: MIND 18 Preview 20 1. Intentionality 27 Intentional Agents 27 Intentional States 41 Theories of Intentionality 60 2. Thought 71 Two Requirements of Thought 77 The First Requirement: Intentional Ascent 86 The Second Requirement: Rule-Following 93 II: MIND AND SOCIETY 126 Preview 128 3. For Individualism, against Collectivism 134 The Issue 136 Do Structural Regularities Override Intentional? 160 Do Structural Regularities Outflank Intentional? 172 4. For Holism, against Atomism 182 The Issue 182 The Argument for Holism 192 Holism and Relativism 210 III: MIND, SOCIETY, AND THEORY 232 Preview 234 5. Social Theory 245 Intentional Interpretation 246 Structural and Historicist Theory 265 Rational Choice Theory 281 6. Political Theory 301 Contract-Centred Thought 305 Value-Centred Thought 319 Institution-Centred Thought 339 Postscript: A Common Mind in Three Senses 357 References 374 Index 388 A 388 B 388 C 389 D 390 E 390 F 391 G 391 H 392 I 392 J 393 K 393 L 393 M 394 N 394 O 394 P 394 Q 395 R 395 S 396 T 397 U 397 V 397 W 397 What makes human beings intentional and thinking subjects? How does their intentionality and thought connect with their social nature and their communal experience? How do the answers to these questions shape the assumptions which it is legitimate to make in social explanation and political evaluation? These are the broad-ranging issues which Pettit addresses in this innovative study. The Common Mind argues for an original way of distinguishing thinking subjects, in particular human beings, from other intentional systems, natural and artificial. It defends the holistic view that human thought requires communal resources while denying that this social connection compromises the autonomy of individuals. And, in developing the significance of this view of social subjects -- this holistic individualism -- it outlines a novel framework for social and political theory. ## Abstract This book is in three sections, with two chapters in each. It begins with questions of psychology: questions to do with what it means to be an intentional agent and, in particular, what it means to be an agent with the capacity for thought. Having sketched an overall view of the intentional, thinking agent, it then goes on to explore the difference that social life makes to the mentality of such agents; in effect, it outlines a social ontology. And, having developed a picture of the mind in society – of the common or social mind – it turns, finally, to the lessons of this picture for the pursuit of social and political theory: for the explanation of what happens on the social scene and for the evaluation of the different ways in which that scene may be structured.