The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism (Blackwell Companions to Philosophy)

The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism provides a systematic introduction to philosophical naturalism and its relation to other schools of thought. Features contributions from an international array of established and emerging scholars from across the humanities Explores the historical development of naturalism and its ascension to the dominant orthodoxy in the Western academy Juxtaposes theoretical criticisms with impassioned defenses, encapsulating contemporary debates on naturalism Includes discussions of metaphysics, realism, feminism, science, knowledge, truth, mathematics, free will, and ethics viewed through a naturalist lens Title Page Copyright Page Contents List of Contributors Preface Chapter 1 Naturalism and its Discontents Introduction What Is Naturalism? Naturalism and Science Strict and Broad Naturalism Methodological Naturalism The Historical Development of Naturalism Arguing for Naturalism Naturalism and the Good Evolution and Ethics Discontents The Shape of the Book References Chapter 2 Naturalizing Ethics Introduction Naturalism in the Broad Sense Why Ethics Isn’t Naturalized Why Naturalize? Understanding Morality Naturalistic Epistemology and the Problem of Normativity Naturalistic Ethics and the Problem of Normativity Hume’s Objection Moore’s Fallacy Relativism and Nihilism Ethics Naturalized: Pluralism and Human Ecology Acknowledgments References Chapter 3 Naturalism in the Continental Tradition Phenomenological Antinaturalism Husserl’s Antinaturalism The Naturalizing Phenomenology Challenge Jonas Affirmative Naturalism Nietzsche and Bergson Deleuze Antinaturalism in Critical Social Theory Conclusion Acknowledgments References Chapter 4 The Naturalism Question in Feminism Introduction Naturalist Commitments Naturalism about All Normativity in Feminist Hands Pragmatic Normativity? Naturalism about Some Kinds of Normativity Naturalism about a Specific Kind of Normativity A Naturalist Move as Part of an Ideology Critique Conclusion References Chapter 5 On Naturalistic Metaphysics What Is Naturalism? On Naturalistic Metaphysics An Objection to Naturalistic Metaphysics Reasons to Doubt the Doubts? The “Miracle” Argument We Should Expect Metaphysical Reliability from Creatures Capable of Abductive Reasoning Help from Thomas Reid Conclusion References Chapter 6 Naturalism and Realism in the Philosophy Science Introduction Naturalism and Scientific Realism Empiricism, Naturalism, and Scientific Realism Naturalism and the Status of the Scientific Realist Hypothesis Naturalism, Metaphysics, and Science Conclusion References Chapter 7 Naturalism without Scientism Integrative Naturalism Epistemic Instrumentalism Philosophy of Science as Constructive Interpretation Acknowledgments References Chapter 8 “The Horrid Doubt”: Naturalism and Evolutionary Biology Early Conflicts, 1692–1872 Contemporary Conflicts The Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism Impact of the Debates References Chapter 9 Naturalism and Antinaturalism in the Sociology of Science Sociology of Science Laboratory Life Robust Social Epistemology The Division of Cognitive Labor Knowledge and Knowledge-Productive Practices Beyond Binaries References Chapter 10 Why Methodological Naturalism? The Aims of Science Defining Methodological Naturalism Natural Things Provisional Atheism Motivating Methodological Naturalism Intrinsic versus Provisional Methodological Naturalism The Theistic Rationale for Methodological Naturalism Defending Methodological Naturalism Conclusion Acknowledgments References Chapter 11 Naturalism and the Question of Realism Introduction: What Is Naturalism? What Is Realism? Hilary Putnam on Metaphysical Realism The Brains-in-a-Vat Argument The Model-Theoretic Argument Naturalism and the Status of Rational Intuitions How Could Philosophical Intuitions Be So Different? Are Modal Intuitions Reliable? References Chapter 12 Non-Naturalistic Metaphysics Metaphysics and Naturalism The First Pairing: Methodological Naturalism and Contemporary Analytic Metaphysics The Second Pairing: Ontological Naturalism and Theistically Informed Metaphysics Acknowledgments References Chapter 13 Naturalism and Physicalism Introduction The Case for Physicalism Leibniz, Newton, and the Conservation of Energy Strong Physicalism Vindicated Hempel’s Dilemma The Rise of Physicalism in the 1950s and 60s Arguments against Physicalism The Causal Argument Analyzed Epiphenomenalism and Preestablished Harmony Denying Causal Closure Denying No Overdetermination References Chapter 14 Natural Mind Introduction Methodology vs. Metaphysics Eliminative Materialism as a Naturalized Approach to the Mind Conclusion Acknowledgments References Chapter 15 Naturalism and Dualism Introduction The Core Idea Naturalism vs. Dualism Naturalism vs. Theism Naturalism Defended References Chapter 16 Epistemological Naturalisms Classifying Naturalisms Some Epistemological Naturalists and their Naturalisms Lightweight Epistemological Naturalism I: Norms and the A Priori Lightweight Epistemological Naturalism II: The Armchair Acknowledgments References Chapter 17 Dewey, Naturalism, and the Problem of Knowledge I II Premise A Premise B Premise C Premise D Conclusion III 1 2 3 IV Further Reading References Chapter 18 Truth and Naturalism Introduction Two Notions of “Natural Property” T-Natural L-Natural The Correspondence Theory of Truth Representation as Isomorphism Representation and Reference Representational Reference and T-Naturalness Representational Reference and L-Naturalness Epistemic Theories of Truth Deflationism Deflationary Truth and T-Naturalness Deflationary Truth and L-Naturalness Truth Pluralism and Naturalism Truth as Normative Conclusion References Chapter 19 Against Naturalism about Truth Naturalism Is Truth Causally Efficacious? Is Truth a Natural Property? The Correspondence Theory Antirealism about Truth Deflationary Theories of