The collected works of James M. Buchanan / 4, Public finance in democratic process : fiscal institutions and individual choice

This is a monumental work that outlines the dynamics of individual choice as it is displayed in the process of public finance. Buchanan is perhaps nowhere more clearly a disciple of the great Swedish economist Knut Wicksell than he is in the underlying principles of this seminal work. Specifically, he elaborates on these three central Wicksellian themes: analysis of market failure in the provision of public goods; the insistence on conceiving policy decisions as the outcome of political processes; and, the necessity of treating the tax and expense sides of the budget as interconnected. Echoing Wicksell's antipathy to the 'benevolent despot' model of government, Buchanan lays out in this book a starting point for modern public-choice analysis.Recognising the path breaking work he is about to begin, Buchanan opens his preface by stating, ''Fiscal theory is normally discussed in a frame of reference wholly different from that adopted in this book. This dramatic shift of emphasis...requires that I consider the processes through which individual choices are transmitted, combined, and transformed into collective outcomes. Careful research in this area is in its infancy, and the necessary reliance on crude, unsophisticated models underscores the exploratory nature of the work.'' According to Geoffrey Brennan in the foreword, ''''Public Finance in Democratic Process'' is a work more hospitable to public finance orthodoxy and could be treated as an extension (albeit an important one) of the conventional approach.''

Public Finance in Democratic Process is James M. Buchanan’s monumental work that outlines the dynamics of individual choice as it is displayed in the process of public finance.

Buchanan is perhaps nowhere more clearly a disciple of the great Swedish economist Knut Wicksell than he is in the underlying principles of this seminal work. Specifically, he elaborates on these three central Wicksellian themes:
1.Analysis of market failure in the provision of public goods.
2.The insistence on conceiving policy decisions as the outcome of political processes.
3.The necessity of treating the tax and expense sides of the budget as interconnected.

Echoing Wicksell’s antipathy to the "benevolent despot” model of government, Buchanan lays out in this book a starting point for modern public-choice analysis. Recognizing the pathbreaking work he is about to begin, Buchanan opens his preface by stating, "Fiscal theory is normally discussed in a frame of reference wholly different from that adopted in this book. This dramatic shift of emphasis . . . . requires that I consider the processes through which individual choices are transmitted, combined, and transformed into collective outcomes. Careful research in this area is in its infancy, and the necessary reliance on crude, unsophisticated models underscores the exploratory nature of the work.”

According to Geoffrey Brennan in the foreword, "Public Finance in Democratic Process is a work more hospitable to public finance orthodoxy and could be treated as an extension (albeit an important one) of the conventional approach.”

James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty in the twentieth century.

The entire series includes:

Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty
Volume 2: Public Principles of Public Debt
Volume 3: The Calculus of Consent
Volume 4: Public Finance in Democratic Process
Volume 5: The Demand and Supply of Public Goods
Volume 6: Cost and Choice
Volume 7: The Limits of Liberty
Volume 8: Democracy in Deficit
Volume 9: The Power to Tax
Volume 10: The Reason of Rules
Volume 11: Politics by Principle, Not Interest
Volume 12: Economic Inquiry and Its Logic
Volume 13: Politics as Public Choice
Volume 14: Debt and Taxes
Volume 15: Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory
Volume 16: Choice, Contract, and Constitutions
Volume 17: Moral Science and Moral Order
Volume 18: Federalism, Liberty, and the Law
Volume 19: Ideas, Persons, and Events
Volume 20: Indexes

Front Matter......Page 1 Photograph of James M. Buchanan with portrait of Knut Wicksell, Stockholm, Sweden, 1986......Page 3 Title Page......Page 5 Copyright and Publishing Notes......Page 6 Table of Contents, pp. vii-viii......Page 7 Foreword, pp. ix-xii......Page 9 Preface, pp. xiii-xvi......Page 13 Part One. The Effects of Institutions on Fiscal Choice, p. 1......Page 17 1. Introduction, p. 3......Page 19 2. Individual Demand for Public Goods, p. 11......Page 27 3. Tax Institutions and Individual Fiscal Choice, p. 22......Page 38 4. Tax Institutions and Individual Fiscal Choice, p. 44......Page 60 5. Existing Institutions and Change, p. 57......Page 73 6. Earmarking Versus General-Fund Financing, p. 71......Page 87 7. The Bridge Between Tax and Expenditure in the Fiscal Decision Process, p. 87......Page 103 8. "Fiscal Policy" and Fiscal Choice, p. 97......Page 113 9. Individual Chocie and the Indivisibility of Public Goods, p. 112......Page 128 10. The Fiscal Illusion, p. 125......Page 141 11. Simple Collective Decision Models, p. 143......Page 159 12. From Theory to the Real World, p. 169......Page 185 13. Some Preliminary Research Results, p. 181......Page 197 Part Two. The Choice Among Fiscal Institutions, p. 213......Page 229 14. The Levels of Fiscal Choice, p. 215......Page 231 15. Income-Tax Progression, p. 227......Page 243 16. Specific Excise Taxation, p. 243......Page 259 17. The Institution of Public Debt, p. 258......Page 274 18. Fiscal Policy Constitutionally Considered, p. 269......Page 285 19. Fiscal Nihilism and Beyond, p. 282......Page 298 Index of Authors, p. 303......Page 319 Index of Subjects, p. 305......Page 321 End of the Book, p. 312......Page 328