The British Way of War : Julian Corbett and the Battle for a National Strategy

How a strategist's ideas were catastrophically ignored in 1914—but shaped Britain’s success in the Second World War and beyond Leading historian Andrew Lambert shows how, as a lawyer, civilian, and Liberal, Julian Corbett (1854–1922) brought a new level of logic, advocacy, and intellectual precision to the development of strategy. Corbett skillfully integrated classical strategic theory, British history, and emerging trends in technology, geopolitics, and conflict to prepare the British state for war. He emphasized that strategy is a unique national construct, rather than a set of universal principles, and recognized the importance of domestic social reform and the evolving British Commonwealth. Corbett's concept of a maritime strategy, dominated by the control of global communications and economic war, survived the debacle of 1914–18, when Britain used the German "way of war" at unprecedented cost in lives and resources. It proved critical in the Second World War, shaping Churchill’s conduct of the conflict from the Fall of France to D-Day. And as Lambert shows, Corbett’s ideas continue to influence British thinking. How a strategist's ideas were catastrophically ignored in1914-but shaped Britain's success in the Second World War andbeyond Leading historian Andrew Lambert shows how, as alawyer, civilian, and Liberal, Julian Corbett (1854-1922) brought anew level of logic, advocacy, and intellectual precision to thedevelopment of strategy. Corbett skillfully integrated classicalstrategic theory, British history, and emerging trends intechnology, geopolitics, and conflict to prepare the British statefor war. He emphasized that strategy is a unique nationalconstruct, rather than a set of universal principles, andrecognized the importance of domestic social reform and theevolving British Commonwealth. Corbett's concept of a maritimestrategy, dominated by the control of global communications andeconomic war, survived the debacle of 1914-18, when Britain usedthe German "way of war" at unprecedented cost in lives andresources. It proved critical in the Second World War, shapingChurchill's conduct of the conflict from the Fall of France toD-Day. And as Lambert shows, Corbett's ideas continue to influenceBritish thinking "Leading historian Andrew Lambert shows how, as a lawyer, civilian, and Liberal, Julian Corbett (1854-1922) brought a new level of logic, advocacy, and intellectual precision to the development of strategy. Corbett skillfully integrated classical strategic theory, British history, and emerging trends in technology, geopolitics, and conflict to prepare the British state for war. He emphasized that strategy is a unique national construct, rather than a set of universal principles, and recognized the importance of domestic social reform and the evolving British Commonwealth. Corbett's concept of a maritime strategy, dominated by the control of global communications and economic war, survived the debacle of 1914-18, when Britain used the German "way of war" at unprecedented cost in lives and resources. It proved critical in the Second World War, shaping Churchill's conduct of the conflict from the Fall of France to D-Day. And as Lambert shows, Corbett's ideas continue to influence British thinking."--Amazon.ca Cover 1 Halftitle page 2 Title page 4 Copyright page 5 Dedication 6 CONTENTS 8 Introduction 10 CHAPTER 1 Victorian Empire 23 CHAPTER 2 Making Waves 47 CHAPTER 3 Finding an Audience 60 CHAPTER 4 Politics and Policy 77 CHAPTER 5 England in the Mediterranean 96 CHAPTER 6 The Naval War Course 108 CHAPTER 7 Strategy, Culture and History 132 CHAPTER 8 Shaping the ‘British Way’ 154 CHAPTER 9 ‘Radiant with the Genius of a Maritime State’ 178 CHAPTER 10 Policy, Strategy and International Law 197 CHAPTER 11 Imperial Pageantry 222 CHAPTER 12 Tactics, Signals and Trafalgar 235 CHAPTER 13 Maritime Strategy in a Total War 253 CHAPTER 14 Teaching National Strategy 271 CHAPTER 15 ‘Doctrine – The Soul of Warfare’ 292 CHAPTER 16 The ‘British Way’ at War 316 CHAPTER 17 Propaganda, Peace and the Liberal Empire 346 CHAPTER 18 Naval Operations 368 CHAPTER 19 Explaining the Unpalatable Truth 392 CHAPTER 20 Carrying On 420 Conclusion 441 NOTES 449 BIBLIOGRAPHY 510 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 524 INDEX 527