The Book of Evidence (Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Science)

What is required for something to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this fascinating, elegantly written work, distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein explores this question, rejecting typical philosophical and statistical theories of evidence. He claims these theories are much too weak to give scientists what they want--a good reason to believe--and, in some cases, they furnish concepts that mistakenly make all evidential claims a priori. Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, defines three of them by reference to ''potential'' evidence, and characterizes the latter using a novel epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is then applied to philosophical and historical issues. Solutions are provided to the ''grue,'' ''ravens,'' ''lottery,'' and ''old-evidence'' paradoxes, and to a series of questions. These include whether explanations or predictions furnish more evidential weight, whether individual hypotheses or entire theoretical systems can receive evidential support, what counts as a scientific discovery, and what sort of evidence is required for it. The historical questions include whether Jean Perrin had non-circular evidence for the existence of molecules, what type of evidence J. J. Thomson offered for the existence of the electron, and whether, as is usually supposed, he really discovered the electron. Achinstein proposes answers in terms of the concepts of evidence introduced. As the premier book in the fabulous new series Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science, this volume is essential for philosophers of science and historians of science, as well as for statisticians, scientists with philosophical interests, and anyone curious about scientific reasoning. What Is Required For Something To Be Evidence For A Hypothesis? In This Work, Peter Achinstein Explores This Question, Rejecting Typical Philosophical And Statistical Theories Of Evidence. He Claims These Theories Are Much Too Weak To Give Scientists What They Want - A Good Reason To Believe - And, In Some Cases, They Furnish Concepts That Mistakenly Make All Evidential Claims A Priori. Achinstein Introduces Four Concepts Of Evidence, Defines Three Of Them By Reference To Potential Evidence, And Characterizes The Latter Using A Novel Epistemic Interpretation Of Probability. The Resulting Theory Is Then Applied To Philosophical And Historical Issues. Solutions Are Provided To The Grue, Ravens, Lottery, And Old-evidence Paradoxes, And To A Series Of Questions Including Whether Explanations Or Predictions Furnish More Evidential Weight; Whether Individual Hypotheses Or Entire Theoretical Systems Can Receive Evidential Support; And What Counts As A Scientific Discovery, And What Evidence It Requires. The Historical Questions Include Whether Jean Perrin Had Non-circular Evidence For The Existence Of Molecules; What Type Of Evidence J.j. Thomson Offered For The Existence Of The Electron; And Whether - As Is Usually Supposed - He Really Discovered The Electron. Achinstein Proposes Answers To All Of These, Using His Theory Of Evidence. This Volume Is For Philosophers Of Science And Historians Of Science, As Well As For Statisticians, Scientists With Philosophical Interests, And Anyone Curious About Scientific Reasoning.--jacket. The Dean's Challenge -- Concepts Of Evidence, Or How The Electron Got Its Charge -- Two Major Prbabilistic Theories Of Evidence -- What's Wrong With These Probabilistic Theories Of Evidence? -- Objective Epistemic Probability -- Evidence, High Probability, And Belief -- The Explanatory Connection -- Final Definitions And Realism -- Two Paradoxes Of Evidence : Ravens And Grue -- Explanation Versus Prediction : Which Carries More Evidential Weight? -- Old-age And New-age Holism -- Evidence For Molecules : Jean Perrin And Molecular Reality -- Who Really Discovered The Electron? Peter Achinstein. Includes Bibliographical References And Index. Annotation. What is required for something to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this fascinating, elegantly written work, distinguished philosopher of science Peter Achinstein explores this question, rejecting typical philosophical and statistical theories of evidence. He claims these theories are much too weak to give scientists what they want--a good reason tobelieve--and, in some cases, they furnish concepts that mistakenly make all evidential claims a priori. Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, defines three of them by reference to "potential" evidence, and characterizes the latter using a novel epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is then applied to philosophical and historical issues. Solutions are provided tothe "grue," "ravens," "lottery," and "old-evidence" paradoxes, and to a series of questions. These include whether explanations or predictions furnish more evidential weight, whether individual hypotheses or entire theoretical systems can receive evidential support, what counts as a scientificdiscovery, and what sort of evidence is required for it. The historical questions include whether Jean Perrin had non-circular evidence for the existence of molecules, what type of evidence J.J. Thomson offered for the existence of the electron, and whether, as is usually supposed, he reallydiscovered the electron. Achinstein proposes answers in terms of the concepts of evidence introduced. As the premier book in the fabulous new series Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Science, this volume is essential for philosophers of science and historians of science, as well as for statisticians, scientists with philosophical interests, and anyone curious about scientific reasoning ## Abstract What is required for a fact to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this book Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, which he calls potential, veridical, epistemic‐situation, and subjective. He defines the last three by reference to the first, and then characterizes potential evidence using a new objective epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is used to provide solutions to four ”paradoxes of evidence” (grue, ravens, lottery, and old evidence) and to a series of questions, including whether explanations or predictions furnish more evidential weight; whether individual hypotheses or only entire theoretical systems can receive evidential support (the Duhem‐Quine problem); and what counts as a scientific discovery and what evidence it requires. Two historical scientific cases are examined using the theory of evidence developed: Jean Perrin's argument for molecules (did he have noncircular evidence for their existence?), and J.J. Thomson's argument for electrons (what sort of evidence did this argument provide?). What is required for something to be evidence for an hypothesis? In this text, Peter Achinstein, introduces here a basic concept of potential evidence which is characterised using a novel epistemic interpretation of probability Once there was a dean at my university who was a scientist with high intelligence but low boiling point.