Truth Conclusion: Pluralism about Truth Acknowledgments References Chapter 20 Mathematics and Metaphysical Naturalism References Chapter 21 Naturalism and Mathematics: Some Problems Introduction Motivations for Naturalism Indispensability-Based Mathematical Naturalism Quine–Putnam Indispensability Argument Colyvan’s Extended Indispensability Argument Maddy’s Second Philosophical Naturalistic Mathematics Conclusion Acknowledgments References Chapter 22 Naturalism and Free Will Varieties of Naturalism Free Will and Determinism Free Will and Sciences other than Physics Is Naturalism a Virtue? Acknowledgments References Chapter 23 Free Will and Naturalism: How to Be a Libertarian, and a Naturalist Too Introduction Terminology and Methodological Constraints Naturalists on Free Will A Naturalist-Friendly Libertarian Account of Free Will Substance Causation The Role of Reasons in Agent Causation Naturalism Conclusion Acknowledgments References Chapter 24 Does the New Wave in Moral Psychology Sink Kant? Metaethics: The Empirical Critique of Rationalism Emotions Influence and Cause Moral Judgments Emotions are Necessary for Moral Judgment Reasoning is Not Necessary for Moral Judgment We Are Not Reflective Creatures The Threat to Rationalism: Conclusion Normative Ethics: Empirical Challenges to Kantian Normative Positions Reasoning Does Not Lead to Kantian Normative Conclusions The Motive of Duty The Threat to Kantian Normative Ethics: Conclusion Acknowledgments References Chapter 25 Naturalism in Metaethics Naturalist Conceptual Analyses of Normative Terms Moore’s Open Question Argument Natural and Non-Natural Properties General Arguments for Naturalism in Metaethics Semantic Forms of Naturalism in Metaethics Expressivism as a Version of Naturalism in Metaethics Implicatures and Know-How Network Analysis Synthetic Forms of Naturalism in Metaethics Conclusion References Chapter 26 Evolution and Moral Naturalism Introduction The Evolution of Morality The Case for Moral Nativism Undermining Moral Naturalism Debunking a Debunking Argument The Case for Moral Nativism Supporting Moral Naturalism Conclusion Acknowledgments References Chapter 27 Scientific Naturalism and the Explanation of Moral Beliefs: Challenging Evolutionary Debunking Approaches to the Study of Morality: Science and Philosophy Dividing the Terrain Explaining Beliefs Explaining Our Moral Beliefs Debunking Arguments Response to the Debunking Arguments References Chapter 28 What’s to be Said for Moral Non-Naturalism? What is Moral Non-Naturalism? Two Reductionist Strategies The Structure of Normative Facts Acknowledgments References Chapter 29 Naturalism and Moral Psychology From Dual-Process Theory to Noncognitivism From Sentimental Rules to Moral Relativism From Constructive Sentimentalism to Moral Relativism From Social Psychology to an Error Theory about Character Conclusion Acknowledgments References Chapter 30 Militant Modern Atheism 1 2 3 4 Acknowledgments References Chapter 31 Why Naturalism Cannot Account for Natural Human Rights What Are Natural Human Rights? On Grounding Human Rights Does the Capacity for Rational Agency Ground the Dignity that Accounts for Natural Human Rights? Does Personhood Ground the Dignity that Accounts for Human Rights? A Final Attempt at Secular Grounding Does the Imago Dei Ground the Dignity that Accounts for Human Rights? A Theistic Account of Human Dignity The Naturalist Response References Chapter 32 Cognitive and Evolutionary Approaches to Religion Introduction Setting the Stage The Byproduct Theory Religious Cognition as Individually Adaptive Religion and Religious Cognition as Beneficial for Groups Trends in Experimental Research Acknowledgments References Chapter 33 The Naturalness of Religious Belief: Epistemological Implications Naturalism, Cognitive Science of Religion, and the Reasonableness of Religious Beliefs Natural Histories of Religion Cognitive Science of Religion The Concept of Naturalness in CSR NRT and the Rationality of Religious Belief Conclusion Acknowledgments References Chapter 34 Naturalism in Indian Philosophy Naturalism and Nature Indian Concepts of Nature Atomism Hard Naturalism Protonaturalism Methodological Naturalism Naturalism in Nyāya Epistemology Moral Naturalism References Chapter 35 The Natural History of Shame and its Modification by Confucian Culture Shame as a Behavioral, Emotional, and Cognitive adaptive System What Is Shame? Why Is a Sense of Shame Thought to Be an Adaptation in Social Primates? Shame in Early Confucianism Social Disarray and Violence in the Warring States Achieving Social Status: The Goal of a Good Confucian Early Confucian Texts Use Shame to Promote Nonviolence and Cooperation Early Confucianism’s Influence Present in a Unique Shame Profile in the Present-Day Confucian Diaspora Confucian Diaspora Populations Have a Unique Shame Profile Shame’s Utility for Social Governance, Political Order, Parenting, and Pedagogy in China Conclusion Acknowledgements References Index EULA "Since the turn of the twenty-first century, naturalism has become one of the most prominent philosophical orthodoxies in the Western academy. Yet naturalism is more often assumed than defended. The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism offers a systematic introduction that defines, discusses and defends philosophical naturalism. Essays tackle naturalism's role in existing cultural conversations, from Libertarianism to Confucianism, and provide detailed examinations of philosophical concepts like metaphysics, realism, feminism, science, free will, and ethics as viewed through a naturalist lens. With contributions from an international array of established and emerging scholars from across the humanities, the collection encapsulates contemporary debates in the field. The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism provides an enlightening and accessible guide for self-identified naturalists and philosophy students who are new to naturalism alike"-- Provided by publisher